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Abstract 
The adaptive cycle metaphor provides insight into how and why social-ecological systems change. 
Literature on 'resilience thinking' has built upon this foundation and further developed the concepts of 
resilience, adaptation, and transformation to describe social-ecological system behavior. The 
resilience-thinking literature also describes systems that do not change, even when such change is 
desirable, as being in a trapped state. However, relatively little research has explored why such 
systems are trapped and how to free them. This thesis is the product of doctoral research which 
resolves how to identify, evaluate, and free a system caught in a maladaptive system trap. The study 
setting is water management in Grenada, a small island developing state in the southeastern 
Caribbean. Four research questions guide this study: (1) To what extent is Grenadian water 
management in a trap?, (2) To what extent is Grenadian water management transformable?, (3) Do 
current and recent interventions effectively foster or utilize transformability?, and (4) Which 
interventions should be pursued to facilitate transformation of water management in Grenada?. The 
study is informed by literature on social-ecological systems and integrated water resources 
management.  
Methodologically, the study is an explanatory single-case study of water management in 
Grenada, conducted from 2012 to 2013. The study utilizes data from semi-structured interviews 
(n=19), a questionnaire (n=180), a document review (n>200), and observation. The general strategy 
was to evaluate attempts to transform Grenadian water management within the 3-phase 
transformation framework described in the resilience-thinking literature. 'Points of failure' in 
transformation are defined as the cause(s) of a trap, and interventions to relieve the points of failure 
are proposed. 
Results indicate Grenadian water management is in a rigidity trap, although it exhibits some 
capacity to transform. A key point of failure of attempts to transform the Grenadian water sector into 
an integrated and holistic management system has been an inability to seize windows of opportunity 
to pass key legislation. I conclude the primary cause for this failure is poor fit among the problem, as 
perceived by various stakeholders, the proposed solution prescribed by water sector reform 
proponents, and political reality. In addition, reform proponents focus on advocating for reform to 
water sector professionals and do little to broker passage of legislation politically. Finally, reform 
proponents also assume legislation will be effectively implemented, which is not certain. 
Contributions specific to the Grenadian setting include a post-mortem on why efforts to reform 
the water sector have failed, described above. Five recommendations are made for future 
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interventions to foster transformation of Grenadian water management: (1) engage residents as part of 
a vision to create political pressure for proposed solutions, (2) frame the problem with substantial 
resident input and focus, (3) craft solutions which take advantage of political realities such as funding 
restrictions, (4) anticipate and prepare for crises, and (5) enlist one or more people or organizations to 
serve as brokers. Empirical contributions include support for the three-streams framework of seizing 
windows of opportunity as fundamental to explain transformation of social-ecological systems. The 
primary conceptual contribution is the development of resilience thinking to illuminate ways to free 
trapped systems. I begin by providing a nomenclature to quantify and describe traps, which includes 
the type of trap, the degree of persistence and undesirability of the trap, and recent changes in these 
properties. Then, I develop a framework to assess transformability of a given system based on the 
existing 3-phase framework of transformation. When applied empirically, this framework illuminates 
points of failure of transformation, which I define as the cause of a given trap. Once identified, 
specific strategies can be devised to foster transformation and to break free of a trap. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The past 150 years of economic growth around the globe have powered an unprecedented 
improvement in living conditions for most people. Advancements in disciplines such as engineering, 
economics, and public health have helped create a world with previously unimaginable access to 
resources and wealth, while extending global average life expectancy to nearly 70 years of age 
(World Bank 2011). For example, in 2010, 87% of the world’s population met the WHO/UNICEF 
definition of having access to 'improved' sources of drinking water (World Health Organization and 
UNICEF 2010). Advancements in public health and medicine have neutralized diseases such as 
influenza, polio, and smallpox that once caused untold pain, suffering, and death throughout the 
world. The scale and pace of wealth and economic growth in the 21st century is unprecedented. In an 
economic sense, these advancements are due to a spectacular and accelerating division of labor 
(Smith 1776 [1976]; Sachs 2005) made possible by the confluence of conditions favorable to the 
globalization of goods and services.  
However, a serious problem exists. Living conditions have been slow to improve for many 
people, particularly those in less developed countries (LDCs). This phenomenon is nothing new, since 
inequitable access to resources has likely existed from the beginning of humankind. Thinkers as 
diverse as Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx famously grappled with many of the issues seen today. 
Countless accounts of poverty and inequitable resource distribution exist in the literature and many 
have stimulated social and political movements.   
Independent of the academic and political hand wringing over the causes of inequitable 
distribution of resources, the consequences are stark. A dramatic disparity exists in the distribution of 
wealth among and within nations. Davies et al. (2008) report that the richest 2% of individuals control 
over half of global wealth, while the bottom 50% of individuals cumulatively control barely 1% of 
global wealth. While 87% of the world’s population has access to improved sources of drinking 
water, the 13% that does not represents over 800 million people. And 39% of the world’s population, 
over 2.6 billion people, lack access to basic sanitation (World Health Organization and UNICEF 
2010).  
Paradoxically, this disparity persists even as vast resources flow from more developed countries 
(MDCs) to LDCs to improve living conditions. Over $120 billion of development assistance money 
now flows to LDCs annually (Deutscher 2010). Most of this aid is channeled through aid agencies 
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often criticized for inefficiency and waste (Easterly and Pfutze 2008) and ineffectiveness (Easterly 
2006). Some authors acknowledge difficulties with giving foreign aid but champion present and 
future global efforts such as the Millennium Development Project (Sachs 2005). But others have gone 
so far as to claim that foreign development assistance does harm and should be abandoned (Moyo 
2009). At the very least, the debate over foreign aid underscores the notion that assisting the 
developing world is a complex issue fraught with difficulties. 
Development problems in LDCs are often challenging for a number of reasons. The actors 
often see the same problem differently from their respective positions. The contrasting viewpoints of 
Sachs (2005), Easterly (2006), and Moyo (2009) are one illustration of this reality. Some may deny a 
problem exists at all (Simon 1996) or try to undermine others trying to act (Inhofe 2012). When the 
actors cannot agree that a problem exists, or on exactly what the problem is, coordinated efforts to 
improve the issue can be elusive. Furthermore, even when actors can agree on a specific problem, 
solutions may not exist in an ideal form, and alternatives may be unknown or may not yet exist. 
Choices are usually not between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; many times the best that can be hoped for is 
better. Rittel and Weber (1973) coined the term ‘wicked problem’ in the planning literature to 
describe this type of situation.  
The wicked nature of many development problems and the growing angst with the status quo of 
foreign assistance points to a need to approach old problems differently and from fresh perspectives. 
Indeed, the current condition persists despite the cumulative contributions of many smart and talented 
people and vast investment of resources. If the solution is to apply greater effort in the same ways, 
development would likely not still be a problem. It is my contention that the solution likely lies in 
approaching the same problems in different ways and in ways customized for each setting. 
1.1 Defining the Study 
The study is designed to flow schematically in an hourglass form, illustrated in Figure 1.1. The 
downward flow represents study design; the upward flow represents interpretation of data collected, 
answering the problem statement, and ultimately making a contribution to knowledge. 
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Figure 1.1. Schematic of research design, featuring the roles of data interpretation and 
contribution to knowledge. 
1.1.1 Statement of Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this study is to determine actions most likely to stimulate transformation of Grenadian 
water management. The scope is defined geographically to include the main island of Grenada. 
Additionally, the term water management refers to the management of the freshwater resource; 
supply of potable water to residents, industry, and agriculture; and recognizes linkages to other 
stakeholders at a wide range of scales. The term 'transformation' is defined in Section 2.2.1. 
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1.1.2 Problem Statement 
The problem pursued in this study is, How do traps and transformability affect progress of Grenadian 
water management? Progress is defined relative to resident wellbeing, as discussed in Section 4.1. 
Answering this question is intended to fill knowledge gaps, address the statement of purpose, and 
facilitate a change in the experience of living in the Caribbean depicted in Figure 1.1. This question is 
informed by academic literature as described in Chapter 2, particularly literature on social-ecological 
systems (SES3
1.1.3 Research Questions and Objectives
), resilience thinking, and integrated water resources management (IWRM). This 
problem statement is crafted to ensure the study is relevant to resident wellbeing, but retains a focus 
on traps and transformability of Grenadian water management. 
 
The study is further designed with four research questions and seven objectives, summarized in Table 
1.1. Once answered, the objectives should answer each research question. Likewise, answers to the 
four research questions should solve the problem statement. The full study design is depicted in 
Figure 1.2.  
Table 1.1. Summary of the research questions and objectives. 
Research question #1: To what extent is Grenadian water management in a trap? 
 
Objective #1A: To create a literature based evaluation framework to assess traps 
 
Objective #1B: To apply the evaluation framework to Grenadian water management 
Research question #2: To what extent is Grenadian water management transformable? 
 
Objective #2A: To create a literature based evaluation framework to assess transformability of water 
systems 
 
Objective #2B: To apply the evaluation framework to Grenadian water management 
Research question #3: Do current and recent interventions effectively foster or utilize 
transformability? 
 
Objective #3: To determine if a lack of transformability is inhibiting efforts to improve Grenadian water 
management 
Research question #4: Which interventions should be pursued to facilitate transformation of 
water management in Grenada? 
 
Objective #4A: To identify which aspects of the system are the key points preventing change 
  
Objective #4B: To determine the most effective ways to relieve, or marginalize, the key points preventing 
change 
 
                                                     
3 Social-ecological systems is a term used to acknowledge the interdependence of social systems and 
ecological systems and that neither type of system can be understood in isolation.  
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Figure 1.2. Schematic structure of study, featuring linkages among research components. 
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1.2 Study Area 
Selection of a manageable and well-defined study area and specific problem is important to develop 
insight relative to the conceptual knowledge gaps in the academic literature. Large systems quickly 
become unwieldy and difficult to study. For example, trying to explain the dysfunction of the United 
States congressional system from an SES perspective would likely be untenable. An ideal study 
location is one with definite boundaries, is small, but is similar enough to other contexts that its study 
may serve as a model for larger systems. 
Small island developing states (SIDS) may present a uniquely manageable opportunity to study 
the dynamics of social change, particularly with regard to water management. Population sizes and 
land areas are commonly small and easier to approach than those in continental settings. Additionally, 
SIDS typically have better defined boundaries. In a literal sense, the boundaries are well defined as 
shoreline, which usually reduces or eliminates overlapping jurisdictions over a common fresh water 
resource and simplifies the approach to water management. In a broader geographical context, the 
remoteness of SIDS tends to dampen outside influences. However, it is acknowledged that SIDS are 
not simply small, manageable, LDCs. They have unique attributes and the setting of each SIDS must 
be carefully considered before extrapolating judgments to other settings.  
Water resource management on the island of Grenada (pronounced 'gri-ney-duh') was chosen 
as a single case study for several reasons. First, the small island setting provides a manageable sized 
system to study with well-defined boundaries, both politically, and in terms of fresh water resources. 
Second, this island experiences many of the same difficulties facing other small island states 
throughout the world, particularly concerning water resource management. Third, similar to other 
LDC settings, relatively large amounts of foreign aid are routinely targeted at improving water supply 
and management in Grenada. Fourth, I resided in Grenada for most of the past 7 years, working in the 
Department of Public Health at a local university, and have accumulated a breadth of knowledge of 
the island and access to key persons in the water sector that would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere 
in the timeframe of a PhD project. Finally, as discussed further in Chapter 3, conducting a single case 
study rather than a multi-case study enables a more in-depth analysis. This strength admittedly comes 
at the price of the breadth of analysis afforded in a multi-case study approach.  
The nation of Grenada is located between the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, at the 
southern end of the Windward Islands (Figure 1.3). Politically, the nation of Grenada consists of three 
populated islands, the islands of Grenada, Carriacou, and Petit Martinique. The latter two islands are 
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sparsely populated, do not have water distribution infrastructure, and rely 100% on rainwater 
harvesting to meet water needs. This study does not consider the outlying islands. 
 
Figure 1.3. Map of Grenada. Figure adapted from images in The World Factbook, published by 
the US Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on 15 March 2012 at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gj.html. 
1.2.1 Geography of Grenada 
Grenada is classified as an upper-middle income country by the World Bank with a per capita income 
of $7,710 US, measured in terms of 2009 purchasing power parity (World Bank 2011). The nation 
has a population of approximately 110,000, almost entirely on the main island of Grenada. As of 
2012, there is a net migration of people moving away from Grenada, reflected in an emigration rate of 
3.3 migrants per 1,000 population per year (Central Intelligence Agency 2012). Despite emigration, 
the birth rate (16.6 per 1000 people) is relatively large compared to the death rate (8.0 per 1000 
people) and Grenada experiences modest population growth of 0.5% annually. 
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The island of Grenada is approximately 30 km (19 mi.) in length, north to south, and 15 km (9 
mi.) in width, from east to west, with a total land area of approximately 286 km2. The island is 
volcanic in origin and mountainous, rising to an elevation of 840 m (2,760 ft.; Caribbean 
Conservation Association 1991). Similar to other small, volcanic islands, the mountainous island 
terrain forms many long, narrow watersheds (Figure 1.4). The island is located on the 12th parallel 
North and has a tropical climate, moderated by northeast trade winds and year-round seawater 
temperatures of 27-30° C.  
 
Figure 1.4. Watersheds of Grenada. Figure created using the Grenada Water Information 
System, May 7, 2012. http://www.cariwin.gd/webmap/app/db/index.php. 
Precipitation on the island varies over space and time. The nearly constant trade winds blow 
warm moist air over the island from the east, resulting in large amounts of orographic precipitation in 
the interior of the island (Figure 1.5). However, the island experiences distinct dry (January – May) 
and wet (June – December) seasons (Figure 1.6). This seasonal variability is driven by the annual 
north and south migration of the North Atlantic high pressure cell. During the wet season months, this 
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high pressure zone migrates northward, causing the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone to migrate 
northward and over the Caribbean. This results in a convergence and uplifting of surface winds over 
the Caribbean, which drives precipitation during this time of year. During the dry season, the opposite 
situation occurs. The North Atlantic high pressure cell, and therefore the Inter-Tropical Convergence 
Zone, migrate southward, causing lower-tropospheric divergence over the Caribbean and subsidence 
of surface winds, which greatly reduces precipitation during this time of year (Stephenson, Chen, and 
Taylor 2008, p. 87).  
 
 
Figure 1.5. Average annual precipitation in Grenada. Figure adapted from CEHI (2006b). 
Interannual variability in precipitation is also significant and responds strongly to the El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO). During an ENSO event, the North Atlantic high pressure cell 
strengthens and expands toward the equator, causing higher sea-level air pressure and lower surface 
water temperatures over the Caribbean. The effect of these developments is for a decrease in 
precipitation over the Caribbean during ENSO events, although the full relationship is considerably 
more complex than presented here (Giannini, Kushnir, and Cane 2000). Droughts in Grenada 
correlate with ENSO-intensified dry seasons and represent the times the water supply is most stressed 
with regard to producing sufficient water to supply the nation.  
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Figure 1.6. Average monthly precipitation in Grenada. Figure adapted from CEHI (2006b). 
1.2.2 Water Management Challenges and Solutions 
Fundamentally, Grenada has an abundance of freshwater resources. Although reliable estimates of per 
capita water supply do not exist, a tropical rainforest exists within 10 kilometers (6 miles) of every 
residence. Nonetheless, water management in Grenada faces many challenges and water shortages 
continue to exist. 
Water is generally supplied to residents through a system of diverting source water from high-
elevation streams to treatment plants and then distributing treated water to residents at lower 
elevations. A distinct advantage of this system is that it utilizes gravity to distribute water and greatly 
reduces the need for costly pumping. However, the rugged terrain also reduces opportunities for easy 
diversion or distribution of water from one watershed to another. As a result, the water supply system 
uses 33 relatively small water treatment plants, most of which use surface water from small streams, 
and a water distribution system with limited ability to move water from watersheds with excess water 
resources to watersheds in need of greater water supply.  
Seasonal water shortages in Grenada result from a combination of factors. Some water 
treatment plants are particularly vulnerable to dramatic seasonal fluctuations in source water. The 
Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI; 2006a) identified five treatment plants that collect 
water from catchments with greater dry-season potential evapotranspiration (PET) than dry-season 
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rainfall. Stated another way, if actual evapotranspiration (ET) is at or near PET in these catchments, 
any water flowing in the stream must originate from groundwater storage. This contributes to 
vulnerability to water shortages during drought conditions.  
Additionally, difficulties in diverting water around the island make areas with high populations 
vulnerable to dry season shortages. On balance, Grenada has vast freshwater resources. But the bulk 
of the population is located in the southwest corner of the island. The lack of ability to divert 
sufficient water from other watersheds often contributes to seasonal water shortages. In some cases, 
shortages occur despite the presence of abundant water resources a few kilometers away.  
All of these problems could be relieved if sufficient water could be stored from wet season to 
dry season. Unfortunately, options for water storage are limited. In concept, a large dam could be 
constructed to store water from wet season to dry season. Even if this were a cost-effective solution, 
the rugged terrain precludes easy distribution of water from any central location to other parts of the 
island. Another option is to construct many moderate size dams to store water and supply water 
treatment plants around the island. However, this option is not considered in the water authority’s 
current 5-year plan (NAWASA 2009). Large storage tanks could also be constructed throughout the 
island to store potable water for times of shortage. Large storage tanks are used in some parts of the 
island, but expansion of their use is not presently under consideration.  
An added challenge posed by poor water storage options is that sediment-laden water is 
frequently flushed into streams, and into water intakes, after significant rainfall events. Most water 
treatment plants lack the ability to let heavy sediment loads settle from water being treated. In these 
cases, the plant operators choose between closing the treatment plant until the source water clears, 
which causes a supply disruption to residents, and supplying sediment-laden water to the distribution 
system. However, only two of the 20+ treatment plants that utilize surface water in Grenada are 
staffed outside of normal business hours. If the rainfall occurs during these non-staffed times, 
sediment-laden water flows through the unstaffed water treatment plants and enters the distribution 
system.  
Finally, the mountainous terrain and deficiencies in the water distribution system cause 
difficulty in maintaining consistent water pressure. Spikes in water pressure can rupture household 
fixtures and cause frequent breaks in the distribution system. This can further exacerbate water 
quality and quantity problems.  
Technical solutions exist to overcome supply problems, both at the resident and water authority 
levels. Residents can, and many do, store rain or piped water in plastic water tanks or cisterns under 
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their homes. The water authority could utilize additional streams or establish intakes and treatment 
plants farther downstream than presently located to expand source water supply. Use of groundwater 
also could be expanded. Water use could be reduced; leakage could be reduced in the water 
distribution network, or policies to promote water use efficiency and conservation could be 
implemented. 
The current state of water supply in Grenada is a product of the existing water management 
system. Technical solutions to management challenges have been implemented to varying degrees 
and water supply has improved in recent decades.4
Shortcomings of Grenadian water management have been recognized, and domestic and 
international efforts to transform the water sector into a holistic and integrated management system 
are ongoing. Despite these efforts, change remains elusive. This dissertation describes a research 
effort to explain why Grenadian water management resists change. Furthermore, this research 
assesses strengths and weaknesses in current intervention efforts and prescribes interventions likely to 
stimulate transformation of Grenadian water management.
 Nevertheless, solvable supply shortages persist. 
The fundamental issue is likely not a lack of water or technical solutions; the fundamental issue is that 
existing water resources and technical solutions are insufficiently managed.  
5
1.3 Description of Dissertation Organization
 Beyond the case, this research contributes 
a generalizable nomenclature to quantify and describe traps. It also advances the concepts of 
resilience thinking and provides a generalizable strategy of seeking out and alleviating points of 
failure in transformation to free trapped systems.  
 
This thesis utilizes a traditional structure, similar to that used in most scientific journals and as 
discussed in Yin (2009, Kindle location 3540). First, the study problem is defined and background 
information is presented. Relevant literature is then discussed, followed by presentation of the 
research design and study methodology and the results of data collection. An analysis of the results is 
                                                     
4 Data to document trends in the frequency and severity of water supply shortages does not exist. To judge 
these parameters, I relied on observation, document, interview, and questionnaire data. Similarly, no long-
term (>10 years) records of streamflow exist and almost no streamflow data exist at all. No water demand 
forecasts have been made. Overall population is relatively stable (Section 1.2.1), but trends in urbanization are 
difficult to discern until data from the 2009 census are published (results from the 2000 census were not 
published until 2009). All of these data would be useful to develop a quantitative assessment of trends in 
water shortages. 
5 As stated in Section 1.1.2, the problem statement guiding this study is crafted to retain relevance to resident 
well being, but a focus on the SES concepts of traps and transformability. In particular, recommendations 
made in this study are intended to help Grenadian water management overcome any traps and to enable it to 
transform, but do not address the 'best' type of system Grenadian water management should transform into. 
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then presented, followed by the study conclusions and implications. Accordingly, the remaining 
chapters of this thesis are: 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review, 
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, 
Chapter 4 – Grenadian Water Management System, 
Chapter 5 – Traps and Transformations, 
Chapter 6 – Breaking the Rigidity Trap, and 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion. 
  
14 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides a discussion and evaluation of academic literature relevant to this study as well 
as context for the position of this study with respect to current scientific knowledge. Within this 
discussion, research gaps and opportunities for contributions to the literature are identified. In 
particular, I argue that a synergy exists among the concepts of transformability, MS traps, and IWRM, 
but such synergy should be validated through research of real SESs. I have structured the chapter in 
five sections as follows: 
• The first section presents the conceptual framework of resilience thinking, which guides the 
design and interpretation of the study. 
• The second section builds upon the discussion of resilience thinking and focuses specifically 
on transformation of SES. In this section, I scrutinize current research and delineate research 
gaps relevant to this study.  
• The third section presents a parallel discussion on MS traps in SESs, and also scrutinizes 
current research and delineates research gaps.  
• The fourth section presents a discussion of the literature on IWRM. The recent attempt to 
implement IWRM in Grenada is arguably the best example identified in this study to 
illustrate the dynamics of transformation and MS traps. The discussion of the academic 
literature on the normative principles of IWRM and the difficulties with implementing them 
in an operational sense serves as a basis for discussing the study results.  
• The fifth and final section summarizes the key findings of the literature review and draws 
conclusions. Discussion focuses on how these three literatures connect to frame this study 
and highlight how knowledge gaps will be filled.  
I do not discuss all potentially relevant literature to this study. In the presence of the expansive 
and fragmented academic literature and in an environment of finite resources, I decided to review a 
subset of the relevant literature. Furthermore, the literature discussed in this chapter is a subset of all 
the literature considered in preparing this study.  
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
I use the term conceptual framework to denote the set of principles with which I “analyze, 
understand, and prescribe” actions to resolve dilemmas specific to my case. In contrast, I consider the 
term theoretical framework to denote a set of principles to “describe, explain and predict” at a nearly-
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universal level (Mitchell 2008, p. 141-2). For example, Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection 
can be applied to describe, explain, and predict the evolution of life forms the world over. However, 
there is no nearly universal principle to describe, explain, and predict persistent, wicked problems 
such as how to bring about change in a society. These problems often involve learning through trial 
and error and lateral thinking to approach the issue from multiple angles until something works. A 
more reasonable, and still useful, target is to aim to analyze, understand, and prescribe solutions for 
these cases. Basic principles and generalizations can serve as reference points to navigate wicked, 
persistent problems and I refer to these guideposts as a conceptual framework.  
2.1.1 Resilience and Resilience Thinking 
The fundamental goal of the study is to illuminate ways to foster resilience in Grenadian water 
management. In this sense, I tentatively describe resilience as ability of a system to ‘absorb shocks’ 
when disturbed. The study helps identify strategies to make Grenadian water management better able 
to overcome shocks such as drought, infrastructure failures, and funding shortfalls, and still deliver 
high quality water service to users. 
Literature on social-ecological systems provides considerable commentary on how to 
conceptualize resilience. Holling (1973) introduced the concept of stability domains to describe the 
extent to which one type of system, an ecosystem, could be disturbed while still being ‘able to get 
back’ to its original form. Holling also introduced the concept of thresholds as being the ‘tipping 
point,’ or the point at which a disturbed ecosystem would "flip" (p. 9) to a different form. These 
concepts were used to explain why abrupt, dramatic, and often permanent changes in ecosystems 
occurred following disturbances that had previously caused modest and reversible changes to system 
behavior. Examples in the SES literatures of such ‘flipping behavior’ include insect outbreaks in 
forest ecosystems (Ludwig, Jones, and Holling 1978), eutrophication of lakes (Scheffer et al. 1993; 
Carpenter and Cottingham 1997), and societal collapses and processes of social collapse and renewal 
(Homer-Dixon 2006).  
Scheffer et al. (1993) and Gunderson (2000) used a 'ball-in-cup' heuristic to describe the 
concept of stability domains, thresholds and ‘flipping behavior’ of ecological systems (Figure 1.2). In 
the ball-in-cup illustration, the ball is defined to be the state of a given SES, and the cup is defined to 
be a stability domain. At equilibrium, the ball rests at the bottom of the ‘cup.’ If the ball is disturbed, 
signified by pushing the ball away from the equilibrium point, it will normally return to the bottom of 
the cup. However, if the ball is pushed ‘too far,’ it will cross a threshold and trigger rapid and 
turbulent change, and move toward a new equilibrium in a new stability domain. In this analogy, the 
16 
 
term resilience is defined as the capacity for a system to absorb disturbance and remain in the same 
cup, or stability domain.  
 
Figure 2.1. Ball in cup heuristic used to describe social-ecological resilience. The state of the 
system is represented as a ball, the valleys, or cups, are defined to be alternative stability 
domains. Figure redrawn from images in Carpenter and Gunderson (2001, p. 454). 
The adaptive cycle (Holling 1986) and panarchy (Holling 2001) explain key aspects of 
resilience. The adaptive cycle is a metaphor to describe the dynamics of SES change (see Walker and 
Salt 2006, p. 31-36). Within the social-ecological systems literature, systems are observed to pass 
through four distinct phases that form a cycle. The four phases are growth and exploitation (r), 
conservation (K), release (Ω), and reorganization (α). Holling (1986) first presented the adaptive 
cycle graphically as a ‘sideways figure 8’ with a Y-axis of potential and X-axis of connectedness 
(Figure 2.2). Later representations include a Z-axis of resilience (Figure 2.3; Holling 2001). Holling 
(2001, p. 394) provides crucial definitions for these axes. The potential axis6
                                                     
6 Terminology for the Y-axis of the adaptive cycle has been variable in the literature. Holling (2001) described 
the Y-axis using both “potential” and “wealth.” In describing lock-in traps, Allison and Hobbs (2004) used the 
term “potential” as well as the terms “capacity” and “capital” to illustrate the dynamics of trapped systems. 
The terms capital and wealth are perhaps used to emphasize the accumulation of resources or to provide 
better integration of the adaptive cycle analogy to other disciplines as discussed in Abel, Cumming, and 
Anderies (2006, p. 3). Gunderson, Holling, and Allen (2010, p. 436) provide a table similar to Table 2.1 that 
provides both terms, “capital/potential.” All of these terms are consistent with the meaning of the axis, as 
defined in Holling (2001), which is to determine the limits of what is possible, or the options for the future. I 
choose to use the term potential because it is most common in the literature.  
 is defined as 
determining the limits of what is possible, or as the options for the future. The connectedness axis is 
defined as “the degree to which a system can control its own destiny.” Finally, the resilience axis is 
defined as “how vulnerable the system is to unexpected disturbances and surprises” (Holling 2001, p. 
394) and is essentially a measure of how well the system is able to stay in ‘one cup,’ as depicted in 
Gunderson (2000). Walker et al. (2004) point out the adaptive cycle does not mean systems always 
cycle through these stages in sequence and many permutations of system behavior are possible. The 
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concept of panarchy (Figure 2.4; Gunderson and Holling 2002), defined below, was developed to 
illustrate that adaptive cycles exist at many scales, both within a SES and among SESs. Many of these 
adaptive cycles interact and can profoundly influence the stability of any given system, enhancing or 
reducing resilience.  
 
Figure 2.2. 2-D representation of the adaptive cycle with axes of potential and connectedness. 
Modified from Panarchy edited by Lance H. Gunderson and C.S Holling. Copyright © 2002 
Island Press. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC. 
 
Figure 2.3. 3-D representation of the adaptive cycle with axes of potential, connectedness, and 
resilience. Modified from Panarchy edited by Lance H. Gunderson and C.S Holling. Copyright 
© 2002 Island Press. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC. 
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Figure 2.4. Graphical representation of the panarchy metaphor. From Panarchy, edited by 
Lance H. Gunderson and C.S Holling. Copyright © 2002 Island Press. Reproduced by 
permission of Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Unfortunately, it is easier to define what resilience is than to explain how to get it. To help fill 
this gap, resilience thinking has emerged in academic literature as a metaconcept7 which describes 
how to foster resilience. Resilience thinking describes the full range of factors that affect change in 
SESs, and is governed not only by resilience, but also by adaptability and transformability (Figure 
2.5; Walker et al. 2004; Walker and Salt 2006). 8
Walker et al. (2004) further described resilience as having four key aspects: latitude, 
precariousness, resistance, and panarchy. Latitude is the amount a system can be changed before 
crossing a threshold into a new stability domain. This can be thought of as the width of the cup. 
Resistance is the difficulty of moving the system and can be thought of as the steepness of the cup. 
Precariousness is how close the system is to a threshold and can be thought of as how close the ball 
is to the top of a cup. Panarchy is a metaphor for the effect of influences from other scales on the 
system and can prevent, or cause, the system to cross thresholds.  
  
                                                     
7 A metaconcept is defined herein as a concept devised to analyze another concept. 
8 Walker and Salt (2006) provide the earliest use of the term ‘resilience thinking’ in the literature. Use of this 
term to describe how adaptability, resilience, and transformability work in concert to affect social-ecological 
systems has grown increasingly common, although its application remains inconsistent. Notably, Gunderson, 
Holling, and Allen (2010, p. 423) acknowledged use of this term to “capture a coherent set of notions that 
together produce a framework for conceptualizing and explaining how systems of humans and nature 
behave.” 
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Figure 2.5. Depiction of how adaptability, transformability, and resilience act to affect social-
ecological system behavior in the resilience-thinking framework. 
Resilience and adaptability are closely related in that resilience is the capacity of a system to 
remain in one stability domain, or ‘cup,’ while adaptability is defined as “the capacity of the actors 
in a system to manage the system's resilience” (Walker and Salt 2006, p. 119).9
                                                     
9 Many terms with the root word 'adapt' exist within the social-ecological systems literature. At least 13 such 
words are used throughout this thesis. In many cases, the proliferation of 'adapt words' is grammatical in 
nature (e.g., adapt, adapting, and adapted; adaptive and adaptiveness). In other cases, confusion results from 
inconsistent use in the literature (e.g. adaptability and adaptive capacity). Where appropriate, I confront the 
confusion directly, define the meaning of each term, and omit further use of particularly confusing 'adapt 
terms' (e.g. adaptive capacity, see Section 2.1.1). Ultimately, my use of these terms is a reflection of the social-
ecological systems literature.  
 In practice, 
adaptability is achieved by manipulating the four key properties of resilience to prevent the system 
from falling into a different stability domain, or ‘cup.’ In a natural resource management context, 
management actions can attempt to purposefully move a system away from a threshold or prevent it 
from moving toward a threshold. Management actions can also manipulate the position of the 
thresholds, or alter the shape of the cup. For example, to avoid social disruption in response to climate 
change, managers could choose to encourage cultivation of new crops that may be better adapted than 
current crops to future climatic conditions. In effect, this would ‘widen the cup’ and increase the 
latitude that the system can be pushed before crossing into an undesirable stability domain, in this 
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case to social disruption. Other management decisions could be targeted at improving the healthcare 
system to provide some social resistance to future disease conditions. Management efforts can also be 
taken to identify situations in which the system is precariously close to existing thresholds and to 
move the system farther away from those thresholds. For example, if unprecedented tropical storms 
are expected in the future because of climate change, management actions could be targeted at 
preparing for such storms. Finally, the concept of panarchy can be utilized to affect the stability of a 
given SES, as described below. 
Walker and Salt (2006, p. 119) state explicitly that the concept of adaptability is equivalent to 
adaptive capacity. The distinction between adaptability and adaptive capacity elsewhere in the 
literature is subtle and often avoided. Some authors avoid using both terms in the same publication 
(Walker et al. 2004; Walker and Salt 2006), others equate the two terms outright (Holling 2001, p. 
394), and The Resilience Alliance offers subtly distinctive definitions for both in a glossary of terms 
posted on its web page (http://www.resalliance.org/608.php). For the purposes of the current 
discussion, the two are treated as equals, and the term adaptability is preferred to avoid confusion 
between the terms adaptive capacity and adaptive cycle.  
 Transformability is the capacity of a system to ‘reinvent itself’ when the form of the current 
system is deemed untenable. Walker and Salt (2006, p. 62) define it as “the capacity to create a 
fundamentally new system when ecological, social, economic, and political conditions make the 
existing system untenable.” It is the ability to recognize when the system is better off not remaining in 
the same cup, to identify or create a better cup to move to and then to move there. In the ball-and-cup 
heuristic, resilience and adaptability were focused on keeping the ball in a stability domain. 
Transformability does the opposite; it focuses on moving the ball to a new domain.  
2.1.2 Traps 
Empirical observations of SESs following the idealized trajectory provided by the adaptive cycle 
framework are limited. In fact, SESs often do not follow the trajectory indicated by the adaptive 
cycle. These non-conforming systems have been termed maladaptive (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
and described as being in a pathological state (Allison and Hobbs 2004). Relatively little research 
exists to explain the reasons and consequences for maladaptive system behavior. In some cases, 
influences through panarchy or fundamental failures in the SES prevent progression through the 
adaptive cycle and result in a non-desirable and stubbornly persistent ‘trapped’ state (Allison and 
Hobbs 2004; Abel, Cumming, and Anderies 2006; Bunce et al. 2009). The existence of a poverty trap 
and a rigidity trap was discussed briefly in Gunderson and Holling (2002, p. 95-98). A lock-in trap 
was later described by Allison and Hobbs (2004), who also hypothesized the existence of one more 
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as-yet unobserved maladaptive system. This fourth trap, was later termed an isolation trap (Table 2.1; 
Gunderson, Holling, and Allen 2010).  
Table 2.1. The eight positions a system may occur within the adaptive cycle, if system potential, 
connectedness, and resilience are each assigned a 'high' and 'low' value. Table adapted from 
Allison and Hobbs (2004). 
  Potential Connectedness Resilience Description in Literature 
K (Conservation) High High Low Holling 1986 
Ω (Release) Low High Low Holling 1986 
α (Reorganization) High Low High Holling 1986 
r (Exploitation) Low Low High Holling 1986 
          
Rigidity trap High High High Gunderson and Holling 2002 
Lock-in trap Low High High Allison and Hobbs 2004 
Poverty trap Low Low Low Gunderson and Holling 2002 
Isolation trap High Low Low Gunderson, Holling, and  Allen 2010 
 
Both rigidity and lock-in traps occur when a system is maintained in the K phase of the 
adaptive cycle for a prolonged period. However, not all systems that persist in the K phase will fall 
into one of these traps, or are even undesirable. In fact, corporations go to great lengths to maintain 
high levels of production characteristic of the K phase, while mitigating the likelihood of a large, 
corporation-wide breakdown (Gunderson and Holling 2002, p. 95). Corporations achieve this state by 
maintaining many small adaptive cycles within the company, such as a research and development 
division, designed to produce variability and creativity. Lockheed-Martin’s famed ‘skunkworks’ 
project is one such example (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Variability is managed internally and 
corporation-wide rigidity is avoided. The corporation can anticipate or respond more quickly to 
market changes and maintain the productivity of being in a K phase without experiencing the risk of a 
dramatic breakdown. In essence, what separates a ‘bad’ K phase from a ‘good’ K phase is 
adaptability and transformability occurring at smaller scales within the panarchy (Gunderson and 
Holling 2002, p. 402). A rigidity trap results when a system in the K phase is made or becomes 
increasingly rigid over time. Panarchy influences often contribute to rigidity by preventing 
breakdown and change of a system. If the resources available within the system for rebuilding a new 
future system are slowly lost over time, a lock-in trap results (Allison and Hobbs 2004). Nations run 
by corrupt dictatorships often fit this description. When these dictatorships eventually fall, a nation 
may be left with little to rebuild with (Laurance 2004). 
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Poverty traps, in the context of maladaptive systems, occur when a SES has low connectedness, 
potential, and resilience (Table 2.1; Holling 2001). These conditions may come about in different 
ways. If the breakdown experienced in the Ω phase of the adaptive cycle is sufficiently severe to 
prevent the reorganization of capital, or destroys most or all the capital in a system so that there is 
nothing left to reorganize, then a poverty trap results. The poverty trap condition is also, perhaps, a 
logical continuation of rigidity and lock-in traps. The result of a lock-in trap is a system with low 
potential (or wealth), high connectedness, and high resilience. If a lock-in trap continues for an 
extended period, the loss in potential (or wealth) can be extreme and undermine system 
connectedness, the degree to which a system controls its own destiny. The resulting system is low in 
connectedness and potential (or wealth) and high in resilience. However, when the conditions that 
perpetuate the lock-in trap change and resilience is reduced, a poverty trap results.  
2.1.3 Alternative Approaches 
I recognize academic perspectives other than resilience thinking could be used to inform this study. 
Some, such as governance (Gelcich et al. 2010), diffusion of innovation (Rogers 2003), and policy 
transfer (Mukhtarov 2007), provide broad frameworks to approach problems or even to define ideal 
solutions to strive for in working through problems. Many more, such as psychological empowerment 
(Menon 1999), critical consciousness (Freire 2005), and community-based social marketing 
(McKenzie-Mohr 2000), provide tools useful to sort through difficult aspects of problems. Resilience 
thinking complements, overlaps, and perhaps restates some of these other options and its use should 
not be considered mutually exclusive with other approaches. For example, the application of 
resilience to sustainable development is documented in widely cited publications authored by most of 
the key authors in the resilience field (e.g., Folke, Carpenter, Elmqvist, Gunderson, Holling, Walker 
et al. 2002). Ultimately, each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. I chose resilience 
thinking for the conceptual framework of this study because it offers a set of principles useful to 
analyze, understand, and prescribe actions to resolve complex social issues, yet is accommodating of 
insight from other perspectives. Literatures and approaches that inform, complement, or provide 
alternatives to resilience thinking are discussed as appropriate. 
2.2 Transformability 
The concept of transformation of social systems is not new to the academic literature. Thomas Kuhn’s 
celebrated text on the structure of scientific revolutions dates to the early 1960s (Kuhn 1962) and 
other examples date to the early 20th century or even before (Hildreth 1853; Ellwood 1905). Within 
the literature on resilience, use of the terms transformation, used to describe a fundamental change in 
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a SES system, and transformability, used to describe the potential for such change, is relatively 
recent. Early works considered observed ecological transformations. Examples include observations 
of ecosystem transition from grass- to woody-dominated rangelands (Walker et al. 1981; Walker, 
Langridge, and McFarlane 1997) and from clear lakes to turbid lakes (Scheffer et al. 1993; Carpenter 
and Cottingham 1997). Gunderson (2000) utilized the ball-in-cup heuristic to describe the behavior of 
SESs and illustrate transformation as the movement of a system from one cup to another (Figure 2.1). 
Below, I focus on the development of the concept of transformability within the resilience-thinking 
literature, provide discussion about gaps in knowledge, and identify ways to fill those gaps in the 
current study.  
2.2.1 What is Transformability? 
Academic attempts to explain transformation within the SES framework are a relatively recent 
development. The landmark ‘panarchy publications’ of C.S. (Buzz) Holling and Lance Gunderson 
(Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002) built upon previous work and greatly advanced the 
academic understanding of SES behavior, notably by presenting the concept of panarchy for the first 
time. These publications advanced the conceptualization of transformation beyond ‘cup to cup’ 
movements. Both publications explained transformation as a response to conditions such as loss of 
diversity within an SES, a change in the surrounding environment, and disturbance. However, the two 
‘panarchy publications’ left many unanswered questions. For example, neither publication provided a 
definition for transformation or explained how it relates to other key concepts in resilience thinking. 
The widely cited publication of Folke et al. (2002) also provided a description of transformability, but 
similarly did not define the term. In 2004, Brian Walker et al. published a paper aptly titled, 
Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems that provided the first 
explicit definition for transformability. Walker et al. (2004) also clarified the relationship between 
transformability and other key concepts in resilience thinking (Figure 2.2). Two years later, Brian 
Walker co-authored a book titled, Resilience Thinking (Walker and Salt 2006) that elaborated on the 
points presented in his 2004 publication and provided extensive case-study support. 
The definition of transformability provided by Walker et al. (2004, p. 62) is “the capacity to 
create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, social and political conditions make 
the existing system untenable.” In terms of the Gunderson (2000) ‘ball in cup’ analogy, 
transformability is the ability to recognize when the system is best served by moving to a different 
cup and then moving to that new cup.  
The Walker definition remains the most widely cited definition in the SES literature by a wide 
margin, although other variants occasionally appear (Table 2.2). For example, Chapin et al. (2009, p. 
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241) defines transformation as a “fundamental change in a social–ecological system resulting in 
different controls over system properties, new ways of making a living and often changes in scales of 
crucial feedbacks.” To date (2012), no other publications in the academic literature have adopted this 
definition. Folke et al. (2011, p. 724) essentially rephrase the first half of the Walker definition and 
retain its second half: “The capacity to create untried beginnings from which to evolve a 
fundamentally new way of living when existing ecological, economic, and social conditions make the 
current system untenable.” Folke et al. (2011) was authored by 22 individuals, including most of the 
key authors in the resilience-thinking field, notably Brian Walker. The Folke et al. (2011) definition is 
also used in Westley et al. (2011). The significance of the change in wording between the 2004 
Walker definition and the 2011 Folke definition is not discussed in the literature, nor did Westley et 
al. (2011) indicate a reason for using the Folke definition. As of 2012, the Walker et al. (2004) 
definition remained in the glossary of terms maintained on the Resilience Alliance website 
(http://www.resalliance.org/) and is the definition used in this study. Some authors (Moore and 
Westley 2011; Schoon et al. 2011) have endorsed the notion that transformation is simply a larger 
version of adaptation. Nuances in the distinction between the terms ‘transformation’ and ‘adaptation’ 
are discussed further in a following subsection.  
 
Table 2.2. Summary of definitions for ‘transformation’ from the resilience-thinking literature. 
Selected Publication 
from the Literature on 
Resilience Thinking 
Google 
Scholar 
Citations,             
Sept. 2012 
Definition of 
Transformation 
Description of How 
Transformation Occurs 
Holling 2001                                                                     1,095 None given As part of the adaptive cycle 
Gunderson and Holling 
2002 2,116 None given As part of the adaptive cycle 
Folke et al. 2002                                                               897 None given A response to a large system shock 
Walker et al. 2004                                                           901 First explicit definition of transformability Not Provided 
Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 
2004 232 
Complies with                         
Walker et al. (2004) 
First explicit conceptual 
framework to describe 
transformability   
Walker and Salt 2006 584 From Walker et al. (2004) Not Provided 
Gunderson and Light 2006 75 None Given 3-phase framework is inferred (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004) 
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Selected Publication 
from the Literature on 
Resilience Thinking 
Google 
Scholar 
Citations,             
Sept. 2012 
Definition of 
Transformation 
Description of How 
Transformation Occurs 
Olsson et al. 2006 279 None Given 3-phase framework                                  (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004) 
Anderies, Walker and 
Kinzig 2006 119 From Walker et al. (2004) Not Provided 
Walker et al. 2006 305 From Walker et al. (2004) Not Provided 
Folke 2006 804 From Walker et al. (2004) Not Provided 
Gunderson et al. 2006 62 From Walker et al. (2004) Not Provided 
Olsson et al. 2008 82 None given Not Provided 
Chapin et al. 2009 79 Provides a new definition 3-phase framework                                  (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004) 
Folke et al. 2010 83 From Walker et al. (2004) 3-phase framework                           (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004) 
Gelcich et al. 2010 41 From Walker et al. (2004) 3-phase framework                             (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004) 
 
Finally, I highlight one nuance in my use of the term transformation. In common, non-technical 
language, transformation describes any large change in appearance or structure. This type of 
transformation is often brought about by abrupt, unexpected shocks to the system and the new form 
that emerges is anything but intentional. The unexpected, unintentional type of transformation 
referred to in common language is precisely what resource managers try to avoid. As mentioned 
earlier, resilience thinking is a metaconcept to explain and illuminate how to foster resilience. In the 
resilience thinking sense, transformation is a tool to steer a system away from the 'large, unintentional 
transformation.' It is a relatively orderly and intentional transition to a more desirable state.  
2.2.1.1 Transformability and Resilience 
Transformability is also a fundamental component of resilience thinking, but acts to weaken 
resilience. In the ball in cup analogy, transformability is the ability of the system to move to a 
different cup. In this respect, transformability and resilience are opposed. In a practical sense, it may 
help to consider resilience as something that is not always good. For example, being stuck in a dead-
end job may be a resilient situation, but in this case resilience is ‘bad.’ When an opportunity arises to 
move to a better job, transformation is ‘good’ in that it improves the overall situation.  
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2.2.1.2 Transformability and Adaptability  
To understand the relationship between resilience and adaptability, it is important to recognize the 
precise meaning of adaptability. Adaptability is one component of resilience thinking, and is defined 
in Section 2.2.1 as “the capacity of the actors in a system to manage the system's resilience” (Walker 
and Salt 2006, p. 119). In the ball in cup analogy, adaptability is the capacity to manipulate the shape 
of the cup to prevent the system from falling into a different cup.  
Adaptability operates through similar mechanisms as transformability, but has an opposite 
function. Both adaptability and transformability change the resilience of a system by manipulating the 
four key characteristics of resilience: resistance, precariousness, latitude, and panarchy. However, 
adaptability acts to strengthen resilience whereas transformability acts to weaken resilience. In the 
ball in cup heuristic, adaptability is the ability to manipulate the shape of the cup to move the ball 
away from thresholds, and transformability is the ability to manipulate the shape of the cup to move 
the ball over thresholds.  
Other views on the distinction between adaptability and transformability have been expressed 
in the resilience-thinking literature. Some authors describe transformation as simply being a larger 
form of adaptation (Moore and Westley 2011; Schoon et al. 2011). Issues of scale and panarchy also 
serve to complicate the distinction between adaptation and transformation. Schoon et al. (2011) 
contend that transformability and adaptability are two ends of the same continuum and their 
difference depends on the scale of interest and perspective used. To paraphrase their discussion, one 
person’s adaptability is another’s transformability. To illustrate the importance of scale and panarchy, 
Folke et al. (2010) stress that adaptation and transformation commonly occur simultaneously at 
different levels within the same panarchy. Consider a panarchy linking a community, the local water 
authority, and employees within the water authority. Presume the water authority recognizes a need to 
protect the community better from disinfection byproducts in the water supply. The water authority 
could reassign some of its engineers to focus on reducing disinfection byproducts. Thus, adaptability 
at the community level, expressed as a marginally decreased health risk, actually depends on 
transformability at the water-authority employee level, expressed as a fundamentally new job function 
for specific employees. Folke et al. (2010) refer to this concept as multiscale resilience.  
To summarize, my interpretation of the resilience-thinking literature is that transformability is 
the ability to move a system to a different stability domain, while adaptability is the ability to 
manipulate a system to remain within the same stability domain. The two concepts work in concert 
via panarchy linkages, but the degree to which they operate by similar mechanisms remains unclear in 
the literature. The crucial distinction, however, is that the two terms indicate actions in opposite 
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directions; one stabilizes a system, the other destabilizes a system. This study is underpinned by the 
understanding of resilience thinking described above.  
2.2.2 The Transformation Process 
The landmark 'panarchy publications' of Holling (2001) and Gunderson and Holling (2002) provided 
a dramatic advance in the conceptual understanding of resilience thinking. Unfortunately, these and 
other early works provided limited guidance on the nature of transformation, indicating that it simply 
occurs as part of the adaptive cycle or in response to a large shock to the system (Folke, Carpenter, 
Elmqvist, Gunderson, Holling, and Walker 2002). Olsson, Folke, and Hahn (2004) provided the first 
framework in the SES literature to explain transformation as a deliberative process, not a simple 
reaction to external shock. The Olsson, Folk, and Hahn framework consists of three phases and 
utilizes a window of opportunity (Figure 2.6). The first phase is preparation for transformation, 
followed by seizing a window of opportunity. The second phase is navigating the transition and the 
third phase is stabilizing the new regime.  
Subsequent resilience-thinking literature on transformability has either endorsed or inferred 
acceptance of the Olsson 3-phase framework, particularly to describe purposeful transitions from one 
natural resource management practice to another (Table 2.2). Some literature provides valuable 
insight into specific aspects of transformation but does not directly interpret it within the context of 
the 3-phase transformation framework. Nevertheless, these insights are relevant and can be applied to 
one or more of the three phases. Therefore, I utilize the Olsson 3-phase framework to frame 
discussion of the process of transformation.  
 
Figure 2.6. The 3-phase framework of social-ecological system transformation. Phases 1 and 2 
are linked by seizing a window of opportunity. Figure adapted from Olsson et al. (2010). 
Phase 1: 
Prepare for 
Transformation Phase 3: 
Stabilize the new 
systemSeize a 
Window of 
Opportunity
Phase 2: 
Navigate the 
Transition
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2.2.2.1 Preparing for Transformation: Networks and Bridging Organizations 
Early works based on case studies of transformation made basic observations of 'essential ingredients' 
for successful preparation for transformation. First, establishing a common acknowledgement among 
stakeholders of the need for transformation, or at least a willingness to go along with it appears to be 
important (Gunderson 1999; Anderies, Walker, and Kinzig 2006; Olsson et al. 2006). Second, these 
same authors cite a loose agreement on how to facilitate the transformation as being key and 
acknowledge both these points present a challenge to resource managers.  
Two basic views have emerged in the literature to explain how a system proceeds through the 
first phase of transformation. The first of these views I interpret as the 'networks and bridging 
organizations perspective;' the second is provided by the 'three-streams framework,' (Kingdon 
1995 [2003]), which I discuss in the next section. The former is essentially a collection of 
observations and hypotheses regarding factors that usher a system through the first phase of 
transformation, while the latter is a far more structured 'framework' to describe the same. It is not 
clear to what degree these literatures are complementary, or mutually exclusive, and both have 
occasionally been discussed in the same publication (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004; Olsson et al. 
2006).  
Figure 2.7 provides my interpretation of the 'networks and bridging organizations perspective,' 
based on synthesis of available literature. Olsson et al. (2006, n.p.) described networks and bridging 
organizations as "critical factors for transforming social-ecological systems" and provided 
commentary on how these factors interact. In this context, the term social network refers to the 
linkages and ties among system actors. Actors can refer to any entity, a government agency, private 
party, or other stakeholder that directly influences the SES of interest10
The exact form of the social network in Figure 2.7 is variable, although to foster learning and 
trust effectively within the system the network must be inclusive of diverse viewpoints and 
knowledge and safe for the members to communicate freely. This is particularly relevant to the 
degree of formality in the network, a point expanded upon below.  
 (Gunderson et al. 2006). The 
key function of these networks is to foster learning and trust within the system.  
 
                                                     
10 The term 'stakeholder' denotes all entities with an interest in the system. The term 'actor' denotes 
stakeholders that may affect the system. 
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Figure 2.7. The 'networks and bridging organizations perspective' to describe critical factors of 
preparing the system for transformation. 
The literature repeatedly discusses three forms of successful social networks with varying 
degrees of formality: epistemic networks (Gunderson et al. 2006), shadow networks (Gunderson 
1999), and bridging organizations (Olsson et al. 2007). Epistemic networks are groups that enable 
the exchange of information and ideas among members with contrasting viewpoints (Olsson et al. 
2006). The term shadow network refers to a group that exists informally and is politically 
independent, removed from regulation and implementation (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al. 2006). 
The benefit of the informal nature of these groups is the members are freer to exchange information, 
think about creative solutions, and consider a wider variety of options since members are not 
necessarily under the direct scrutiny of their employers (Olsson et al. 2006). Bridging organizations 
are formal in nature and emerge on an ad hoc basis as a means to bridge actors across multiple scales 
(Folke et al. 2005; Gunderson et al. 2006). From these descriptions, it can be inferred that these 
classifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may work together. For example, a shadow 
network is distinctive in its informal nature and could be considered a type of epistemic network. In 
addition, bridging organizations commonly provide a venue for epistemic networks to operate 
through activities such as workshops. Information networks is another term used in the resilience-
thinking literature to refer to these networks in general terms (Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 2011) 
and a significant literature specific to networks also expands on these concepts beyond what is 
represented here.  
Case studies of attempts to transform resource management regimes illustrate the value of 
networks to navigate transformative change. Olsson et al. (2006) reviewed five case studies of 
attempted transformations in water management and found that suitable networks were established 
among stakeholders in the Kristianstads Vattenrike catchment in Sweden and the Everglades in the 
United States, and were instrumental in the successful transformation to adaptive management 
regimes. Gunderson (1999) cites stakeholder networks as being instrumental in multiple 
transformations of Everglades management systems. In contrast, attempts to transform management 
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of the Northern Highlands Lake District in Wisconsin and the Mae Nam Ping Basin in Thailand 
highlight stakeholder networks which did not develop and transformation of a management system 
did not occur (Olsson et al. 2006).  
A critical aspect of the social networks described above is that they must have a safe arena to 
operate in (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004). This characteristic has been described as a crucible 
(Gunderson et al. 2006) and an incubator of new management approaches (Folke et al. 2005). From a 
logistical perspective, members of these networks may need more free time to participate and 
opportunities to interact. In addition, the groups themselves may need financial support as well as 
management help to support routine operations. The more formal varieties of networks, particularly 
bridging organizations, tend to excel in this regard (Biggs, Westley, and Carpenter 2010). However, 
several authors have noted that informal networks tend to be more successful arenas for promoting 
innovative approaches to management (Gunderson 1999; Folke et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). 
These authors have observed that actors are more likely to leave entrenched positions and think 
together when removed from the scrutiny of the public, employing agencies, and constituencies, as 
well as the need for political maneuvering. 
Many authors have stressed the role of leadership in fostering the formation and maintenance of 
the social networks described above (Folke 2006; Gunderson and Light 2006; Olsson et al. 2006). 
Gunderson et al. (2006, n.p.) describe leadership as the “the oil that keeps the network lubricated.” If 
leadership breaks down, problems tend to arise throughout the transformation process. For example, 
in their case study of water management in the Goulburn-Broken Catchment of southeast Australia, 
Olsson et al. (2006) describe how misguided political leadership prevented transformation by 
championing adaptation strategies rather than pursuing transformation of the system. Gunderson et al. 
(2006) observed that a lack of regional leadership was also a likely impediment to transformation in 
the North Highland Lakes District in northern Wisconsin.  
While there is agreement on the importance of having a leader emerge to shepherd the system 
through the process of transformation, less agreement exists about the characteristics of that leader. 
Drawing on the organizational science literature, some authors have evaluated transformational 
leadership through the academic lens of social entrepreneurship (Biggs, Westley, and Carpenter 2010; 
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010). Olsson, Bodin, and Folke (2010) discussed successful social 
entrepreneurship. These authors report the literature has been more effective at explaining the success 
of an entrepreneur based on the social connections around the entrepreneur than based on 
characteristics of the entrepreneur.  
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Drawing further from the literature on social networks, Olsson, Bodin, and Folke (2010) 
describe the leaders who enhance transformability as having diverse and strong panarchy connections 
to other levels. The ability of actors to precipitate change is a function of their connectedness and 
their ability to take advantage of that connectedness. This finding is consistent with broader literature. 
For example, Malcolm Gladwell's The Tipping Point describes key tipping actors as having many 
diverse and loose connections to facilitate information flow as well as strong connections that foster 
the trust of other actors (Gladwell 2000). 
Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011) evaluated connections within networks to gain a better 
picture of the environment in which a policy entrepreneur11
System-wide learning is a product of the social networks described above, when operated in an 
appropriate arena for discourse (Gunderson et al. 2006; van der Brugge and van Raak 2007). System 
actors learn to reframe problems, view issues from others’ perspectives, and explore avenues of 
cooperation (Biggs, Westley, and Carpenter 2010). Trust among actors can be built, sense-making 
and innovation can occur, collaboration can emerge, and conflict can be avoided (Olsson, Folke, and 
Hahn 2004; Olsson et al. 2006). New ways of managing natural resources can emerge and an 
opportunity for successful transformation emerges. One common tactic among case studies of 
successful transformations in water management is promotion of scenario building exercises among 
stakeholder groups (Folke et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2006). Scenario building is widely recognized as 
an important tool for creating change (Maas and Maas 2009; Bishop and Strong 2010). One reason 
for its effectiveness in contributing to systemic change may lie in its ability to strengthen ties and trust 
within the system, and build common knowledge and leadership within the system. As noted in the 
following sections, scenario building also aids managers to navigate the uncertain transition phase of 
transformation. 
 for transformation is likely to succeed. 
Their work discussed unsuccessful attempts to transform water management in two separate cities in 
Mexico. They observe that close connections between an actor and family and friends can make an 
actor rigid in the context of cooperating with diverse management concerns. A more ideal situation is 
to have more equality between the bonds that hold an actor in place and the bonds to other 
stakeholders and a commitment to the greater good. This conclusion, in turn, is reminiscent of the 
observation of Gunderson (1999) that if resilience or flexibility among actors is low, it is simply not 
possible to transform the system and manage adaptively.  
                                                     
11The term 'champion' also occurs in the literature to describe people instrumental in changing a system. 
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2.2.2.2 Preparing for Transformation: The Three-Streams Framework 
Application of the three-streams framework to the resilience-thinking framework was first proposed 
by Olsson et al. (2006), who adapted the concepts from Kingdon (1995 [2003]). This framework 
describes three 'families of processes,' which Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 87) terms the three 'streams' 
of problem, solution,12
 
 and politics. At special times, these three streams come together (Figure 2.8) 
to allow a system to pass through a window of opportunity for transformation. Joining the three 
streams and seizing windows of opportunity are discussed in detail in the following section, 2.2.2.3.  
 
Figure 2.8. Graphical depiction of joining the three streams of problem, solution, and politics. 
Kingdon's 1995 work is a revised edition of a textbook first published in 1984 (Kingdon 1984). 
Kingdon (1984), in turn, draws from an earlier work titled, A garbage can model of organizational 
choice (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). These earlier authors described four streams13
The garbage can model contrasts sharply with rational problem solving in explaining how 
organizations act to solve problems. In rational problem solving, problems are first identified, then 
alternative solutions are considered, and finally the best alternative is chosen and acted on (Marston et 
al. 2003). The opposite occurs in the garbage can model of organizational choice. In the garbage can 
model, people define solutions which benefit them in some way and then search for a problem to 
which to attach their solution. Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 86) describes the garbage can model as: 
 in developing 
a 'garbage can model' to explain organizational choice in university settings, but it is also applicable 
in certain contexts such as public policy making.  
                                                     
12 Kingdon (1995 [2003]) used the term 'policy' rather than 'solution' on p. 87, but also used the term 'solution' 
in other passages. Olsson et al. (2006) used the term 'solution' to describe this stream, nomenclature which I 
retain here. 
13 The four streams described by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) are problems, solutions, participants, and 
choice opportunities. 
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People do not set about to solve problems [in the garbage can model]. More often, solutions 
search for problems... Nor do they go through a prescribed logical routine: defining the problem, 
canvassing the possible solutions, evaluating the alternatives in terms of their ability to solve the 
problem at the least cost. 
Whether or not a given solution is acted upon depends on joining a proposed solution to a recognized 
problem and generating political support for action, collectively referred to as joining the three 
streams of problem, solution, and politics (Kingdon 1995 [2003]; Olsson et al. 2006).  
Kingdon (1995 [2003]) considers the garbage can model applicable to organizations 
characterized as: (a) 'organized anarchies,' which feature poorly defined or conflicting problems; (b) 
having membership without solid understanding of how the organization operates; and (c) having 
imprecise participation in making decisions, for example by whichever people who happen to attend a 
given meeting. In other words, cases of transformation in water management are often well suited to 
the garbage can model. Mucciaroni (1992) provides a critique of the garbage can model and a recent 
edited book examines the garbage can model in considerable depth (Lomi and Harrison 2012), with 
contribution from the authors of the seminal 1972 publication (Cohen, March, and Olsen 2012).  
In the problem stream, perceptions, power, and crisis govern how and why attention is given to 
one problem rather than another. People inevitably perceive aspects of any issue differently, 
depending largely on how they are affected. For example, raising taxes is likely to be perceived 
negatively by those who will pay more and positively by people who benefit from government 
programs enhanced by the tax increase. Power relations further determine why attention is paid to one 
problem rather than another. Stakeholders with power have a disproportionately strong influence on 
which problems are addressed. Crises often elevate certain conditions to 'problem status' and create 
political incentive to address them. Kingdon (1995 [2003]) discusses budget crises as an unusual, but 
important, type of crisis. Budget crises can constrain or promote the chance for a given condition to 
be defined as a problem (Kingdon 1995 [2003]). For example, during a budget crisis, issues perceived 
to be expensive to address are likely to be ignored regardless of merit. However, issues perceived as a 
way to save money may quickly be defined as a problem worth solving. 
The solution stream has been described as a 'primeval soup' of proposals, containing a wide 
range of potential solutions for any given problem. In the words of Kingdon (1995 [2003]): 
... ideas are floated, bills introduced, speeches made; proposals are drafted, then amended in 
response to reaction and floated again. Ideas confront one another ... and combine with one 
another in various ways. The "soup" changes not only through the appearance of wholly new 
elements, but even more by the recombination of previously existing elements. ...as in a natural 
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selection system... Some ideas survive and prosper; some proposals are taken more seriously than 
others. 
Solutions are advocated by policy entrepreneurs, people who invest in a given policy in hopes of a 
future return such as career advancement, job security, or the satisfaction of seeing the advancement 
of a policy with which they agree. Usually, the solution stream is prone to inertia and resistant to 
promoting new ideas. Policy entrepreneurs engage in 'softening up' the system by sensitizing key 
actors to the merit of their pet solutions. 'Softening up,' described in Kingdon (1995 [2003]), is time 
consuming and difficult, but enables proposals to gain political traction. From Kingdon (1995 [2003], 
p. 128): 
It takes a long time to educate people. And then once you get them educated, you have to build up 
some power to do something. Educating people is very time consuming and energy consuming. 
and: 
A proposal... has to go through a gestational period. It takes a number of years. 
Eventually, perhaps years later and through processes of persuasion and diffusion, a solution may 
gain an audience and reach a tipping point to gain widespread recognition. Then, when a window of 
opportunity presents itself, a path has been paved to advance the given solution. 
The political stream comprises factors dictating which solutions gain political support. Key 
factors include the political mood of a country or organization, lobbying efforts, elections, the 
ideology of the ruling political party, and turnover of persons with decision-making power (Kingdon 
1995 [2003]). Consensus building in the political stream is achieved through bargaining and building 
political coalitions. As Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 159-160) states, "Joining the coalition occurs not 
because one has simply been persuaded of the virtue of that course of action, but because one fears 
that failure to join would result in exclusion from the benefits of participation."  
A crucial aspect of Kingdon's three-streams framework is the complementary roles of advocacy 
and brokering. Advocacy denotes general actions intended to persuade others to accept the merit or 
need for a policy or idea. Brokerage is a distinct set of actions that join the three streams. Kingdon 
(1995 [2003], p. 183) describes these activities (emphasis added): 
...calling attention to the special role entrepreneurs play in joining the streams highlights two 
rather different types of activity. Advocacy is involved, but so is brokerage. (Policy) entrepreneurs 
advocate their proposals, as in the softening up process in the policy stream, but they also act as 
brokers, negotiating among people and making critical couplings. Sometimes, the two activities are 
combined in a single person; at other times, entrepreneurs specialize, as in the instance of one 
pushing from an extreme position and another negotiating the compromises. This emphasis on 
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coupling shifts our focus from invention, or the origin and pushing of an idea, to brokerage. 
...Inventors are less important than entrepreneurs. 
In the three-streams framework, the essence of preparing the system for transformation is advancing 
the streams through advocacy so that policy entrepreneurs may join them via brokerage when a 
window of opportunity arises. The role of brokerage is of primary importance to the following 
section. Finally, my use of these terms is limited to the definition described here and does not reflect 
the relatively large academic literature dedicated to advocacy and brokerage.  
2.2.2.3 Windows of Opportunity 
Windows of opportunity link the first two phases in the transformation framework (Olsson, Folke, 
and Hahn 2004). Huitema and Meijerink (2010, n.p.) summarize Kingdon's view of windows of 
opportunity as "particular moments in time (for instance an election or disaster) that offer 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to launch and gain support for new policy proposals." In terms 
of the Olsson 3-phase framework of transformation, windows of opportunity are the times when 
policy entrepreneurs can join the three streams and propel the system from the first phase, into the 
second phase.  
Before continuing with a description of how windows of opportunity are seized, I recognize 
two important limitations of this discussion. First, relatively little of the transformation literature has 
considered how windows of opportunity are seized. In particular, the transformation literature on 
networks and bridging organizations provides insight to what factors are important in transformation, 
but says little about how windows are seized. Within the transformation literature, the three-streams 
framework (Kingdon 1995 [2003]) is, by a wide margin, the most explicit framework used to describe 
how windows are seized; nevertheless, it is not widely utilized (Table 2.3). As a result, my discussion 
is 'Kingdon 1995 heavy.' Second, an abundance of applicable frameworks, theories, and approaches 
exists outside the relatively narrowly defined 'transformation literature.' Two examples are the 
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1987) and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991), both of which have been used to assess processes of change in social-ecological systems. 
I attempt to note the existence of many of these approaches and acknowledge their potential 
application to the 3-phase transformation framework. Furthermore, delineations between literatures 
are often poorly defined and overlap, which required 'judgment calls' to include specific publications 
in this discussion. For example, in building Table 2.3, I slightly stretched the boundaries of 
'transformation literature' and considered some publications that could be considered 'transitions 
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literature'14 and 'social innovation literature.'15
Table 2.3. Citation of Kingdon (1995), and discussion of brokerage and the three-streams 
framework in transformation literature. 
 In general, however, the scope of my discussion is 
limited to frameworks, theories, and approaches which have been applied explicitly to the 3-phase 
transformation framework (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004). 
Publication  Kingdon (1995) Brokerage Three-Streams 
Olsson Folke and Hahn 
(2004) 
Cited 
prominently Not explicitly discussed 
Mentions the three streams, 
their importance can be 
inferred 
Anderes, Walker, and 
Kinzig (2006) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Olsson et al. (2006) Cited prominently Not explicitly discussed 
Discussed explicitly and 
considered with regard to 
case study research 
Gunderson et al. 
(2006) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Gunderson and Light 
(2006) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Olsson et al. (2007) Cited prominently 
Discussed as a key to 
developing networks, not 
for joining the 3 streams 
Not explicitly discussed 
 
Gelcich et al. (2010)  
 
Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Olsson, Bodin, and 
Folke (2010) Not cited 
Defined and discussed as 
a key in developing 
networks, not for joining 
the 3 streams 
Not explicitly discussed 
                                                     
14 These publications were part of a 2010 special feature of Ecology & Society, titled Realizing Water 
Transitions: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs in Water Policy Change. I include these publications in Table 2.2 
to recognize more recent work utilizing the Kingdon three-streams framework and because the publishing 
journal, Ecology & Society, is operated by the Resilience Alliance and is associated with much of the literature 
discussed throughout this chapter. 
15 Some publications in Table 2.3 could be considered to be 'social innovation literature.' Moore and Westley 
(2011) describe social innovations as being similar to social-ecological system transformation. I include these 
publications in Table 2.3 because they are particularly insightful to critical aspects of SES transformation. 
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Publication  Kingdon (1995) Brokerage Three-Streams 
Huitema and 
Meijerink (2010)* 
Cited 
prominently Explicitly discussed Explicitly discussed 
Font and Subirats 
(2010)* 
Cited 
prominently Not explicitly discussed 
Discussed explicitly and 
considered with regard to 
case study research 
Werners, Matczak, 
and Flachner (2010)* 
Cited 
prominently Not explicitly discussed 
Discussed explicitly and 
considered with regard to 
case study research 
Meijerink and 
Huitema (2010)*  
Cited 
prominently Explicitly discussed Explicitly discussed 
Pelling and Manuel-
Navarrete (2011) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Westley et al. (2011) Not cited 
Discussed as a key to 
developing networks, not 
for joining the 3 streams 
Not explicitly discussed 
Schoon et al. (2011) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
Moore and Westley 
(2011) Not cited 
Discussed as a key to 
developing networks, not 
for joining the 3 streams 
Not explicitly discussed 
Armitage, Marschke, 
and van Tuyen (2011) Not cited Not explicitly discussed Not explicitly discussed 
* These papers were part of a special feature of Ecology & Society titled, Realizing Water 
Transitions: The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs in Water Policy Change.  
 
With regard to the three-streams framework, policy entrepreneurs join the three streams by 
generating political support to implement a given proposal to address a recognized problem. The 
tactics used to join the streams is described in Kingdon (1995 [2003]) as brokerage. Without 
brokering, political action is unlikely. Political maneuvering, deal making, and bargaining are aspects 
of brokering. However, Kingdon (1995 [2003]) dedicates much text to the topic of anticipating crises 
and planning for windows of opportunity as a crucial aspect of brokering. 
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Windows of opportunity usually open briefly and policy entrepreneurs must typically act 
quickly to join the three streams. Policy entrepreneurs can act faster and more effectively when a 
window opens if they prepare far in advance (Kingdon 1995 [2003]). Among other tasks, policy 
entrepreneurs can develop strategies and proposals to take advantage of likely problems, form 
political alliances, and anticipate opportunities to spring into action. The goal is to be positioned in 
advance to propose a solution viewed as appropriate and politically attractive when the window of 
opportunity opens. Waiting until the window opens to develop proposals and build alliances is a poor 
strategy for success. 
Fortunately, Kingdon (1995 [2003]) states many windows of opportunity occur predictably and 
provides examples of windows opened by political elections, budget cycles, and expiration of 
legislation. Furthermore, Kingdon discusses many windows as being predictable in form. 
Anticipating the timing and form of a window of opportunity will help policy entrepreneurs structure 
and prioritize preparations to seize the moment of crisis when it comes. To illustrate this point, 
Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 181-182) provided comments of an anonymous bureaucrat discussing 
prospects for legislation promoting energy conservation: 
I think... there should be a little group in a back room that is laying plans right now for how to 
handle the next Arab oil embargo. You want to be in a position to take advantage of times like that. 
[It] does not present itself too often, and you want to be ready to propose changes at the point 
that the opportunity does come along. 
The greater the variety of crises policy entrepreneurs prepare for, the greater the chance they will be 
able to seize the next window of opportunity, whatever it looks like.  
When policy entrepreneurs join the three streams, the window of opportunity is considered 
seized. Seizing a window of opportunity is critical to transformation, but does not guarantee it. 
Seizing a window only advances the system to the second phase in the Olsson 3-phase framework. 
Unless policy entrepreneurs execute later phases of transformation properly, transformation may stall 
or the final form of the system may morph undesirably. For example, Wilder (2010, n.p.) describes a 
situation in Mexico where, "legal modifications to the national water law that emphasize integrated 
watershed planning and local participation were approved in 2004 but have never been formally 
implemented." Furthermore, in discussing transformations in governance of Chilean marine coastal 
resources, Gelcich (2010, p. 16,795) explicitly reminds the reader that transformation involves more 
than seizing a window of opportunity such as passing key legislation: "legislation enabled a national-
scale transformation in governance... However, achieving this transformation was more complex than 
simply changing legislation."  
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2.2.2.4 Navigating the Transition 
Olsson et al. (2006) utilize the analogy of negotiating rapids in a canoe to illustrate the challenges of 
preparing for and navigating SES transformations. It is possible for a canoeist to prepare for running a 
section of rapids. The canoeist can develop skills to maneuver the boat, choose to enter the rapids in a 
favorable spot, and anticipate where corrective strokes may be required. In the end, however, the 
canoeist must execute the right moves at the right time to emerge at the bottom of the rapids in a 
desirable state. In this analogy, even the best preparations can prove fruitless if the wrong moves are 
made in the turbulent and rapidly changing arena of the transition phase. 
The experience of water management in the 1990s of the Goulburn-Broken Catchment in 
southeast Australia illustrates the importance of navigating the transition phase correctly (Olsson et 
al. 2006). An impending crisis in this catchment stimulated progress toward a fundamental change in 
water management for this system. The preparation phase of transformation was well executed and 
the stage was set for transformation to a more desirable system state. However, a critical mistake was 
to support and enable landowners to adapt to deteriorating conditions in the catchment rather than to 
support policy to transform the SES to a different and more desirable form. The effect of this decision 
was to derail transformation of the system, with substantial negative consequences. More than a 
decade after the missed opportunity described by Olsson et al. (2006), Walker et al. (2009) argue that 
water management in the catchment is still in need of transformation, and is in a poor position to do 
so. In the analogy described above, water managers entered the rapids properly, but missed the 
opportunity to navigate to safer water. The canoe struck a rock, capsized, and exited the rapids keel 
side up as it remained as of 2009.  
In general, relatively little resilience-thinking literature has discussed the transition phase of 
transformation. Olsson et al. (2006) attribute this gap to the unpredictable and turbulent nature of the 
transition phase; transition is not something that is planned, it is navigated. Some authors point to 
relevant literature on other academic topics as providing insight, notably on the literature on transition 
management (van der Brugge and van Raak 2007), and sociotechnical transitions (Folke et al. 2010). 
2.2.2.5 Building Resilience of the New Regime 
Literature on the 3-phase transformation framework offers little about the final phase of 
transformation, other than to acknowledge its existence (Folke et al. 2005; Folke et al. 2010; Gelcich 
et al. 2010). Olsson et al. (2010) argue that the key to a new and more desirable resource management 
regime is to establish itself in a network of collaborators and carve out a new, collective niche. 
Chapin et al. (2009) echo this point and add two more strategies to build resilience of a new regime: 
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(1) to enhance stewardship in the new system and (2) to support the involvement of key individuals in 
social networks for problem solving. 
2.2.3 Lessons Learned and Next Steps 
The transformation literature is limited in some important ways. In terms of geographical scope, only 
a handful of publications apply the concept of SES transformation in developing world settings, 
where transformations are arguably needed the most to address urgent humanitarian issues (Gelcich et 
al. 2010; Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 2011). To my knowledge, only two publications exist that 
have attempted to evaluate a SIDS for the presence of adaptive cycles: Bunce et al. (2009) on the 
semi-autonomous island of Rodrigues in the Indian Ocean and Found and Berbés-Blázquez (2012) in 
the Caribbean. 
One important gap in the transformation literature is a method for determining and describing 
the extent of transformability. It is intuitive that not all systems are equally 'transformable' or 'not 
transformable,' yet no method to quantify or describe this exists. If such a method existed, it would be 
easier to determine which systems are close to transforming and which systems are 'hopeless.' We 
could better judge the effectiveness of interventions, and it would be easier to draw attention to the 
specific point(s) of breakdown in transformation of trapped systems. 
The resilience-thinking approach to transformability is a relatively young and small niche in the 
literature, but provides a widely applicable and convenient framework to guide research and interpret 
future study. Most notably, tremendous opportunity exists to fill gaps using literature from dozens of 
other topics. To date, this strategy has been utilized to some extent, with the most successful attempts 
drawing heavily from the literature on social networks and especially governance. Additional 
application of these and other complementary literatures, verified with research specific to resilience 
thinking, is likely to be a ‘low-hanging fruit’ for future research. Further discussion on the scope of 
potentially useful literatures and their relevance in this study is provided at the end of Section 2.3.6. 
Some aspects of the case study are designed to advance the literature on transformation. First, 
the study is designed to document multiple transformative events and evaluate the appropriateness of 
the Olsson 3-phase transformation framework and the way by which windows of opportunity are 
seized. This study is also designed to evaluate the significance and characteristics of policy 
entrepreneurs and windows of opportunity. Finally, this study is designed to evaluate synergies in 
considering transformation and traps together. This last point is discussed further at the end of the 
section on MS traps.  
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2.3 Maladaptive System Traps 
Resilience of SESs is usually described in a positive light, as something to manage for or to value 
(Holling 1973; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Falkenmark and Rockström 2008). In this context, 
resilience indicates the ability of a system to adapt to change and persist, ‘in one cup’ in the 
Gunderson (2000) ball-in-cup analogy. However, a system can be too resilient and not change 
enough, even when it becomes advantageous to do so. One example is the large bureaucracy of the 
former Soviet Union that was infamously rigid and resistive to change long after it was clear that 
change was needed.  
The elegance of the resilience-thinking framework can be misleading when interpreting real-
world systems. The literature has had mixed success when explaining the behavior of real-world 
SESs. For example, Allison and Hobbs (2004) report remarkable success in the progression of the 
western Australian agricultural sector through adaptive cycles. They were able to identify two full 
iterations of the adaptive cycle. Similarly, Found and Berbés-Blázquez (2012) effectively used 
resilience thinking concepts to explain the 500-year persistence of sugarcane plantation landscapes in 
the Caribbean. These authors identified adaptive cycles at multiple levels of a social-ecological 
system and attributed resilience at the plantation landscape level to two transformations of how those 
plantations were operated, which permitted the plantation landscape to persist. In contrast to these 
relative successes, the experience of Abel, Cumming, and Anderies (2006) was not as clear cut. They 
studied social-ecological systems in Zimbabwe and Australia and found that the adaptive cycle 
process exists, but usually not in an ideal form and is often visible only in hindsight. They did, 
however, find the adaptive cycle useful in explaining system changes. Furthermore, Bunce et al. 
(2009) expressed frustration at not being able to identify any adaptive cycle behavior in their study of 
recovery from a SES collapse on Rodrigues Island in the Indian Ocean.  
Fortunately, a subset of the resilience-thinking literature has discussed the tendency of some 
systems to become ‘too resilient’ and not follow the classic adaptive cycle trajectory of breakdown, 
reorganization, and regrowth. These systems are described as maladaptive and their persistent, rigid 
states as traps. 
2.3.1 What are Maladaptive System Traps? 
The literature on resilience thinking first recognized the significance of systems that do not change 
over time as prescribed by the adaptive cycle framework approximately 10 years ago (Holling 2001; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002). Such systems were described as being maladaptive (Holling 2001) or 
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pathological (Allison and Hobbs 2004), reflecting their divergence from the adaptive cycle, and as 
being in a ‘trapped’ state, reflecting their failure to change over time.  
The literature provides little in the way of a definition, or even a consistently used term, to 
describe systems that fail to conform to the adaptive cycle. To provide a basis for studying these 
systems, I provide a term here and define it in the following paragraph. First, I combine descriptions 
in the literature of these systems as ‘maladaptive’ and ‘trapped’ to form the term maladaptive system 
trap (MS trap). To my knowledge, this term has not been used in the literature prior to this study. Past 
studies commonly refer to specific types of traps, but authors generally avoid referring to the general 
state of maladaptive systems as ‘trapped.’  
Second, based on a thorough review of the literature on maladaptive and trapped systems, I 
observed three fundamental traits common to all maladaptive systems discussed in the literature. 
These systems are considered both ‘trapped’ and ‘bad,’ in that they persist when it is better for the 
system to change. Furthermore, description of these systems as trapped and bad is relative (see 
Section 2.3.2). Therefore, I define a maladaptive system trap as a persistent and undesirable state, 
acknowledging that both 'persistent' and 'undesirable' are relative terms.  
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the adaptive cycle framework consists of three axes: potential, 
connectedness, and resilience (Figure 2.3). A system can occupy eight positions with regard to ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ levels of these three properties (23). The adaptive cycle describes four of these positions. 
The remaining four positions are occupied only by ‘maladaptive’ systems in a ‘trapped’ state. Each of 
these positions defines a distinct MS trap (Table 2.1). Holling (2001) and Gunderson and Holling 
(2002) recognized two types of MS traps: a rigidity trap and a poverty trap. Allison and Hobbs (2004) 
later recognized lock-in traps and proposed the existence of a fourth maladaptive system, recently 
described as an isolation trap by Gunderson, Holling, and Allen (2010).  
A rigidity trap is defined as a system position consisting of high potential, high connectedness, 
and high resilience. This trap was first recognized by Holling (2001) and Gunderson and Holling 
(2002) and is essentially a K-phase system that fails to lose resilience and proceed through the release 
phase of the adaptive cycle. Rigidity traps are often held in place through panarchy linkages that 
prevent change at the scale of interest. Such systems are highly productive, but lack flexibility to 
adapt when conditions change. Rather than collapsing as a ‘normal’ K-phase system would, 
something prevents the system from failing, usually through panarchy linkages. One highly visible 
example of this is government actions in the United States to bail out a banking system that is 'too big 
to fail.' An example from the resilience-thinking literature is the managing of the Maine lobster 
fishery as a monoculture of lobsters as described in Steneck et al. (2011). This system is highly 
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lucrative, so lucrative that there is great resistance to changing the management approach to foster a 
more diversified system. Since money is the underlying motivating factor that perpetuates the trap, 
Steneck et al. coin the term gilded trap to describe the situation, but it is essentially a rigidity trap. 
Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011) describe rigidity traps in two Mexican municipalities 
maintained largely by the structures of power within the system and their ability to manipulate the 
discourse and prevent conscientization, the psychological process of becoming aware of reality 
(Freire 2005).  
A lock-in trap is defined as a system with low potential, high connectedness, and high 
resilience (Allison and Hobbs 2004). This condition results when a system caught in a rigidity trap 
loses potential. This trap was first discussed in the resilience-thinking literature by Allison and Hobbs 
(2004) to describe the situation in a western Australia agricultural region in which management is 
‘mining’ the ecological resource for agricultural gains. In this case, agricultural management 
decisions were deeply entrenched and caused the land to become less able to support agriculture. 
However, as the land became less able to produce, the pressure to produce at a high level continued or 
even increased. This pressure further entrenched the existing land management practices and 
accelerated degradation of the land. Ultimately, the land was nearly totally depleted and a new and 
very stable and undesirable situation emerged, characterized by low productivity, diversity, and 
options. These authors coined the term 'lock-in' to reflect a similar situation in the economics 
literature, in which 'lock-in' describes an industry with high 'sunk-costs' leading it to deplete the 
resource it depends on. Examples of this phenomenon are often not described explicitly as being lock-
in traps but serve as excellent references. Notable examples are Uzbekistan water management as 
described by Schlüter and Herrfahrdt-Pähle (2011) and 'the tragedy of the commons' described in 
Garrett Harden’s celebrated essay (Hardin 1968).  
Both poverty traps and isolation traps are defined, in part, as systems with low resilience. There 
is an apparent contradiction between being ‘trapped’ while also being defined as having ‘low 
resilience’ that has not been confronted directly in the literature. In explaining this apparent paradox, I 
first draw attention to the working definition of MS trap described above, as a 'persistent and 
undesirable state.' The word ‘state’ is used to denote the distinct position in the adaptive cycle 
framework with regard to connectedness, potential, and resilience (Table 2.1). The word ‘persistent’ 
is used to denote that the state of the system persists over time and is not meant to describe a system 
that persists over time. In this context, the state of a trapped system can be defined as having ‘low 
resilience,’ resulting in a system that constantly changes form, but is unable to stabilize on any one 
form or change its position with regard to the adaptive cycle framework.  
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A poverty trap is defined as a system with low potential, low connectedness, and low 
resilience. This trap was first recognized by Holling (2001) and Gunderson and Holling (2002) and is 
essentially a system that emerges from the release phase of the adaptive cycle with no resources, no 
ability to reach out and gather resources, and little or no hope for revitalization. Systems in a poverty 
trap are erratic in their precise form, but very stable with regard to possessing low potential, 
connectedness, and resilience. This point is illustrated in the case study presented by Bunce et al. 
(2009). They observed a system that experienced a collapse, but rather than staging a recovery the 
system continued in what the authors described as being “stuck in post collapse recovery” (p. 223), in 
downward spirals without new structure emerging. The downward spirals have existed for over 100 
years, through many generations, leadership changes, and intervention efforts. Nevertheless, the dire 
situation facing the system of having low potential, connectedness, and resilience persists. Holling 
(2001) provides another ecological example of a system caught in a poverty trap, an overgrazed 
grassland savanna system that flips into a stable situation characterized by an eroded landscape with 
sparse vegetation. The eroded land depletes the ability for the soil to support vegetation, while the 
lack of vegetation promotes further erosion of the soil. Other examples have been documented. For 
example, Enfors and Gordon (2008) describe the frustrating rigidity of mechanisms that hold a 
dryland system in Tanzania in a poverty trap. Gunderson et al. (2006) describe the management 
system in the Wisconsin north highlands lake district as approaching a poverty trap, with connections 
within the system being too weak to mobilize resources or spread innovation. 
An isolation trap is defined as a system with high potential, low connectedness, and low 
resilience. Systems fitting this description are rare and only two publications in the resilience-thinking 
literature mention this type of trap. Allison and Hobbs (2004) noted the space for such a trap in the 
adaptive cycle analogy and hypothesized its existence. Later, Gunderson, Holling, and Allen (2010) 
coined the term isolation trap to denote isolated populations of plants or animals that are considered 
to be ‘threatened’ or ‘endangered.’ These systems have the capacity to grow into larger populations 
and persist, but are not resilient to disturbance. Their lack of resilience persists because of their 
isolation. I propose that isolation traps are less ‘trapped’ than other maladaptive systems and are 
prone to changing form and losing potential, thus morphing into poverty traps. An example of this is 
an isolated and endangered population that, because of its low resilience, experiences a disturbance 
and goes extinct.  
2.3.1.1 Variability within the Literature 
Considerable variability exists within the resilience-thinking literature regarding MS traps. Carpenter 
and Brock (2008) provide a subtly different definition for a poverty trap as a system with low 
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connectedness, low resilience, and an unrealized potential for change. The last portion of this 
definition contradicts definitions provided in prior literature (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Allison 
and Hobbs 2004) and later literature has defined such a system as being in an isolation trap 
(Gunderson, Holling, and Allen 2010). Carpenter and Brock (2008) also define a rigidity trap as 
having low potential, high connectedness, and high resilience. This view contradicts the previously 
accepted definition of a rigidity trap (Holling 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002) and in fact is 
precisely the definition given elsewhere in the literature for a lock-in trap (Allison and Hobbs 2004; 
Gunderson, Holling, and Allen 2010). Carpenter and Brock (2008) also appear to have 
misrepresented Allison and Hobbs (2004) as describing the western Australia agriculture system as 
being in a rigidity trap rather than a lock-in trap.  
Alternate visions of MS traps also appear in other publications. Biggs, Westley, and Carpenter 
(2010, n.p.) refer to a poverty trap as being “stuck in the α phase” and a rigidity trap as being “stuck 
in the K phase” of the adaptive cycle. These explanations may be thought of as over simplifications 
and contradict the definitions for rigidity and poverty traps described above. Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 
(2010, p. 265) acknowledged lock-in traps, but then did not recognize that if a system in a rigidity 
trap loses potential it is then in a lock-in trap. Finally, Schoon et al. (2011) describe a persistent K-
phase of the adaptive cycle as a 'lock-in situation,' but don’t acknowledge the term ‘trap’ in their 
discussion. In this study, I use the definitions for traps provided in the previous section and avoid all 
of the alternate visions of MS traps presented in this section. 
The four types of maladaptive systems have had variable significance to the resilience-thinking 
literature. Nearly all publications that discuss maladaptive systems acknowledge, define, or describe 
rigidity traps or poverty traps. However, isolation traps and lock-in traps are often ignored. As stated 
above, isolation traps are rare and have only been mentioned in two publications (Allison and Hobbs 
2004; Gunderson, Holling, and Allen 2010). Lock-in traps have been defined in the literature for 
nearly a decade, but many authors have resisted acknowledging them in discussions of MS traps. 
Some of these publications have been widely cited (Folke et al. 2007), appear in the foremost 
resilience-thinking-oriented journals (Schoon et al. 2011), and are authored by major authors in the 
field (Folke et al. 2010). Despite this, the concept of lock-in trap is particularly applicable to this 
study and is explicitly discussed in later chapters. 
2.3.2 Issues of Time and Space in Maladaptive System Traps and Transformation 
Scales of time and space appear to have a profound effect on the analysis of SES. For example, 
Allison and Hobbs (2004) describe the western Australia agriculture system as going through 
46 
 
adaptive cycles and as being in a back loop. However, they also show that when viewed in a more 
holistic context the same system can be seen as being in a lock-in trap. One lesson to be drawn from 
Robards et al. (2011) is that one person’s rigidity trap may be another person’s robustness. Michael 
Schoon et al., writing from the perspectives of archaeology, provide insightful commentary to this 
point in a special feature section of Ecology and Society (Schoon et al. 2011, n.p.). They state:  
What is perceived as a transformative event from a local or short-term perspective may appear as a 
more gradual adaptation at a larger scale. Conversely, a slowly dwindling population may appear 
stable to an observer within the population, but may result in a transformative shift at a societal 
level when viewed on a larger time scale. Likewise, a shift in the geographical scale may change 
perspectives of what constitutes adaptation or transformation. 
This point is further evident when comparing two widely cited interpretations of the same case 
study. Gunderson et al. (2006) describe management of the Florida Everglades as being in a rigidity 
trap, while Olsson et al. (2006) describe it as having undergone multiple transformations and as being 
in a late K phase. This difference in interpretation is especially notable since both publications 
appeared in the same year (2006) and each lead author co-authored the other publication. Neither 
publication discussed this apparent contradiction nor has the point been acknowledged elsewhere in 
the literature. However, one possible explanation is that Gunderson et al. (2006) were referring to a 
rigidity trap at the larger scale of a ‘management by manipulation’ paradigm and Olsson et al. (2006) 
were referring to transformation at the smaller scale of how that management was done.  
2.3.3 What Causes Maladaptive System Traps? 
There have been relatively few explicit attempts to explain the causes of MS traps. Nevertheless, 
these few attempts have tapped a broad array of ideas from similar academic fields and applied them 
to the resilience-thinking context. This approach serves to provide explanations for the existence of 
MS traps, provide a basis for judging how to avoid or escape MS traps, and to inspire future attempts 
to glean useful insight from literature in other fields.  
Scheffer and Westley (2007) adopt an evolutionary perspective toward MS traps and explore 
the apparent contradiction between the long-term survival of systems and the nearly ubiquitous 
tendency of systems to become rigid and vulnerable to collapse when conditions inevitably change. 
These authors argue that evolutionary pressure favors short- term efficiency over long- term 
innovation in systems ranging from cells to individuals to groups of people. They note that in 
controlled experiments, groups tend to eliminate voices of dissention when given the option, even 
when doing so impairs the effectiveness of the group (Boulding 1964). A widely studied example of 
this phenomena is ‘group think,’ first observed by Janis (1972) in the run-up to the Bay of Pigs 
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invasion. Furthermore, Scheffer and Westley (2007) discuss the tendency of societies to over value 
material infrastructure, the so-called ‘sunk-cost effect’ (Janssen, Kohler, and Scheffer 2003), and how 
this may have led to the collapse of some ancient civilizations (Diamond 2005). The work of Scheffer 
and Westley (2007) provides a starting point for approaching MS traps as a phenomenon that is 
evolutionarily hard-wired into systems.  
One possible cause of MS traps is related to ongoing discussions in the MS resilience literature 
on the so-called ‘problem of fit,’ a mismatch between management institutions and the ecological, 
economic and socio-cultural aspects of a SES that the institutions are expected to manage.(Folke et al. 
1998; Young 2002; Folke et al. 2007; Galaz et al. 2008). Olsson, Bodin, and Folke (2010) describe 
how this issue impairs feedback loops between social and ecological systems and leads many systems 
into lock-in traps. One lesson from these publications is that SESs managed in this way do not merely 
perform poorly, they also tend to fall into lock-in traps. 
The issue of path dependence is also described as a mechanism of trap formation (Olsson, 
Bodin, and Folke 2010). These authors utilize the definition for path dependence provided in Kay 
(2003, p.406), “A system [in which] initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in the same 
direction; in other words, there are self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms or positive feedbacks.” Path 
dependence was particularly popular in the economics and institutional governance literatures in the 
1990s and was linked to 'lock-in' behavior of economies nearly two decades ago (Liebowitz and 
Margolis 1995). Kay (2003) showed positive feedbacks within the European agricultural system are a 
result of past policy decisions and serve to reduce the realistic range of options for future policy 
reforms. The result is very similar to a lock-in trap. Within the resilience-thinking literature, Schlüter 
and Herrfahrdt-Pähle (2011) show that positive feedback mechanisms related to path dependence are 
largely responsible for causing a missed window of opportunity to reforming an outdated Soviet-style 
water management system in the Amudarya River Basin in Uzbekistan.  
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke (2010) describe the contribution of the field of historical 
institutionalism16
                                                     
16 Historical institutionalism is described in Steinmo (2008) as “an approach to studying politics” distinguished 
by “its attention to the ways in which institutions structure and shape political behavior and outcomes.” 
 to understanding the feedbacks that lead to path dependence. Within the resilience-
thinking literature, Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011) demonstrate how rigidity at high levels of 
government squashed windows of opportunity for change at lower levels within the system. This 
squashing occurred largely through manipulating the public discourse on management issues to 
suppress expression of viewpoints that challenge the current structure of the government, a 
phenomenon described in other fields as limiting conscientization (Freire 2005).  
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Schoon et al. (2011) evaluated five case studies of SESs conducted from an anthropology 
perspective and identified four distinct positive feedbacks that led to rigidity or lock-in traps. The first 
positive feedback is caused by rigidity in infrastructure. Infrastructure tends to be highly effective at 
fulfilling specific needs but can also become less useful as conditions change. For example, erecting 
extensive water supply infrastructure may make a particular area hospitable for human settlement. 
These settlements may come to overestimate the reliability of the infrastructure and resist allocating 
resources to ‘unnecessary’ alternatives to the established infrastructure. However, if conditions 
change sufficiently the usefulness of the infrastructure can suddenly be reduced dramatically, leaving 
the settlement with few options. This feedback can work synergistically with another positive 
feedback observed by Schoon et al. (2011), that as investment in infrastructure increases, the 
willingness of a society to abandon that infrastructure in favor of pursuing other ways to meet societal 
needs tends to decrease. This view is echoed in earlier works that describe the consequence of the 
‘sunk cost effect’ in SESs (Janssen, Kohler, and Scheffer 2003) and is reminiscent of other works that 
discuss the role of path dependence in causing MS traps (Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010). A case 
study presented in Nelson et al. (2010) illustrates the synergistic effects of rigid infrastructure and 
heavy investment in infrastructure. Nelson et al. observed that overextending reliance on obsolete and 
rigid irrigation infrastructure led the native peoples of the Hohokam culture in the southwest United 
States to ruin.  
Schoon et al. (2011) point to two other sources of feedback that lead to lock-in traps. Large 
population size tends to drive reliance on heavy infrastructure and increase the perceived costs of 
resilience-enhancing strategies. In other words, large populations rely on heavy infrastructure for 
amenities such as water, electricity, and food supply. Once in place, heavy infrastructure can make 
the population hesitant to adopt resilience-enhancing strategies, such as diversification. For example, 
large cities generally utilize central water supplies. From a resident perspective, the existence of a 
safe and reliable central water supply likely diminishes the willingness to diversify water supplies 
through a strategy such as rainwater harvesting. Finally, Schoon et al. (2011) found that threats to 
security tend to reduce variability within a society, which leads to lock-in traps. Scheffer and Westley 
(2007) report similar observations of ancient societies that became increasingly rigid during resource 
crises, precisely at the time they needed to be diverse and flexible. This same theme is perhaps most 
famously depicted in the bestselling book Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed 
(Diamond 2005).  
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2.3.4 How Can Maladaptive System Traps be Detected? 
The literature offers remarkably little guidance on how to verify the presence of a MS trap. In one 
sense, identification of traps, defined as a persistent and undesirable state, seems obvious; you will 
know it when you see it. However, the literature offers no examples of studies that set out explicitly 
to evaluate MS traps. Instead, observations of MS traps often arise from studies of resilience or 
transformation of specific systems. The doctoral research done by Helen Allison in the Western 
Australian agricultural region is illustrative of this approach (Allison 2003; republished as Allison and 
Hobbs 2006). Allison set out to evaluate the history of natural resource management in Western 
Australia from 1889 to 2003 with regard to the three key factors in the adaptive cycle framework, 
resilience, connectivity, and capital. She successfully identified two complete iterations of the 
adaptive cycle and noted the present system is characterized by high connectedness, high resilience, 
and low potential. Allison also discussed the maladaptive nature of the arrangement and coined the 
term 'lock-in trap' to describe it.  
Later research done by Bunce et al. (2009) took an approach similar to Allison (2003) and is 
significant to this study for being the only attempt in the literature of evaluating SES behavior on a 
small island with regard to the adaptive cycle. These authors evaluated the small semi-autonomous 
island of Rodrigues in the Indian Ocean for the three variables in the adaptive cycle framework to 
explain SES behavior over time. Bunce et al. were unable to identify movement of the SES through 
adaptive cycles, although they did document the conditions characteristic of a poverty trap. They did 
not identify the MS trap explicitly, although they did state on p. 223, “Overall, we support a notion 
that social–ecological systems may get stuck in a post-collapse recovery, in which no structure 
emerges.” In both the Allison and Bunce cases, traps became visible after evaluating a SES for the 
three variables in the adaptive cycle framework.  
Some guidance may be inferred from contributions to the literature that evaluates other aspects 
of resilience thinking. Biggs et al. (2010) provide seven attributes of systems they deemed to have 
transformed in the past. In addition, The Resilience Alliance has published two workbooks dedicated 
to assessing resilience in social-ecological systems (Resilience Alliance 2007, 2010). Section 3.2.1 
documents how this study utilizes all of these building blocks to construct a method to evaluate 
Grenadian water management for the presence of MS traps.  
2.3.5 Can Traps be Escaped or Avoided? 
The practical goal of studying MS traps is to develop strategies to avoid or escape them. The 
resilience-thinking literature provides limited advice on specific strategies to pursue these ends. 
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Gunderson, Holling, and Allen (2010) indicate that there are two fundamental ways for a system to 
break out of a MS trap. One is through a sufficiently large crisis; the other is a slower erosion of 
resilience in the trapped system. Sufficiently large crises are often not conveniently available and can 
be unattractive alternatives altogether. The slower erosion of resilience seems a more attractive option 
in most cases, and is the approach considered in the large majority of literature on MS traps.  
One direct approach to break out of a trap is to identify and remove the fundamental feedbacks 
that reinforce the trap. For example, Steneck et al. (2011) identified a MS trap in management of the 
Maine lobster fishery driven by a strong financial incentive to cultivate monocultures of lobsters. 
These authors contend that removing the financial incentive for the fisheries management agency to 
resist change is essential before change is possible. 
Multi-scalar collaborative networks have also been shown to be useful in overcoming a trapped 
situation. Butler and Goldstein (2010) showed how the US Fire Learning Network, a multi-scalar 
collaborative network, was used to overcome a rigidity trap in US wildland fire management. These 
authors validated the multi-scalar collaborative network approach, but also draw attention to 
complications that limit the effectiveness of such networks. Nevertheless, in concept, this lesson is 
applicable to other multi-scalar networks, notably the different forms of integrated resource 
management that have gained popularity in recent years. 
Moore and Westley (2011) argue that networks must possess agency to move effectively 
beyond MS traps. In this context, Moore and Westley base their view of agency on the description 
provided in Emirbayer and Mische's appropriately titled and widely cited publication, 'What is 
Agency?' (1998, p. 962): 
(A) temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual 
aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and 
toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the 
contingencies of the moment). 
Moore and Westley (2011, n.p.) maintain such agency "is needed in order to form a targeted 'pipeline' 
and so create an interaction that might otherwise not have occurred." They go on to discuss agency in 
a MS traps context and draw from case studies of institutional entrepreneurship to describe the 
necessary skills and characteristics of network members to foster the agency needed to move beyond 
trapped situations. 
Some large corporations overcome non-creative, efficiency focused, 'trapped' corporate cultures 
by isolating research and development and cultivating an innovation-oriented culture. Scheffer and 
Westley (2007) describe the production-oriented and innovation-oriented cultures as incompatible, 
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necessitating their separation. This strategy has apparently worked to keep large corporations such as 
Phillips and IBM competitive for many decades.  
Other suggestions in the literature to avoid and break free of MS traps are more general in 
nature. For example, maintaining flexible and diverse physical and social infrastructure, such as by 
fostering foreign trade, and managing across diverse scales, such as by  allowing flooding to happen 
on small scales, have been suggested (Schoon et al. 2011).  
2.3.6 Lessons Learned and Next Steps 
One lesson drawn from the preceding discussions of transformability and MS traps is that they look 
remarkably like opposite sides of the same coin. One concept (transformability) describes processes 
of change, the other (trap) describes processes of resistance to change. The same issues cited as the 
causes of MS traps are also identified in literature that describes obstacles to transformability, 
particularly with regard to networks. For example, Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011) and Butler 
and Goldstein (2010) describe multiple-scale aspects of networks and their effect on transformation 
(Pelling and Manuel-Navarette) and freeing a system from a rigidity trap (Butler and Goldstein). 
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke (2010, p. 266) go so far as to say that understanding MS traps is a key to 
fostering transformation of a system. Conversely, the literature on transformation has great, if largely 
unarticulated, application to understanding MS traps better. In essence, the way to avoid or break out 
of a MS trap is to foster transformability, and the way to foster transformability is to avoid or break 
out of a MS trap. Explicitly evaluating the two phenomena in concert appears to be a gap in the 
literature, but is a fundamental feature of this study. 
One important gap in the traps literature is a method for determining and describing the severity 
of a trap. It is intuitive that some trapped systems are closer to breaking free of the trap than others, 
yet no method, or even nomenclature, exists to quantify or describe the severity of traps. If we had 
such a method, it may provide insight to how to free systems from traps. It might also be possible to 
judge the effectiveness of interventions. 
The cutting edge in research on transformability and MS traps is to adapt the lessons from other 
academic areas. Utilizing relevant concepts from other academic areas is a fundamental strength of 
using the resilience-thinking framework and the opportunity in this regard is tremendous. Table 2.4 
provides two dozen examples of areas in the literature applicable to transformability, MS traps, and 
this study in particular and is far from exhaustive. Concepts from most of the areas in Table 2.4 have 
been applied to transformability or MS traps to some degree, but some have not, such as conservation 
psychology and community-based social marketing. A handful of these topics has been used with 
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great success to explain certain aspects of transformation and MS traps, especially networks and 
governance. The analysis technique of explanation building was specifically incorporated into this 
study to provide an opportunity to explore the usefulness of concepts from other literatures, such as 
those in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4. Selected literature relevant to the current study. 
Name of Literature 
or Framework Selected References Potential Relevance to Study 
Planning (Strategic) Mukhtarov 2007                 Mukhtarov 2008, p. 173-4 Directly applicable to IWRM, according to Mukhtarov 
Planning 
(Communicative) Goldstein 2009 
Useful to enhance resilience to surprises and 
cooperation through innovative approaches to 
'collaborative deliberation'  
Policy Transfer Mukhtarov 2007 Directly applicable to operationalizing IWRM, according to Mukhtarov 
Psychological 
Empowerment 
Menon 1999   
Spreitzer 1995   
 Ker Rault and Jeffrey 2008 
Has potential for explaining an underlying factor 
affecting participation in water management; Is also 
measurable and easily integrated into research 
methods 
Governance Gelcich et al. 2010  Huitema and Meijerink 2009 
Provides insight to processes of transformation; 
Provides insight to assist the transition from 
normative to operational water management 
Ecosystem 
Stewardship Chapin et al. 2009 
Reframes resource management transitions from a 
stewardship perspective 
Change 
Management 
Medema 2008    
Meijerink and Huitema 2010 
Provides insight into fundamental processes of 
change and strategies for overcoming barriers to 
change 
Transition 
Management 
van der Brugge and 
van Raak 2007 
Provides insight into transformations, particularly the 
role of shadow networks and arenas 
Learning via 
Adaptive 
Management 
Armitage, Marschke, and 
Plummer 2008 
Pahl-Wostl 2009 
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010 
Provides insight to transformation processes. 
Critical 
Consciousness 
Freire 2005 
Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 
2011 
Provides insight into transformation and SES traps, 
grounded in Marxist theory 
Environmental 
Futures 
Bishop, Hines, and Collins, 
2007 
Bishop 2011 
Strong 2011 
Very similar to SES resilience literature, but utilizes a 
distinct framework with different models and 
analogies; provides an alternative perspective to SES 
resilience 
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Name of Literature 
or Framework Selected References Potential Relevance to Study 
Organizational 
Science 
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010 
Gladwell 2000 
Robards et al. 2011 
Provides insight into transformation from corporate 
settings, particularly with regard to networks, 
agency, and innovation  
Sustainable 
Development or 
Sustainability 
Brundtland 1987 
Redclift 1987 
Redclift 2005 
Provides a context and political space to apply 
concepts of transformability, traps, and resource 
management; limited use to apply to transformability 
and traps 
Conservation 
Psychology Saunders 2003 
Psychology-based insight into why people hurt or 
help the environment; particularly applicable to 
elements of transformation 
Community Based 
Social Marketing 
McKenzie-Mohr 2000 
Westley, Holmgren, and 
Scheffer 2010 
Psychology-based pragmatic approach to fostering 
changes in human behavior 
Multi-Stakeholder 
Platforms 
Steins and Edwards 1999 
Warner 2007 
Provides insight into overcoming issues of power and 
contrasting vision in stakeholder negotiation; 
particularly applicable to IWRM 
Multi-Scalar 
Collaborative 
Networks 
Butler and Goldstein 2010 Provides insight similar to multi-stakeholder platforms 
Social Innovation 
Biggs, Westley, and Carpenter 
2010 
Olsson et al. 2006 
Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004 
Used by some authors to describe the process of 
transformability within the context of the adaptive 
cycle and panarchy  
Punctuated 
Equilibrium Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010 
Provides insight into transformation by focusing on 
'branching points' and critical junctures from which 
development changes paths 
Conflict Resolution Hipel et al. 2008 Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour 1993 Provides insight into managing stakeholder conflict 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Hall and Taylor 1996 
Olsson, Bodin, and Folke 2010 
Provides insight into processes of stability and 
control, particularly applicable to SES traps 
Sociotechnical 
Transitions 
Geels 2005 
Geels and Schot 2007 
Provides insight into transformations, particularly 
with regard to processes of stability and the nature 
of transformation 
Diffusion of 
Innovation 
Rogers 2003                                                                 
Atwell, Schulte, and Westphal 
2008                                 
Provides insight into the spread of ideas among 
groups 
Political Ecology 
Bryant and Bailey 1997 
Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 
2011 
Provides insight into the power dynamics of social 
change 
Windows of 
Opportunity 
Birkman et al. 2008        
Michaels, Goucher, and 
McCarthy 2006  
Provides insight into one critical aspect of 
transformation 
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The literature on resilience thinking was a central influence on the design of many parts of the 
study (Figure 1.2). At the beginning of the study, I pursued a purpose, “to determine what 
interventions are most likely to stimulate transformation of Grenadian water management” and 
considered a wide swath of literature, most of which is not captured in this chapter. Resilience 
thinking resonated as the best way of addressing my purpose in my specific setting and I decided to 
utilize it as the central concept underpinning the study.  
Evaluation of the resilience-thinking literature revealed important gaps in knowledge and 
research methods, some of which needed to be filled to conduct this study. I made judgments on 
which gaps were necessary to resolve in order to pursue my purpose in my specific setting, based 
largely on my experiences living and working in Grenada since 2006. For example, it was necessary 
for me to define an MS trap and develop a way to identify one before I could assess if one exists in 
Grenadian water management. The gaps I determined to be crucial to enable pursuit of the study 
purpose are captured in the 'research gaps' box of Figure 1.2. 
I worded my problem statement carefully based on my understanding of the resilience-thinking 
literature. My criteria were to form a question that was worded as concisely as possible, adequately 
fills the research gaps identified above, and that, once answered, would allow me to properly address 
my study purpose. In the literature review, it became apparent that traps and transformations are 
closely related, described above as 'different sides of the same coin.' Upon further deliberation, I 
judged that it is fundamentally impossible to evaluate transformation in my setting without also 
evaluating what prevents transformation, namely traps. Thus, I decided it was not necessary to 
include the term traps in my problem statement and settled on the wording, “How do traps and 
transformability affect progress of Grenadian water management?” 
The depth of the literature review became particularly relevant in determining the research 
questions and objectives. It was immediately evident that to address the problem statement it is 
necessary to evaluate the status of Grenadian water management with regard to both the presence of 
traps and the degree to which it is transformable. This became the basis of the first two research 
questions. It was also clear that it would be necessary to adapt methods of assessing aspects of 
resilience, traps, and transformation found in the literature to the Grenadian water management 
setting, which led to the formation of objectives 1A and 2A.  
Finally, research questions #3 and #4 were created to verify if the academic concepts of traps 
and transformation have value in an operational water management context. Research question #3 
was created to judge recent and current interventions with regard to transformability and determine if 
they can be made more effective by manipulating the transformability of the system. Research 
55 
 
question #4 seeks to verify if the concepts of transformability and MS traps can be used as a basis to 
form insightful recommendations to stimulate progress in Grenadian water management. 
2.4 Integrated Water Resources Management 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is one approach to advance water resources 
management beyond making decisions based solely on the narrow mandates and authority of water 
management authorities. The IWRM approach establishes a new management style of 
accommodating diverse water users with potentially conflicting needs (Mitchell 1990). Attempts to 
implement IWRM have been difficult and have achieved varying levels of success (Rahaman and 
Varis 2005; Medema, McIntosh, and Jeffrey 2008). Some assessments of the difficulties of 
implementing IWRM maintain the basic concept of IWRM is valid and cite difficulties in 
implementation in the local context for inconsistency in IWRM effectiveness (Medema 2008), 
although other authors challenge the basic value of IWRM (Biswas 2004a; Jeffrey and Gearey 2006). 
The following discussion evaluates both the basic concept of IWRM and its application in practical 
settings.  
The purpose of this section is to provide a basis for judgments made later in this thesis 
regarding progress of efforts to implement IWRM in Grenada. To reduce confusion, IWRM, defined 
as a concept in the normative sense, is termed normative IWRM and IWRM, defined as an operational 
water management approach, is termed operational IWRM from this point forward.  
2.4.1 Normative IWRM 
Normative IWRM is rooted in early efforts to manage water resources to meet diverse needs. Early 
forms of integrative water management have existed since at least the early 20th century (Table 2.5). 
However, the current normative framework for IWRM has developed over the last 35 years as a 
reaction to the widespread existence of non-inclusive water management. The IWRM concept was 
advanced dramatically at three key conferences: Mar del Plata (1977), Dublin (1992), and Rio (1992; 
Rahaman and Varis 2005). The core normative IWRM concepts were enshrined at the later two 
conferences in the Dublin Statement (ICWE 1992) and Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 of the Rio 
Declaration (United Nations 1993), occasionally referred to as the Dublin Principles (Table 2.6). 
Other descriptions of IWRM are provided in the academic literature (Walther 1987; Mitchell 1990). 
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Table 2.5. IWRM timeline. 
Year Events relevant to the development of Integrated Water Resources Management 
1900’s Setting the stage: Growing realization that each sector cannot continue to manage water independently of each other and of the environment (Medema, 2008) 
1930’s Tennessee Valley Authority first attempts at what would someday be known as IWRM                           (Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Mitchell, 2007) 
1960 Catchment-based approach to water management appears in England, Wales, and France                                (Mitchell, 2007) 
1977 First UNESCO conference on water in Plata del Mar, origin of modern form of IWRM (Medema, 2008) 
1980's 
Water fades from international political agenda, Despite it being the WHO “international decade for 
water supply & sanitation” (White, 1998) 
Alberta introduces some form of IRM for public land management                                                                                                
(Walther, 1987; Alberta Energy and Natural Resources, 1983) 
1992 
International Conference on Water and Environment (Dublin)                                                                            
Key product: the four ‘Dublin Principles' 
Rio Earth Summit, Rio de Janero, 178 nations essentially ratify the Dublin Principles                                                   
Key product: Agenda 21 (United Nations, 1993) 
Plata del Mar (1977), Dublin (and by inference Rio) were later described as the three ‘productive’ 
conferences of modern times (Gleick and Lane, 2005; Gleick, 2006) 
1993 World Bank develops a widely cited definition of IWRM 
1997 1st World Water Forum - Marrakech, Morocco, in 1997, 500 people in attendance                                      (Gleick and Lane, 2005; Gleick, 2006) 
2000 
 
GWP defines IWRM (Global Water Partnership, 2000), which continues to be the most widely accepted 
definition (Medema, 2008) 
2nd World Water Forum & Ministerial Conference - The Hague, 12,000 people in attendance, ushers in 
era of large water conferences (Gleick and Lane, 2005; Gleick, 2006) 
UN Millennium Project launched, Millennium Development Goals adopted one year later; Key water 
goals are to "halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation" 
 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg - called for countries to develop IWRM and Water Efficiency Plans by 2005 
2003 3rd World Water Forum – Kyoto, 24,000 people in attendance                                                                                            (Gleick and Lane, 2005; Gleick, 2006) 
2004-06 Biswas (2004) and Jeffrey and Gearey (2006) publish widely cited criticisms of IWRM 
2005-15 International Decade for Action - Water for Life (World Health Organization, 2005) 
2006 4th World Water Forum – Mexico, nearly 20,000 in attendance (Gleick, 2006) 
2009 5th World Water Forum – Istanbul, 33,000 people in attendance  (WWF 5 web page) 
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Table 2.6. The Dublin Principles (ICWE 1992). 
Number Description 
1 
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable 
resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment. 
2 
Water development and management 
should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners, and 
policymakers at all levels. 
3 Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.  
4 
Water has an economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as 
an economic good. 
 
One criticism of normative IWRM is that it lacks a solid, meaningful definition (Biswas 
2004a). Critics point to the number and diversity of IWRM definitions. To illustrate this point, I 
provide a non-exhaustive list of nine definitions for IWRM in Table 2.7. This issue also led Jønch-
Clausen and Fugl (2001, p. 502) to state that, “To some extent IWRM has degenerated into one of 
these buzz-words that everybody uses but that means many different things to different people.” 
Molle (2008, P. 132) describes IWRM as an idealistic ‘nirvana concept’ that, on its face, is 
unobjectionable and sounds nice. However, flexibility in its meaning can easily sabotage 
implementation when each stakeholder decides to promote a distinct interpretation of IWRM to its 
own benefit. Mole (2008, p. 136) acknowledges that, in concept, the gentle and flexible interpretation 
of IWRM can serve as a ‘boundary object,’ or a common platform for stakeholders that are typically 
antagonistic to one another. To this end, IWRM can provide a valuable common ground for 
negotiation between stakeholders that are willing to engage others in good faith. 
The effect of normative IWRM on modern water management is profound. An early high-
profile success was the explicit endorsement of IWRM at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
including a commitment to develop national IWRM plans as outlined in Agenda 21, Article 18, which 
was ratified by all 178 nations attending the conference (United Nations 1993). Since this time, 
IWRM has served as a political rallying point for efforts to transform water resources management 
around the world. Jeffrey and Gearey (2006, p.2) go so far as to say, "It is difficult to overstate the 
extent to which IWRM has become the norm or even, one might say, the orthodoxy in water 
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resources management." Lamoree (2004, p. 400) credits the promotion of IWRM for a “move away 
from single-sector institution responsibility and decision making,” a “renewed focus on stakeholder 
participation in water management," and “broadening the water profession to include non-technical 
disciplines and multi-disciplinary research.” To some degree, the popularity of IWRM can share some 
of the credit for putting and keeping water issues on the international political agenda.  
Table 2.7. Selected definitions of Integrated Water Resources Management. 
Selected Definitions of Integrated Water Resources Management 
Global Water 
Partnership 
A process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social 
welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems. (Global Water Partnership 2000) 
World Bank  
An integrated water resources perspective ensures that social, economic, 
environmental and technical dimensions are taken into account in the management 
and development of water resources. (Easter et al. 1993) 
USAID  
A participatory planning and implementation process, based on sound science, that 
brings stakeholders together to determine how to meet society's long-term needs 
for water and coastal resources while maintaining essential ecological services and 
economic benefits. (USAID 2006) 
Cap-Net 
A systematic process for the sustainable development, allocation and monitoring of 
water resource use in the context of social, economic and environmental objectives.                                                                                                 
(http://www.archive.cap-net.org/iwrm_tutorial/p_2_1.htm)  
World Water 
Forum 
An incremental and adaptive policy approach that seeks the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related resources. It also seeks to 
harness water resources to attune to national development goals and challenges, 
such as poverty alleviation, economic growth, social development and 
environmental sustainability. (Comisión Nacional de Agua 2006) 
Grigg (1999) A framework for planning, organizing and controlling water systems to balance all relevant views and goals of stakeholders. 
Grigg (2008) A framework for planning, organizing and operating water systems to unify and balance the relevant views and goals of stakeholders. 
Medema 
(2008) 
A democratic process for developing and managing water and related resources in a 
coordinated and sustainable manner. 
Jonker (2007) A framework within which to manage people's activities in such a manner that it improves their livelihoods without disrupting the water cycle. 
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2.4.2 Operational IWRM 
Operational IWRM can be described as a decision-making framework that combines the 
consideration of diverse management needs alongside the more idealistic concepts of normative 
IWRM. The form of an operational IWRM framework is entirely flexible and success or failure often 
depends on adapting an IWRM framework to match specific applications (Walther 1987; Mitchell 
1990, 2009). Figure 2.9 provides a generic graphical representation of my conceptualization of 
operational IWRM. To be consistent with recent literature, this figure is intentionally vague regarding 
how diverse management concerns are considered, and to what degree the normative aspects of 
IWRM laid out in Global Water Partnership (2000) and in the Dublin Statement (United Nations 
1992) are adhered to. The most critical aspect of Figure 2.9 is that management actions are informed 
by a holistic consideration of diverse stakeholder concerns and are not fragmented in nature.  
 
Figure 2.9. Author's representation of linkages between the normative and operational aspects 
of IWRM within a decision-making framework. 
2.4.2.1 Criticism of Operational IWRM 
While normative IWRM has widespread support, implementing it in specific settings has had 
inconsistent results. To a large degree, examples of managing water resources while integrating 
diverse concerns of management predate the origin of the term IWRM. For example, the origins of 
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what would eventually become known as IWRM in Canada can be traced to the establishment of the 
Ontario Conservation Authorities in 1946 and the initiation of 'comprehensive river basin 
management' in the 1960s (Mitchell 2006). Notable successes under the ‘official’ IWRM title are not 
uncommon and include the implementation of integrated catchment management in west Australia 
(Mitchell and Hollick 1993) and north Australia (Johnson, Shrubsole, and Merrin 1996). A Global 
Water Partnership Background Paper from 2004 provides a robust inventory of ongoing IWRM 
efforts from around the world, including in Uganda, Burkina Faso, China, Quebec, Thailand, India, 
and Brazil (Jønch-Clausen 2004). However, virtually all case studies of IWRM implementation 
contain some elements of both success and failure. Other works document cases of apparent failure of 
IWRM. For example, implementing IWRM in southern Africa has largely failed to achieve 
substantive integration of water management concerns and may even prove impossible at this time 
(Pollard 2002; Swatuk 2005; Swatuk and Motsholapheko 2008).  
A substantial body of literature describes the difficult transition from normative to operational 
IWRM, sometimes referred to as the ‘implementation gap,’ and cautions against the idealistic 
application of normative IWRM (Walther 1987; Mitchell 1990, 2009). Experiences from the field 
indicate that implementing IWRM should not be approached in terms of following a recipe (Mitchell 
1990; Lankford et al. 2007). However, this caution has not deterred some authors from expecting 
such recipes (Biswas 2004b, 2008). Lankford and Cour (2005) observe that attempting to implement 
all aspects of normative IWRM in any given setting invites failure. These authors recommend 
approaching IWRM as a 'toolbox' and to be adaptive about which tools are needed to accomplish a 
specific management objective in a given setting. Mitchell (1990, p. 4) made this point 15 years prior: 
at the strategic level, a comprehensive approach should be used to ensure that the widest possible 
perspective is maintained, but in contrast, a more focused approach is needed at the operational 
level where attention should be directed to a smaller number of issues that account for most of the 
problems. 
Many authors have treated ambiguity in the normative definition of IWRM as desirable 
flexibility to implement a management framework customized to fit specific management situations. 
In fact, some authors emphasize that successful implementation of IWRM depends on customizing 
the concept to fit the specific management context and can be vital to overcoming conflict between 
agencies at the boundaries between their jurisdictions (Mitchell 2004; Lankford and Cour 2005; 
Lankford et al. 2007; Mitchell 2009). 
Despite this literature, some authors have criticized IWRM sharply for failures in traversing the 
implementation gap (Biswas 2004b; Jeffrey and Gearey 2006; Biswas 2008; Merrey 2008). This 
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criticism is acknowledged as valid, even among champions of IWRM (Lamoree 2004; Mitchell 
2007).  
It deserves highlighting that the problem of implementation is not specific to IWRM, or even to 
water management, and is not insurmountable. Implementation difficulties face all attempts to move 
water and other types of resource management beyond the fragmented, rigid, and non-inclusive 
decision-making practices of the past. Change in water management is difficult, regardless of the type 
of management regime being implemented or the framework utilized. For example, ‘adaptive 
management’ is another common water resources management approach that is championed in the 
literature but widely criticized for similar implementation issues (Table 2.8; McLain and Lee 1996; 
Walters 1997). Rynes et al. (2001) note that similar criticism over implementation exists in every 
field that has both academics and practitioners. Despite the difficulties of implementing new 
approaches to water management, there are success stories. To date (2012), 24 examples of successful 
implementation of innovative approaches to water resources management have received the annual 
national (Australia) and international Thiess Riverprize award from the International 
RiverFoundation17
Table 2.8. Challenges and criticisms of adaptive management. Similar criticisms are grouped. 
. Case studies of past award winners are provided in International RiverFoundation 
(2007) and Gregory, Brierley, and Le Heron (2011). 
Challenge or Criticism Source 
                Social Inflexibility  
Fundamental conflicts in ecological values between stakeholders Walters (1997) 
In practice, research and management stakeholders express strong self-interest, seeing 
AM policy as a threat to themselves, not an opportunity for improvement Walters (1997) 
Experimental policies have been seen as too costly, particularly monitoring costs Walters (1997) 
Poor flexibility in the social system, more so than the ecological system Gunderson (1999) 
Stakeholders may be resistive due to perception that AM is a risk to their interests Stankey  et al. (2005) 
Stakeholders may see AM as too costly Medema (2008) 
Stakeholders may see AM as too complex Medema (2008) 
  
                Ecological Risk  
Experimental policies seen as too risky, particularly to endangered species Walters (1997) 
Stressed ecosystems may have little or no resilience, causing a fear of triggering an 
ecosystem shift to an unwanted stability domain Gunderson (1999) 
Contradictory to the precautionary principle Nudds (1999) 
                                                     
17 The Riverprize is an award given annually since 1999 to recognize development and implementation of 
innovative and sustainable programs in river management. More information is available on the International 
Riverfoundation website, http://www.riverfoundation.org.au/.  
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Challenge or Criticism Source 
AM is not appropriate in situations calling for risk-averse approaches or where 
management decisions are irreversible Trauger (1999) 
Stakeholders may see AM as too ecologically or economically risky Medema (2008) 
  
                Difficulties in Operationalizing  
In practice, relies on linear systems models McLain and Lee (1996) 
Discounts non-scientific forms of knowledge McLain and Lee (1996) 
Doesn't foster shared understandings among diverse stakeholders McLain and Lee (1996) 
Modeling of management scenarios is imperfect Walters (1997) 
Monitoring data is incomplete or imperfect Walters (1997) 
AM requires well thought out and adaptable long-term monitoring Kernohan and Haufler (1999) 
In practice, the best information is not normally used, in favor of 'conventional wisdom' 
and anecdotal science Trauger(1999) 
Managers aren't truly in control of basic physical, chemical, and ecological processes, 
let alone the social, economic, and political parameters of the system: it may more 
complex than we can understand 
Trauger (1999) 
Conflicting definitions, poor direction for implementation Failing  et al. (2004) 
As a process, AM is better suited as one element of a structured decision process,    
rather than as a decision process itself Failing  et al. (2004) 
Requires long-term funding source Medema (2008) 
Is time consuming, stakeholders may lose interest Medema (2008) 
 
2.4.3 Lessons Learned and Next Steps 
IWRM has emerged as a dominant paradigm in water resources management (Jeffrey and Gearey 
2006), but faces persistent problems in an operational context (Pollard 2002; Swatuk 2005). 
Normative IWRM has been embraced by the Global Water Partnership, perennially endorsed at the 
World Water Forum conferences, enshrined in Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration, and implemented 
the world over. However, at an operational level, problems have emerged, resulting in many failures 
and criticism (Merrey 2008). Some authors have endorsed dropping the IWRM concept altogether 
(Biswas 2004a, 2008), but have not proposed an alternative, and thus a more prudent path forward is 
to search for new insight that might help guide current and future attempts to implement IWRM. 
At the core of IWRM implementation difficulties lies a fundamental resistance to change. 
Pollard (2002) makes an important point that integration is about changing behavior, both of 
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individuals and of organizations. Mitchell and Hollick (1993, p. 742) suggest that for IWRM to 
succeed “people and agencies [need to] to move out of their present comfort zones. By definition, 
such a move creates discomfort.” Swatuk (2005, p. 878) frames the full meaning of implementing 
IWRM as “fundamentally [reconstituting] how resource access, allocation and use decisions are 
made,” which he describes as “a profoundly political act which challenges the very bases of power,” 
and advises that “resistance is to be expected.” Case studies of attempts to implement IWRM show 
that this change in behavior is difficult to accomplish and may be perceived as threatening to some 
(Mitchell and Hollick 1993). 
Despite ongoing attempts to develop advice and guidelines for IWRM implementation 
(Rahaman and Varis 2005; Mitchell 2009), bridging the implementation gap continues to be a 
research need. This is a daunting challenge that has frustrated academics in other contexts and 
disciplines. Undoubtedly, insight is readily available in literature on other academic disciplines (Table 
2.4). One way forward may be to reframe the fundamental issue from being a problem with IWRM to 
being an issue of overcoming traps, or possibly an issue of SES transformation, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Allison and Hobbs 2004). In short, many of the apparent 
failures of IWRM can be recast as failed attempts to transform systems in a maladaptive trapped state. 
Certainly, the scope of literature focused on changing entrenched social-ecological systems is vast 
and deep compared to the IWRM literature focused on overcoming implementation challenges.  
To date (2013) there have been no attempts to my knowledge to apply the resilience-thinking 
concepts of transformability and MS traps explicitly to implementing IWRM. A handful of 
publications has applied concepts similar to those found in the transformability and MS traps 
literature to the implementation of IWRM. Examples come from literatures on policy transfer 
networks (Mukhtarov 2007), governance (Funke et al. 2007; Turton et al. 2007), strategic planning 
(Mukhtarov 2008), and change management (Medema 2008). Additionally, the role of IWRM in 
fostering water management for resilience can be inferred from Carpenter et al. (2009). A reasonable 
next step is to assess attempts to implement IWRM explicitly from the SES perspectives of MS traps 
and transformation. 
The above discussion on IWRM provides am important contextual contribution to the study. In 
Grenada, progress has been made recently on adopting IWRM as a management approach. Tracing 
the evolution of IWRM in Grenada provides great insight into both processes of transformability and 
MS traps. A solid fundamental understanding of IWRM is crucial in this regard. In addition, a solid 
understanding of IWRM informs the execution of interviews and enriches interpretation of data 
gathered from all sources. 
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The first section of this chapter establishes the conceptual framework that inspired the study. 
Specifically, SES resilience is defined and presented as a key goal of resource management. The 
evolution of SES resilience literature is discussed, including the adaptive cycle and panarchy. 
Resilience thinking is discussed as a metaconcept that emerged to explain how to foster resilience. 
Importantly, trapped systems are also discussed. Finally, other approaches to explain resilience were 
acknowledged and briefly discussed. 
The second section builds upon the discussion of resilience thinking and identifies specific 
research gaps and opportunities for contribution to the literature on transformability. The definition of 
transformation is discussed and a distinction is made between transformability and adaptability. 
Literature on the process of transformation is discussed. The first research gap identified is how 
transformability occurs in developing world and especially SIDS settings. The second research gap 
identified is to explore farther how ideas and insights from other academic literatures can help explain 
transformation of SESs. A bias in the transformation literature toward relatively orderly, intentional, 
and gradual processes over transformations that result from unexpected and abrupt shocks to SESs is 
also acknowledged. Finally, the ways in which the literature on transformation informed the design of 
the study are provided. 
The third section of this chapter focuses on MS traps, builds upon the discussion of resilience 
thinking provided in the first chapter, analyzes the literature on the causes of traps, and identifies 
research gaps and potential for future research. The first research gap identified is to explore the 
usefulness of considering MS traps and transformation concurrently. The literature on each concept 
has considerable insight to offer the other. The second research gap identified is to explore the 
applicability of lessons and concepts from other disciplines for application to the relatively sparse MS 
trap literature. Applying concepts from other literatures appears to be the current direction of research 
on traps, which has powered remarkable progress in recent years. However, the potential to continue 
on this trajectory is vast and future research will validate which concepts from other disciplines are 
truly useful to improve understanding of MS traps. Finally, the ways in which the literature on MS 
traps informed the design of the study are provided 
The section on IWRM discusses the evolution and criticism of normative and operational 
IWRM and draws attention to a research need for improved understanding of how to implement 
IWRM. In general, wide support for the normative concepts of IWRM exists but successful 
implementation is inconsistent. It is argued that value exists in reframing the implementation 
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challenges of IWRM from an issue of IWRM to an issue of transformation and the difficulty of 
transforming water management systems in a maladaptive trapped state.  
A ‘low hanging fruit’ approach to advance all three literatures considered in this chapter 
involves drawing from concepts in other academic areas to guide future research. The opportunity to 
do this is enormous, perhaps even intimidating. Table 2.4 contains a partial summary of dozens of 
academic topics with specific potential for application to the literatures reviewed in this chapter. The 
challenge for researchers is to sift through the literature in a sensible but expedient manner and select 
which concepts to draw upon. A researcher’s experiences, strengths and limitations, and the research 
project at hand, may serve as a guide for selecting which concepts to draw upon.  
The largest ‘take-home’ point of this literature review is that considerable synergy likely exists 
in applying the concepts of transformability, MS traps, and operational IWRM to one another. The 
application of these themes in concert defines the intellectual space in which this study is conducted. 
Perhaps most importantly, the scholarly understanding of transformability, MS traps, and IWRM 
dictated to a large degree how the study was designed and conducted. 
(Brundtland 1987; Redclift 1987; Walther 1987; Easter et al. 1993; Fang 1993; United Nations 1993; Spreitzer 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; White 1998; Grigg 1999; Kernohan and Haufler 1999; Menon 1999; Nudds 1999; Trauger 1999; Global Water 
Partnership 2000; McKenzie-Mohr 2000; Rogers 2003; Saunders 2003; Biswas 2004a; Failing, Horn, and Higgins 2004; Geels 2005; Gleick and Lane 2005; Redclift 2005; Stankey, Clark, and Bormann 2005; World Health Organization and UNICEF 2005; Comisión Nacional de Agua 
2006; 2006; Jeffrey and Gearey 2006; Michaels, Goucher, and McCarthy 2006; USAID 2006; Bishop, Hines, and Collins 2007; Geels and Schot 2007; Jonker 2007; Mitchell 2007; Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008; Atwell, Schulte, and Westphal 2008; Birkmann et al. 2008; 
Hipel et al. 2008; Ker Rault and Jeffrey 2008; Medema 2008; Goldstein 2009; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Meijerink and Huitema 2010; Westley, Holmgren, and Scheffer 2010; Bishop 2011; Robards et al. 2011; Strong 2011) 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This study originated from a desire to understand processes of change in Grenadian water 
management.18
3.1 Research Approach
 Following this interest, an extensive literature review was performed (see Chapter 2) 
to inform the construction of a framework for a study of Grenadian water management, including a 
problem statement and research questions (see Chapter 1). This chapter documents the design and 
methodological decisions regarding (1) the use of a single-case study approach, (2) the use of mixed 
methods, (3) the mix of research methods chosen and how they were executed, and (4) how data were 
analyzed. 
 
This section documents the decisions to utilize a single-case study approach and to use mixed 
methods. Included are discussions on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the study 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. Finally, measures to ensure academic rigor in this 
study are summarized.  
3.1.1 Case Study Approach 
A case study design was chosen based on the nature of the research inquiry and considerable reading 
on case study research design to confirm and define its applicability to the study. Landmark textbooks 
(Stake 1995; Yin 2009) and reviews of case-study research methodology (Tellis 1997a, 1997b; Baxter 
and Jack 2008) provided rich guidance for considering the case study approach and defining how it 
should be used in the study. Notably, the introduction of Yin’s textbook is subtitled, How to Know 
Whether and When to Use Case Studies as a Research Method (Yin 2009, p. 3). Yin’s discussion 
provides useful information on research methods in the social sciences and commentary on the 
appropriateness of each in various situations (2009, p. 5-14). 
In describing the applicability of case-study research to specific studies, Yin (2009, p. 4) 
advises, “The more that your [research] questions seek to explain some present circumstance (e.g., 
‘how’ or ‘why’ some social phenomenon works), the more that the case study method will be 
relevant.” Yin continues, “The method is also relevant the more that your questions require an 
extensive and ‘in depth’ description of some social phenomenon.” Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 545) 
provide more specific advice in their discussion of Yin’s position for applying case study design:  
                                                     
18 The term “water management” refers to a broad management of water resources and extends beyond the 
operation of the water authority. 
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[A] case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer 'how' and 
'why' questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the [behavior] of those involved in the study; (c) you 
want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon 
under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.  
The current study was judged by me to fulfill all of these conditions. Specifically, in this study I seek 
to understand why water management in Grenada is slow to progress and how transformative change 
can be brought about. Additionally, it is not possible to manipulate the system and in-depth analysis 
of the social-ecological context is likely to be important.  
Defining case study research is less precise than describing when it is applicable. Yin (2009) 
defines case study in terms of how and what it studies. First, case study is empirical and considers 
existing phenomena in their real-life context. Second, case study manages complex situations with 
many variables by relying on the widely-used method of triangulation of evidence.  
Despite the appeal of case-study research, several aspects have been sharply criticized (Tellis 
1997a, 1997b; Myers and Newman 2007; Diefenbach 2009). Yin (2009, p. 14-16) describes and 
refutes the most common perceived drawbacks (Table 3.1). These drawbacks are acknowledged here 
and considered as avoidable pitfalls. They are further discussed below and later in Chapter 5. 
Given the decision to use a case study design, I then decided to pursue a single case study. The 
choice between studying multiple cases or a single case involves making a tradeoff between the 
breadth of research and the depth. As a practical matter, I had an opportunity to research the 
Grenadian case much more deeply and with greater insight than was possible for me to do elsewhere. 
Also, I had reservations that the value of comparing multiple cases would offset the gains possible 
from a focused study of the Grenadian case. As a practical matter, living and working in Grenada 
provided me with insight into the local culture and water resource issues and access to key actors that 
would be difficult to duplicate in another setting without cutting deeply into my ability to explore the 
complexities of the why and how questions that interested me. In my view, the opportunity to dig as 
deeply as possible into the Grenadian setting was an opportunity too great to pass up. The literature 
on case-study design supports this reasoning. Specifically, the single-case model is justified because it 
is a revelatory case, in that “the investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon 
previously inaccessible to social science inquiry” (Yin 2009, p. 48). This view is consistent with case-
study methodology review papers (Tellis 1997a, 1997b; Baxter and Jack 2008). 
Given the use of a single-case study design, I further decided to utilize an ‘embedded,’ rather 
than a ‘holistic,’ case study approach. A holistic approach focuses on the global nature of an entity, 
without regard to the dynamics between individual parts within the entity being studied, while an 
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embedded approach focuses on the dynamics of subunits within a case (Yin 2009). To a large degree, 
the point of this study was to examine the dynamics between individual parts of the case, Grenadian 
water management. Therefore, the study was designed as an embedded single-case study. This 
methodological selection is consistent with published review articles on case study methodology 
(Tellis 1997a, 1997b; Baxter and Jack 2008). Other authors have used the terms ‘nested’ or ‘layered’ 
to describe the embedded case study (Patton 2002).  
Table 3.1. Common criticisms and rebuttals of case-study research (based on information 
provided in Yin, 2009). 
Perceived problem with                                                          
case-study research Explanation 
It is not rigorous This perception is an artifact of sloppy research                                         and is not a fair criticism of the methodology 
It provides little basis for                     
scientific generalization 
Case-study research is generalizable                                        
analytically (to theory), but not statistically (to 
populations) 
It takes too long and produces long, 
unreadable documents 
This is true of many case studies, but                                                          
these problems can be avoided 
It does a poor job evaluating cause and 
effect relationships 
This is true to a large extent, but case studies can                              
elaborate why and how a causal relation exists -                            
something other methodologies struggle with 
 
The case in this study is defined as Grenadian water management and multiple embedded units 
were chosen, or emerged during the study, to capture the relationships between and among key actors 
in the system. The embedded units of analysis were not mutually exclusive and some units 
overlapped. For example, embedded units included the water authority, water sector reform19
                                                     
19 Water sector reform is the term given to a recent attempt to legislate greater integration of water concerns 
into water resources management. 
, and the 
resident experience with regard to water supply. The single-case, embedded design utilized in this 
study is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Diagram of the embedded single-case study design, recognizing overlap between 
some embedded units. Image adapted from Yin (2009). 
Case-study design can further be described in terms of being exploratory and explanatory. 
Exploratory case studies are said to pursue 'what' types of questions, while explanatory case studies 
pursue 'why' and 'how' types of questions (Tellis 1997a, 1997b; Yin 2003; Baxter and Jack 2008). 
Explanatory case studies are more readily recognized as ‘normal’ case studies, while exploratory case 
studies may even begin with a study framework, but develop research questions and hypothesis after 
data are collected (Tellis 1997a). Exploratory case studies are particularly useful when used as pilot 
projects to assess what types of questions to pursue in further study, but are considerably more limited 
in interpretation of their results. For example, Biggs et al. (2010, n.p.) used an exploratory case study 
approach based on criteria provided in Stake (1995) as justification to "not predefine potential factors 
facilitating transformation, but rather allowed them to emerge from the case studies." Consequently, 
Biggs et al. (2010, n.p.) cautioned their results are inconclusive and that "detailed, rigorous, 
explanatory case study approaches are needed to firmly establish causal connections between 
conditions and events." The design of this study has some aspects of exploratory case study models, 
but is essentially an explanatory case study. The nomenclature explanatory single case embedded 
case study accurately describes the study. However, to prevent wordiness, use of this lengthy term is 
avoided.  
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3.1.2 Use of Mixed Methods 
Decisions on the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in a study were informed by my basic 
assumptions regarding the nature of truth (ontology), how knowledge is created (epistemology), and 
specific, valid ways to gain knowledge (methodology). Guba and Lincoln (1994) describe such basic 
assumptions as forming a research paradigm. A spectrum of perspectives on the nature of truth exists, 
with the quantitative research paradigm occupying one end and the qualitative paradigm occupying 
the other. The quantitative research paradigm is underpinned by the ontological notion that a single, 
knowable truth exists and epistemologically by the positivist belief that a single reality exists and is 
waiting to be discovered (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010). These beliefs lead to the use of specific 
techniques, including experiments and the scientific method to pursue knowledge. In contrast, the 
qualitative research paradigm holds the ontological view that reality is situational and socially 
constructed. Epistemologically, adherents to this perspective can be classified as constructivists and 
view truth as something that humans construct based on their perceptions and experiences.  
Mixed methods research forms a third paradigm and was the one chosen for this study 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007). This research paradigm is a synthesis of the quantitative 
and qualitative approaches and is underpinned epistemologically by pragmatism. This approach 
embraces the construction of knowledge by focusing on the research question as a starting point, and 
how to answer it most effectively, rather than focusing on the nature of the methods used 
(Cherryholmes 1992; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007; Creswell 2009; Bullock 2010). 
Within this research paradigm, researchers select the methods most likely to address their particular 
research questions.  
Adherents of the three research paradigms claim inclusion in a wide variety of 'isms' beyond 
positivism, constructivism, and pragmatism. Many dozens, perhaps hundreds, of epistemologies and 
ontologies exist and influence the research paradigm chosen by a given researcher. To complicate 
matters, much disagreement exists in defining specific 'isms' and how each is distinct. For example, 
within pragmatism there are camps that self-identify with critical pragmatism, pragmatic pluralism, 
prophetic pragmatism, and democratic-socialist-feminist pragmatism (Cherryholmes 1992). Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) lump these classes together as pragmatism of the left, right, and 
center. Still others might split the constructivist epistemologies further. However, true to the 
pragmatist underpinning of this study, I did not dedicate great effort to define a “correct” or even a 
“best” philosophical approach. Rather, I identified a rationale for the study design, selected individual 
research methods, and acknowledged the limitations and strengths of these decisions.   
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3.1.3 Rigor 
To ensure rigor in case-study research, Yin (2009, p. 40) advocates the application of four tests to 
verify the quality of empirical social research. These tests include construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability. Other authors have articulated criteria for rigor differently. I 
acknowledge these differences and note general similarities among criteria used to judge rigor by 
well-cited authors in qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research (Table 3.2). For example, 
Yin's tests compare to differently-named criteria provided in Denzin and Lincoln (2008) for judging 
rigor of qualitative studies. Likewise, Yin (2009) and Dellinger and Leech (2007) share comparable 
conceptualizations of construct validity in judging rigor. 
Yin (2009) also provides robust guidance on how to design, conduct, and interpret case study 
research with regard to these four tests and to ensure rigor of case study research. These tests, the 
advice provided in Yin (2009), and specific details about how this study was conducted to 
accommodate this advice are presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.2. Comparison of criteria for rigor in quantitative, qualitative, and mixed research studies with tests proposed by Yin (2009) 
to verify rigor in case studies, regardless of methodology used. 
Yin (2009) Tests for                 
Rigor in Case Studies 
Criteria for Rigor 
Qualitative Studies  Mixed Methods Studies Quantitative Studies 
  Denzin and Lincoln 
(2008) Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) 
Morse et al. 
(2002) Dellinger and Leech (2007) 
Lincoln and Guba (1981, 
1985) 
Construct Validity Credibility 
Validity 
Construct Validity Objectivity 
Internal Validity Dependability Interpretive Rigor Internal Validity 
External Validity Transferability 
Reliability 
Legitimization External Validity 
Reliability Confirmability Design Quality Reliability 
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Table 3.3. Summary of the four tests for judging the quality of research design, advice provided in Yin (2009), and how this study utilizes 
Yin’s advice. 
Test Explanation Academic Advice                                 (Yin 2009) 
Phase of 
Study How this Study Utilizes Academic Advice 
Construct 
Validity 
The degree to which the 
study accurately measures 
what it is trying to measure 
Use multiple sources of 
evidence (triangulation) 
Data 
Collection The study uses many types of evidence 
Establish chain of evidence Data Collection 
This was developed in conjunction with the case-
study protocol and database (see below). 
Have key informants review 
draft case study report Composition This is documented in the results chapter. 
Internal 
Validity 
The degree to which the 
conclusions are logically 
sound and sufficiently 
supported with evidence 
Use pattern matching Data Analysis These are analytic tools for interpreting case studies 
presented in Yin (2009). The intention is to use one 
or more, but not necessarily all four, of these tools 
to analyze a case study to improve internal validity.                                                                                       
.                                                                                                                 
The results were analyzed using explanation 
building, pattern matching, and addressing rival 
explanations  
Use a logic model Data Analysis 
Use explanation building  Data Analysis 
Address rival explanations Data Analysis 
External 
Validity 
The degree to which 
results can be generalized 
from the unique to the 
other 
Use theory in single-case 
studies 
Research 
Design 
The study is grounded conceptually with regard to 
design, methods, and interpretation of results 
Reliability The repeatability of the findings and conclusions 
Use case study protocol Data Collection These tools were used to guide day-to-day 
operations and were used to document the 
procedures and results of the study Develop case study 
database 
Data 
Collection 
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3.2 Research Methods  
Beyond the methodological issues with mixed methods research and the need to perform the methods 
well, decisions were made regarding what data to collect, from which sources, and how. This section 
discusses these decisions. 
3.2.1 Information Sought in Data Collection 
The study focused on evaluating Grenadian water management in order to identify possible 
maladaptive system traps (MS traps) and evidence of transformability. The literature offers limited 
insight into what information should be sought when applying these concepts to real-world situations. 
Two studies, discussed elsewhere in this thesis as effectively applying the resilience thinking concept, 
did not influence my data collection. Allison (2003) successfully applied resilience thinking concepts 
to assess a social-ecological system for a maladaptive state and Found and Berbés-Blázquez (2012) 
effectively assessed the resilience of the sugarcane plantation landscape in the Caribbean. However, 
neither study provides direction on what methods are effective to assess social-ecological systems or 
describe data collected.  
Other studies did provide some insight and informed aspects of my data collection. Bunce et al. 
(2009) provided considerable commentary on data collection rationale and methods, which helped 
inform my approach to data collection. Biggs et al. (2010) provide seven attributes of systems they 
deemed to have transformed in the past. The Resilience Alliance has published two workbooks 
dedicated to assessing resilience in social-ecological systems (Resilience Alliance 2007, 2010). One 
remarkable similarity in all of these publications is that the specific criteria used to assess a given 
social-ecological system are judged to be situation dependent and largely left to the judgment of 
individual researchers. While maladaptive system traps have a specific academic definition, assessing 
real-world systems for such traps is considered to be situation specific.  
Based on these studies and my experiences of living in Grenada since 2006, I developed a 
series of questions to judge MS traps and transformability in Grenadian water management. The first 
set of questions addressed how MS traps were judged.  
• Had the water management system, or individual adaptive cycles within the water 
management system, remained in one state for a long period, relative to one another?  
• Did formal attempts to improve the system, such as implementing IWRM or conducting 
capacity-building exercises, tend to lose momentum and fail? Why? 
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• Was ‘progress’ (e.g., positive system change) being stifled via panarchy influences such as 
political factors, funding shortfalls, or key personnel or organizations? 
• Did stakeholders believe change was necessary or possible? 
• What ideas did study participants have regarding rigidity of water management? 
The second set of questions addressed how transformability was judged. 
• Had transformations taken place in the past? Past transformations were judged on five key 
questions, adapted for the study from similar criteria utilized in Biggs et al. (2010). 
o Have new named and identifiable entities emerged that were intended to facilitate a 
positive, meaningful change in how water was managed, especially entities that 
replaced a previous dominant or rigid authority that had a narrow scope? 
o Had attempts at this failed or succeeded? 
o To what degree had this entity displayed flexibility, adaptiveness, and an ability to 
foster incremental and transformative change in how water is managed? 
o To what degree had this entity improved water supply conditions?  
o Had the entity become a stable part of water management in Grenada? 
• Did fresh ideas and perspectives exist within the system? Where? And did these ideas and 
perspectives flow from stakeholders with little power to those with the most power? Or 
vertically within the water authority? 
• What planning of the Grenadian water system was being done and has it been effective? 
• Did stakeholders identify a need to change the system? 
• Had there been a reduction, or increase, in the number of intermediate-scale adaptive 
cycles? Explanation: Corporations are noted for fostering internal adaptive cycles to retain 
some adaptability and transformability (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Examples of this 
would be maintaining a research and development division within a corporation or 
conducting periodic internal reviews of mission statements. Did intermediate adaptive 
cycles in the Grenadian water management system play a role in adaptability and 
transformability? 
• What ideas did study participants have regarding transformability? 
With regard to from whom data were collected, I drew upon the resilience-thinking framework 
that underpins the study, particularly on the concept of panarchy. In the panarchy context, all actors 
who potentially influence Grenadian water management are important. This includes a wide range of 
participants, including: 
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• residents  
• academics 
• consultants, both foreign and Caribbean 
• water managers 
• funding agencies 
• other relevant perspectives discovered during the study 
Once the relevant perspectives were identified, decisions were made regarding who the key 
actors were within each perspective to target for data collection. For example, within the water 
manager perspective, key actors included persons working at multiple levels within the water 
authority, as well as in the Ministry of Agriculture. As described below, the snowball sampling 
technique was used with interviewees to capture a wider range of key actors within each perspective.  
With regard to how data were collected, four methods were chosen. These included 
observation, questionnaires, secondary document review, and semi-structured interviews. Each of the 
four methods informed the use of the others and is described below.  
3.2.2 Observation 
Observation is a useful and established qualitative research method which involves observing and 
recording phenomena at a research site as they occur (Yin 2009; Creswell 2013). Yin (2009) notes the 
opportunity to collect data through observation is inherent to most case studies. Since the data are 
unique, useful, and available for observation, they may as well be collected. However, qualitative 
research texts warn that observation is not without peril and should be approached thoughtfully 
(Patton 2002; Yin 2009; Creswell 2013).  
Nuances exist within the observation method of data collection. In particular, researchers 
should consider and define their role relative to the case. Patton (2002) describes a continuum of 
participation from complete immersion, or “going native” (p. 267), on one end to complete removal 
and observation as a spectator on the other, reminiscent of what Yin terms participant observation and 
direct observation, respectively. Similarly, John Creswell (2013, p. 166) describes one end of the 
continuum as "participant as observer" where, "the researcher is participating in the activity at the 
site. The participant role is more salient than the researcher role." On the other end of the continuum, 
Creswell (p. 167) defines a "complete observer" as "the researcher is neither seen nor noticed by the 
people under study."  
Yin (2009) describes advantages and drawbacks to participant and nonparticipant observation 
in case study research. The advantages to both include adding contextual detail to a case study and the 
ability to cover events in real time. However, recording and keeping records of observations requires 
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discipline and can be time consuming. Also, observation data can be selective, in that it is difficult or 
impossible to illuminate all perspectives within a case fairly, possibly distorting the dataset. Another 
danger is that the participation of the researcher may alter the events being studied.  
The participant end of the observation continuum comes with additional benefits and perils 
relative to nonparticipant observation. Yin (2009) acknowledges being a participant can help 
researchers gain access to events and persons otherwise inaccessible to a study. Another advantage is 
that participant observation can be used to gain rich understanding of the context of a case, including 
in-depth insight into the motives and actions of study subjects. Yin (2009) described this as providing 
the opportunity to perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone 'inside' the case study rather than 
someone on the 'outside.' Patton (2002, p. 268) described this benefit as, “the participant observer not 
only sees what is happening but feels what it is like to be part of the setting.” Finally, Yin (2009) 
strongly advises researchers who participate in the case being studied not to become a supporter of 
the group or organization being studied, or in other words, to be ‘captured.’  
The level of my participation in this case was in the middle ground between the 'participant' and 
'non-participant' extremes, and closer to the non-participant end. First, some aspects of my experience 
with the case tend toward 'participant.' I have lived in Grenada since 2006 and held a faculty position 
at a local university most of that time, teaching courses in environmental health. Living in the case 
setting familiarized me with water supply problems and cultural aspects of the setting. Additional 
aspects of my experience in Grenada tended toward 'participant' in the case. For example, I had 
substantial exchanges with key actors in the case both before and during the study, including residents 
throughout the country (many of whom I had surveyed for other projects), elected officials, persons in 
the water authority and in the Ministry of Agriculture, the primary regional funding agency for 
environmental health projects, and academics and consultants in the water sector. I also reviewed 
draft reports regarding the implementation of IWRM in Grenada and had attended and presented 
research relevant to water management in Grenada at regional conferences. Perhaps most notably, at 
separate times I lived next door to, and became friends with, two foreign consultants tasked with 
reviewing the operations of the water authority.  
Although aspects of my experience with the case tend toward 'participant,' other aspects suggest 
my involvement was 'nonparticipant' in nature. First, I believe I have never had any influence over the 
case and therefore doubt that my participation has affected or could affect the events studied. This 
point is a source of personal frustration and in fact inspired my decision to pursue a project evaluating 
mechanisms preventing change in Grenadian water management and how they might be overcome. 
Second, I maintained constant attention to how subjects perceived me and how that might bias their 
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responses to my questions. I made a conscious effort to be perceived by participants as 'intelligent, 
invested, but not dangerous or influential.' My goal was to improve my access to key elements of the 
case only accessible to 'insiders,' without altering the events I was studying.  
My familiarity with the case enabled unique insight into the perspectives and motivations of 
key actors. Simply stated, I better understood the perspective of residents because I was one. I better 
understood the perspective of outside consultants because I was friends with two of them and I 
reviewed draft reports for others. I better understood the perspectives of people working in the water 
authority because I personally knew several of them and had discussed aspects of their work with 
them.  
My familiarity with the case also enriched other methods of data collection. First, my status as a 
long-time resident often proved useful when conducting other methods. For example, when giving 
questionnaires to local residents, conveying that I had lived and worked here since 2006 and was not 
a 'here today, gone tomorrow foreigner' noticeably increased the enthusiasm of respondents. My 
familiarity with the case also informed how I approached other methods and interpreted data. For 
example, when conducting and supervising questionnaires for a related past study on rainwater 
harvesting (Neff, Rodrigo, and Akpinar-Elci 2012), I noticed that the respondents were very sensitive 
to what they believed the researcher wanted to hear or were possibly eager to frame their responses to 
solicit some form of assistance. It was observed in this past study that simply mentioning the words 
“rainwater harvesting” biased responses to advocate for use of the technique and at times for 
assistance in doing so (Neff, Rodrigo, and Akpinar-Elci 2012). In the present study, care was taken to 
focus the questionnaire on the resident experience with regard to water supply and solicit views in 
indirect ways including use of several open-ended questions to avoid biasing the data.  
In addition to the considering and defining the level of participation in the case, qualitative 
research literature recommends researchers consider and define procedures for recording and 
interpreting observations. Creswell (2013) provides detailed procedures for observation, in contrast to 
Yin (2009), who recognizes a range of formality is possible within observation. For this study, I kept 
a notebook of my observations and an MS Word document on the project laptop titled,' who is who 
and how they relate.' I updated the notebook the same day that new observations were made. 
Consistent with advice provided by Maykut, Morehouse, and Morehouse (1994), I reviewed the 
notebook document periodically and considered alternate ways of interpreting the observations. As 
necessary, updates were made to the 'who is who and how they relate' document. 
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3.2.3 Questionnaires 
A questionnaire is one form of a survey that contains "questions and other types of items designed to 
solicit information appropriate to analysis" (Babbie 2008, p. 272). In some disciplines, questionnaires 
administered by an interviewer are termed structured interviews and the term questionnaire is 
reserved for self-completed survey instruments that do not involve an interviewer. Some go so far as 
to describe face-to-face questionnaires consisting of open-ended questions to be semi-structured 
interviews (Brace 2008). Yin’s widely cited book entitled, Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods, is notable for treating surveys as a type of interview (2009, p.108). In this study, the term 
‘interview’ is intended to denote a “guided conversation,” to borrow Yin’s term. The term 
‘questionnaire’ is intended to denote a more highly structured query using both close- and open-ended 
questions, but with follow-up questions limited to clarifying participant responses rather than to probe 
for more information. Interviews are discussed below in a separate section. 
The questionnaire method has some notable advantages and drawbacks. It provides an efficient 
and effective way to capture the views of a large number of people (Milne 1999). In addition, 
questions used in questionnaires may be either closed-ended or open-ended, to generate quantitative 
and qualitative data. This provides for triangulation in the analysis of questionnaire data, which 
supports strong internal validity. However, questionnaires are notoriously sensitive to the wording, 
order, and other details of the questions posed (Babbie 2008; Brace 2008). Conducting face-to-face 
questionnaires can be time consuming and use of open-ended questions can produce large and 
difficult to interpret datasets. Additionally, it can be difficult to judge how much thought respondents 
give to questions, how truthful they are, or if they are interpreting the questions correctly (Milne 
1999).  
Questionnaires were used to capture the views of residents. Questionnaires were administered 
face-to-face because it was the most practical way to capture the views of residents as accurately as 
possible. I rejected conducting questionnaires by mail-in forms or telephone interviews based on 
practical considerations and to avoid difficulties in written or verbal communication. Questionnaires 
were also targeted at communities based on specified criteria, as described below, and conducting the 
questionnaires face-to-face by myself enabled me to verify in real time that recruitment was directed 
at communities with the desired characteristics. Finally, I felt that a face-to-face interaction with 
respondents would better enable me to leverage my residence in Grenada since 2006 to gain 
credibility with respondents, create an opportunity to make first-hand observations, and better 
sensitize myself to the resident perspective.  
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Questions used in the questionnaire were developed to help define the water management 
system and were both open- and close-ended (see Appendix B). Questions were designed to identify 
key variables, thresholds, drivers, power relations among actors, and panarchy within the system. 
Most questions  were close-ended, with the advantage of generating data that were relatively quick 
and easy to administer and analyze, but were prone to bias, a problem observed in previous 
questionnaires used in Grenada (Neff, Rodrigo, and Akpinar-Elci 2012). Open-ended questions had 
the advantage of being less likely to bias participant responses, but were time consuming to analyze. 
All questions were piloted, modified, and compiled into a final questionnaire.  
One crucial aspect of the questionnaire is that it was administered to evaluate the range of 
resident opinion about Grenadian water management, not necessarily to capture the views of a 
‘typical' Grenadian. First, as a practical matter, recruiting randomly among all residents in Grenada is 
difficult. Second, I judged that targeting diverse factions of residents could effectively capture the 
range of resident views and answer my questions regarding key variables, thresholds, drivers, power 
relations among actors, and panarchy within the system, as described in the preceding paragraph. 
Third, targeting specific groups of residents in extreme circumstances defined the range of resident 
experience and attitude most efficiently.  
Recruitment targeted communities of contrasting experiences regarding their potable water 
supply. In addition, based on personal experience I judged that the attitudes, empowerment, and 
behavior of residents vary between rural and urban settings and further recruited to capture 
communities with contrasting degrees of urbanization. Combining the factors of contrasting water 
supply and contrasting urbanization yielded four classifications of communities from which to recruit.  
• Urban communities with a stable, high quality water supply 
• Rural communities with a stable, high quality water supply 
• Urban communities with water rationing and/or frequent water quality problems 
• Rural communities with water rationing and/or frequent water quality problems  
Two aspects of the study population complicated the selection of sampling methods for the 
questionnaire. First, the quality of water supply and the degree of urbanization in a given community 
tend to occur as a gradient, not in an 'either/or' arrangement (Figure 3.2). However, ideal examples of 
communities in each classification were known to me or were tentatively identified by screening 
communities for geographic characteristics typical of each classification. Proximity of communities 
to water infrastructure was determined using the Grenada Water Information System 
(http://www.cariwin.gd). Communities lying in topographically difficult to service areas such as on 
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ridgelines and at high elevation were determined using Google Earth. Communities relying on water 
treatment plants drawing from catchments with a dry season precipitation to evapotranspiration 
deficit were identified in CEHI (2006). Based on this information, I then conducted reconnaissance 
field trips to over 40 communities to discuss the water supply situation with residents and observe the 
urban/rural character of each community. Field reconnaissance allowed me to identify communities 
with the 'best' and 'worst' water service, and with ideally 'urban' and 'rural' character.  
Rural Urban
‘Water Rich’
‘Water Poor’
‘End Member’ 
Classification
Communities 
Surveyed Within 
‘End Member’ 
Classification
 
Figure 3.2. Diagram depicting the population of the study area existing along gradients of the 
degree of urbanization and the quality of water supply. The majority of residents likely live 
somewhere between extremes. However, communities existing at the extremes are considered 
‘end members’ and define the four community classifications surveyed in this study. Within 
each classification, three communities were selected for recruitment. 
The second aspect of the study population that complicated the selection of sampling methods 
was variability of the attitudes and behaviors of communities within each classification. To capture 
this variability within individual classifications, I sampled three communities from each 
classification. Thus, three communities were sampled for each of the four classifications for a total of 
12 communities sampled (4x3). Figure 3.3 describes the geographical distribution of the communities 
surveyed. 
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Figure 3.3. Approximate locations of the 12 communities surveyed. Base map of Grenada 
provided by d-maps.com, http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=1707&lang=en.  
Key considerations for recruitment were to ensure representativeness of the sample. Houses 
within communities that were sampled were selected randomly by beginning the survey in a random 
location within the community and soliciting a head of household, male or female, at every third 
house encountered. I returned up to two additional days to solicit homes that were not recruited on the 
first attempt. A summary of communities visited in each classification and the total number of homes 
recruited and surveyed is provided in Table 3.4. To ensure representativeness of the sample, the size 
of population sampled from each community was homogenized. First, the size of a typical rural 'town' 
community in Grenada was estimated to be approximately 80-120 homes and then urban 'city' 
communities were divided into smaller ‘neighborhood’ units of 80-120 homes for sampling. This 
ensured that every third home was recruited throughout all communities sampled.20
                                                     
20 Statistically, sampling 100 individuals in a population of 1,000 is different from sampling 100 individuals in a 
population of 100,000. In the first case, 1 in 10 individuals is sampled, in the later case 1 in 1,000 individuals is 
sampled. These two samples are not as comparable as samples taken from similar-sized populations. 
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Table 3.4. Summary of communities taking part in the questionnaire and recruitment rates. 
Classification Community Surveyed 
Homes 
Recruited  
Questionnaires 
Completed 
Recruitment 
Rate 
Urban communities                                                                                        
with a stable, high 
quality water supply 
St. George's       
(Carenage area) 41 15 37% 
Tempe                                       
(lower portions) 37 15 41% 
Gouyave                  
(North-Central) 26 15 58% 
Rural communities                                                                                                      
with a stable, high 
quality water supply 
Felix Park 25 15 60% 
Florida 27 15 56% 
Lower Woburn 34 15 44% 
Urban communities                                                                                          
with water rationing 
and/or frequent water 
quality problems 
Calliste 33 15 45% 
Kafé Beau Hill 30 15 50% 
Mont Tout 32 15 47% 
Rural communities                                                                                                 
with water rationing 
and/or frequent water 
quality problems  
Munich 40 15 38% 
La Potre /                                       
Mt. Fann 25 15 60% 
Mt. Airy /               
Bay Gardens 31 15 48% 
 
Questionnaires were administered in November 2011 and May 2012 and all questionnaire 
interviews were conducted by myself to preserve consistency. It is possible that splitting surveying 
between a wet season month (November) and a dry season month (May) could affect resident 
perceptions and therefore responses to some questions. However, I believe the effect of splitting the 
time of year of administering the questionnaires is mitigated because I similarly divided sampling 
within each category between November 2011 and in May 2012. Moreover, splitting surveying 
between wet and dry season may have enhanced data collection with regard to capturing a more broad 
range of resident concerns than would have been possible sampling only at one time of year.  
Formal procedures were followed with regard to record keeping and data processing. The area 
of each community surveyed was delineated using Google Earth and saved as .KML files (Figure 
3.3). I took notes in the field, then summarized them electronically and attached them to the .KML 
files. Finally, I coded questionnaire data and transferred them to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for 
analysis. I recorded details of quality assurance procedures and data processing in an MS Word file 
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for future reference and to facilitate writing this thesis. Details of data analysis are captured in 
comments embedded in MS Excel files kept securely on the project laptop.  
Challenges were encountered while conducting the questionnaire survey. Many homes had 
guard dogs and fences that prevented me from approaching; this was particularly true of wealthier 
residences (Figure 3.4). Wealthier residents were also observed to be less likely to be home, 
especially during weekdays. The effect on sampling was to capture a disproportionate number of 
women, unemployed, and elderly residents, while missing a disproportionate number of men, 
wealthy, and dog owners. Finally, response rates to some questions were low. I attribute this to: 
residents declining to answer some questions; my forgetting to ask a question or record the response; 
and my failure to decipher the shorthand notations recorded for a given response and then not 
counting the response.  
 
Figure 3.4. A screen capture showing a .KML file in Google Earth displaying the delineation of 
the St. George's survey area and field notes summary. 
I administered questionnaires at the beginning of the data collection phase of the research to 
have them enrich the use and interpretation of other methods. For example, having a solid 
understanding for how residents experience and feel about water supply improved my confidence and 
especially my credibility when conducting interviews.  
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Figure 3.5. Grenadian residence with gate and guard dog. This arrangement was common 
among wealthier homes in the study area. 
For the most part, descriptive statistics were utilized to describe respondent survey results. To 
test associations between some of the questionnaire variables, Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
were calculated. Spearman correlations were used because questionnaire data were categorical, 
yielding rank ordered data for many questions. A sample size of 180 respondents (45 per community 
classification) was considered more than sufficient to maintain adequate statistical power (0.8) for 
correlation analysis. A very widely cited publication by Cohen (1992) presents the sample sizes 
required to test the significance of correlation coefficients at a range of scenarios relating to 
population effect size, statistical power, and alpha levels. For a medium population effect size (r=0.3) 
and an alpha value of p=0.05, a sample size of 85 is needed to ensure adequate power. When the 
alpha value decreases to p=0.01, a sample size of 125 is sufficient. Because some of the associations 
analyzed involved only a subset of the entire sample (e.g., tank owners), a much larger total sample 
size than necessitated by Cohen was targeted.  
3.2.4 Document Analysis 
Document analysis facilitates evaluating written records and extracting information to develop 
empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009). The method may be approached with varying levels of 
formality. Peräkylä (2005) describes an 'informal approach' to document analysis as not having a 
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predefined protocol and involves researchers reading and rereading materials until they are able to 
identify key themes and gain insight to the world the document originates from. In sharp contrast to 
the informal approach, other authors describe document analysis as a process of skim reading and 
interpreting material that “combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis” (Bowen 
2009, p. 32) and utilizes coding and category construction, often with elaborate protocols (Basit 2003; 
Peräkylä 2005; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2008; Bowen 2009).  
Peräkylä (2005) acknowledges the validity of approaches with contrasting levels of formality 
and describes the appropriate use of these approaches to document analysis as provided in the widely 
cited Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research: 
An informal approach may, in many cases, be the best choice as a method in research focusing on 
written texts. Especially in research designs where the qualitative text analysis is not at the core of 
the research but instead is in a subsidiary or complementary role, no more sophisticated text 
analytical methods may be needed. (p. 870) 
The author continues, “In projects that use solely texts as empirical materials, however, the use of 
different kinds of analytical procedures may be considered.”  
The literature reflects a wide range of views on the level of formality in document analysis. 
Some authors embrace the more formal forms of the method, often firmly rooted in grounded theory 
(Basit 2003; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2008; Bowen 2009), while others such as Yin view the use 
of documentation in case-study research largely as a tool to support inquiry using other methods. Yin 
(2009, p. 102) states: "For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources" and although a section of text is dedicated to "documentation" 
(p. 101-106), the words “document analysis” occur only once in the book.  
Bowen (2009) and Yin (2009) discuss distinct advantages and disadvantages of document 
analysis and the use of documentation. Bowen (2009) states that document analysis is often the most 
effective technique for gathering information on past events. Thanks to increasing use of the Internet, 
vast amounts of documentation are normally readily available and conveniently attained. Use of 
documentation can be done without directly interacting with the case being studied. In addition, both 
authors tout the stability of documentation, in that documentation is not altered by the presence of the 
investigator, and exactness, particularly in documenting names and events, as advantages of 
documentation. Yin (2009) and Bowen (2009) also discuss the drawbacks of documentation, 
including bias in the documentation itself or in the availability or selection of it. However, assessing 
the bias in documentation can itself be a useful output of documentation research (e.g., if documents 
consistently fail to indicate long-term planning or vision). Finally, a drawback to use of 
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documentation is the time and energy required to sort and review the vast documentation usually 
available through web searches. 
The rationale for utilizing document analysis was to tap a large and readily available source of 
information to complement other methods used. Documents informed the use of other methods and 
provided a critical source of triangulation in the study. Documentation was also readily available. 
Electronic documents were available either online or by request from organizations such as 
NAWASA or CEHI. Paper documentation was also available through newspapers and an archives 
room maintained by NAWASA.  
The use of document analysis was guided by the pragmatist epistemological underpinning of 
the study, which directly conflicts with the epistemological basis of more elaborate approaches based 
on grounded theory approaches that claim to 'let the data speak for itself.' Document analysis involves 
distinct costs in terms of resources that are directly proportional to the level of formality involved in 
the analysis. Grounded theory approaches tend to dedicate vast resources to elaborate methods to 
inform a researcher and often provide rich, unique insight to a study (Basit 2003; Bowen 2009). In 
contrast, the pragmatist perspective dictates that methods be selected based on their value to resolving 
the research questions (Peräkylä 2005). 
Unfortunately, some of the up-side potential of the more aggressive approaches to document 
analysis is mitigated by selection bias in the documentation available as well as from bias within the 
documentation itself. The large majority of documents available for the case in this study are 
produced by NAWASA or by consultants working with the water authority. Even newspaper articles 
on water management issues are often reprints of water authority press releases. This reality creates a 
bias toward the water authority viewpoint of the case, while often marginalizing other perspectives 
not documented as thoroughly. Beyond selection bias, the outward image projected by the water 
authority and consultants was also biased, as discussed in a later chapter. Simply stated, I did not 
want to read too much into the rhetoric of the water authority and associated consultants. A sensible 
alternative was to focus more on the existence of the bias in documentation rather than to dissect the 
rhetoric in it. In fact, evaluating what was not discussed in documents (e.g., multi-decade planning) 
provided great insight to the case. An elaborate approach to document analysis was ruled out because 
the 'value added' over a more basic approach was not likely to offset the costs.  
A more practical approach to the aggressive, formal document analysis technique was 
successfully used in the study. Electronic documents were gathered via the internet or through 
requests to key actors in the case. Paper documents were gathered by browsing the water authority 
88 
88 
 
records room and keeping a scrapbook of newspaper articles from the five Grenada-specific 
newspapers widely available on the island. Finally, relevant videos were identified and reviewed. 
I pursued coding of documents at progressively greater levels of detail until I perceived the 
value of doing so diminish. The first cut of coding was to read each document and judge if it was 
relevant to the study. As per the informal approach to the document review described above, I 
approached the initial reading of documents with a liberal and flexible sense of what was important 
for inclusion. Simply stated, I scanned each document searching for any reason to include it in the 
document review. For example, documents that discussed any aspect of water management or 
sustainability in Grenada were retained. Electronic documents deemed relevant were read, then saved 
in PDF form when practical and attached to an EndNote file. Keywords were assigned to the 
document in EndNote based on the topical content of the document or aspects of the document of 
particular relevance to this study. Text within the document was highlighted as relevant, and written 
and verbal annotations were embedded on the PDF document. I took notes on websites and organized 
them topically as they related to specific research questions. Paper documents deemed relevant were 
saved and organized either in a scrapbook, as with newspapers, or topically as they related to research 
questions. Many paper records, such as those in the water authority records room, were available only 
for a brief viewing. In these cases, I took notes regarding the document and later organized them 
topically alongside other paper documents. In most cases, the first cut of document categorization and 
note taking was sufficient to answer individual research questions.  
Knowledge gained from document analysis was used to develop a basic sense of the case, 
identify the potential existence of deeper issues, and to enrich the insights from other data collection 
methods. Various documents contained much information on the fundamental issues regarding water 
supply in Grenada. However, many documents were noteworthy for the information they did not 
contain, pointing to deeper issues. For example, the “National Rainwater Harvesting Programme for 
Grenada” was authored by a regional UNEP body and barely mentioned the local water authority 
(CEHI 2006a). At the same time, the 5-year strategic plan of the water authority contains brief and 
vague mention of rainwater harvesting and no mention of CEHI. Additionally, none of the 
documentation evaluated for the study revealed direct criticism between these two organizations. This 
apparent lack of coordination, or perhaps non-antagonistic territorialism, provided initial evidence for 
how these two actors view one another and influenced how I approached interviews with both.  
It is impractical to estimate the total number of documents reviewed. Over 200 documents 
survived the first cut of document selection and were potentially relevant to the study. Finally, 42 
Grenada- or Caribbean-specific documents were particularly relevant to specific points made in this 
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thesis and cited. In addition, I collected and used 27 newspaper articles to describe the resident 
experience with regard to water. 
3.2.5 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The semi-structured interview is characterized by the use of relatively few primary questions, but 
with additional follow-up questions to probe for further information (Gillham 2005). Semi-structured 
interviews have characteristics consistent with what Yin (2009) terms 'in-depth interviews' and 
'focused interviews,' both of which Yin indicates can be used to ask the interviewees to articulate their 
own thoughts and insight into research matters.  
Some controversy surrounds interviews, including semi-structured interviews in qualitative and 
case study research. Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews offer the opportunity to gain unique 
insight not matched by other methods and has led some authors to tout semi-structured interviews as 
vital to qualitative and case study research (Opdenakker 2006; Yin 2009; Turner 2010). However, 
others have expressed deep concern about a lack of respect for some serious drawbacks and 
limitations of the method in case study research, in particular, that data collected with semi-structured 
interviews are prone to inaccuracy, bias, and reflexivity (Diefenbach 2009).  
Interview data are prone to inaccuracy because individual interview subjects are thought to 
have a limited ability to respond to questions accurately. Interview subjects, as all of us, can have 
honest difficulties remembering past events accurately (Yin 2009). It can also be difficult for subjects 
to articulate responses in a way that will be correctly interpreted by the interviewer. 
Bias in semi-structured interviews can result from multiple sources, many of which are similar 
to the problems noted above for other methods. First, the data provided by interviews are subject to 
the selection and availability of interviewees (Diefenbach 2009). This limitation is essentially the 
same as was noted above with the selection and availability of documentation and can have similar 
consequences. Creswell (2007) advises that researchers select interview subjects deliberately, using 
one or more defined sampling procedures such as criteria and snowball techniques (p. 127). Second, 
as with questionnaire data, bias may result from poorly articulated interview questions (Yin 2009; 
Turner 2010). Third, the interview setting can alter how interviewees respond to questions 
(Diefenbach 2009). For example, in this study I observed that the attitude of some prospective 
interviewees changed from enthusiastic to uninterested when I suggested introducing an audio 
recorder to the interview setting.  
The issue of reflexivity in interviews refers to a respondent who intentionally provides 
misleading information. Yin (2009, p. 102) describes this phenomenon as the “interviewee gives what 
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interviewer wants to hear.” Diefenbach (2009, p. 881) provides considerably more detail and coins 
the term "socially accepted answering attitude” to describe a situation in which: 
an interviewee mainly provides such answers he or she assumes they are expected from him or 
her, the interviewer wants to hear, and which are socially accepted. The interviewee tries to 
provide the interviewer with ‘information’ that do [sic] not reveal what he or she really thinks but 
what appears to be plausible, appropriate and sufficient. 
This dilemma is similar to bias in 'official' documents in which an organization or agency wishes to 
portray a certain image or conformity to certain policies, but is perhaps more difficult to navigate in a 
dynamic and short-lived interview setting.  
The rationale for utilizing semi-structured interviews was to gain insight into how the actors 
within the case viewed the world around them. Semi-structured interview data were anticipated to be 
the most direct way to capture the various insights related to the case. This method was also selected 
as an important component of data triangulation. In particular, it was hoped that interview data would 
be helpful in identifying the bias of organizations and agencies left unstated in their documents. 
A second rationale for using semi-structured interviews is to take advantage of my position as 
being viewed as familiar and genuine, but not threatening, to many of the actors in the case. Since 
moving to Grenada in 2006, I have become familiar with many of the actors in the case, from the 
perspective of being interested in what they do and from a position without authority or even funding. 
Furthermore, I have consciously fostered a 'curious,' 'non-judgmental,' and 'non-threatening' image 
since my arrival in 2006. Not necessarily by intention, but of equal value to this study, I have also 
come to be viewed as 'not a source of funding.' Notable actors I have had repeated interactions with 
include personnel in the water authority, the Ministry of Agriculture, and five foreign consultants 
working on two projects. One of these consultant projects was tasked with capacity building to 
support IWRM and the other with leading an EU-funded project to audit the water authority for 
operational effectiveness.  
Interviews were conducted face-to-face (n=13) to keep the interview conversation spontaneous, 
minimize the subject’s opportunity to craft ‘socially desirable’ responses, and maximize my ability to 
observe nonverbal cues. Other interview types are easier, faster, and cheaper, but do not offer the 
same upside potential (Opdenakker 2006). When necessary, interviews were conducted by Skype or 
telephone (n=6). 
The issue of recording interviews was approached carefully. Recording was desirable as a 
means to maximize the accuracy of the interview record. However, Yin (2009) reports that recording 
can alter subject responses. This point is consistent with my own observations during the study, and 
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makes sense given Diefenbach’s discussion of the presence in many cultures of a “socially accepted 
answering attitude” (Diefenbach 2009, p. 881). For these reasons, an attempt was made to emphasize 
the confidential nature of the recording and the potential benefit of avoiding the need for me to take 
notes while respondents spoke, with the default being to not record the interview unless the subject 
indicated a willingness to allow it. One other drawback to audio recording is the massive amount of 
resources needed to transcribe interview recordings (Opdenakker 2006). In this study, I did not 
attempt to transcribe entire recordings. Instead, I listened to interview recordings and took notes 
based on the recordings. I also transcribed limited passages that I felt were particularly relevant to 
research questions. For data analysis purposes, notes made from audio recordings were then treated 
the same as notes taken during interviews that were not audio recorded. All interview notes were 
recorded digitally and coded to aid analysis. During analysis, interview notes for each code were 
queried from all interviews and evaluated side-by-side to aid answering research questions.  
Interviewees were selected in a multi-tier process. First, a list of perspectives was identified as 
being particularly important to the case. Examples include the water authority, resident, foreign 
funding agency, and domestic and foreign consultant perspectives (Table 3.5). Second, individuals 
were identified who had insight to each perspective. Third, individuals were selected to capture the 
diversity of opinions within the perspective. Fourth, the snowball interview technique was used to 
identify and pursue further interview leads until no new information was generated for a given 
perspective. In total, nine perspectives were identified, 28 individuals were contacted to participate in 
the study, and interviews were conducted with 19 of these individuals; 17 were interviewed in June – 
September 2012; two additional participants were interviewed and one second interview was 
conducted in April 2013. Many of the interviewees possessed insight to more than one perspective.  
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Table 3.5. Summary of the perspectives sought and captured in interviews. 28 individuals were 
contacted to participate in interviews and 19 were interviewed. Some interviewees had insight 
to multiple perspectives, accounting for the inflated number of interviewed persons in the 
second column. 
Perspective 
Number of persons 
identified,                          
number 
interviewed 
Description 
 
Academic or 
Scientist 
3 identified                                                 
2 interviewed 
Researchers in the region who publish findings on water 
management issues 
Consultant - 
Foreign 
4 identified                                  
2 interviewed 
Persons based outside the Caribbean who are paid to 
provide assistance to some aspect of water management in 
Grenada 
Consultants - 
Grenada 
2 identified                                  
2 interviewed 
Persons based in Grenada who are paid to provide 
assistance to some aspect of water management in Grenada 
Government                     
(non-NAWASA) 
4 identified                             
2 interviewed 
Government personnel, outside of the water authority, who 
are involved in some aspect of water management 
Political 4 identified                                                 1 interviewed 
Persons who have served as elected representatives in 
Grenada, Ministers fall into this category 
Regional Funding              1 identified                                1 interviewed  
Organizations based in the Caribbean that fund research 
into some aspects of water management 
Regional NGO 5 identified                                   4 interviewed 
Non-government organizations engaged in some aspect of 
Grenadian water management 
Resident-focused 
NGO 
4 identified                             
4 interviewed  
Grass roots' non-government organizations focused on 
improving the lives of Grenadian residents 
NAWASA 8 identified                                           8 interviewed 
Persons who do work, or have worked, for the National 
Water and Sewerage Authority 
 
 
3.2.6 Analysis Framework 
This study utilized two data analysis strategies described in Yin (2009, p. 130-136). The first strategy 
was to rely on the conceptual21
                                                     
21 Many of the sources cited in this section refer to 'theories' rather than 'concepts' in their discussions. 
However, the term concept, defined in Section 2.1, also applies in this context.  
 propositions to guide data analysis, SES resilience in this case. The 
second strategy involves examining rival hypotheses to explain the case study. In essence, the two-
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prong strategy for data analysis was designed to enrich internal validity and place the utility of 
resilience thinking into context with other approaches to answer the research questions. 
Other approaches to data analysis were considered but not selected. These include time-series 
analysis (Yin 2009), thick description and thick analysis (Patton 2002; Ponterotto 2006), the 
grounded approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008), and the constant comparative and theoretical sampling 
techniques within the grounded approach (Boeije 2002).  
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I describe the single-case study approach of this research, as well as the use of mixed 
methods and multiple analysis strategies to ensure triangulation on the research questions. The case 
study design was utilized largely for its ability to answer 'how' and 'why' water management in 
Grenada has been and is slow to progress. Mixed methods were used as a pragmatic way to answer 
the research questions efficiently and to provide diverse sources of evidence to allow triangulation on 
each research question. The four specific methods used were observation, questionnaires, document 
analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Finally, data analysis was designed to triangulate on the 
research questions while developing new conceptual insights into SES resilience. 
Prior to data collection, the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo in 
Waterloo, Ontario and the Institutional Review Board at St. George's University in Grenada reviewed 
details of the proposed study to protect human participants. Both bodies approved this research: 
University of Waterloo Ethics Clearance ORE File #17549, St. George's University Ethics Clearance 
IRB Application #11039. 
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Chapter 4 
The Grenadian Water Management System 
This chapter opens the second half of this dissertation, both in terms of length and in content. The 
first half, Chapters 1 to 3, introduced the research problem and questions as well as the case study, 
provided context for the study within the academic literature, and described the methods used. 
Chapters 4 to 6 document and discuss the results of the study, answer the four research questions, and 
underpin the conclusions presented in Chapter 7. 
In this chapter, I define ‘improvement’ in water management, evaluate data collected, and 
define what the Grenadian water management system is based on a detailed description of the three 
embedded units in the case study (Figure 3.1). More simply stated, this chapter defines 'what' 
Grenadian water management is, to provide a basis for discussing traps and transformations in later 
chapters. In Chapter 5 and 6, I will build upon the discussion presented here to address all four 
research questions. The three main sections of this chapter provide insight regarding: 
• the resident experience with regard to water (in 2012), 
• the water management system in Grenada, and 
• recent efforts to reform the water sector in Grenada. 
4.1 The Resident Experience: A Baseline for Judging ‘Improvement’ 
Defining the resident experience with regard to water provides a baseline to determine if various 
proposals to change the water management system are 'good' for residents or are likely to be 
perceived by residents as 'good'. The full value of these judgments will become more clear in later 
chapters when discussing factors that affect the prospects for transformation. For now, consider that a 
system is more likely to transform if members in the system perceive transformation is strongly in 
their best interest. Conversely, a system is less likely to transform if members in the system perceive 
transformation will not affect them significantly or be detrimental.  
Progress in water management is a deceptively complex term and commonly contains two key 
elements: (1) what to judge it relative to, and (2) how to judge it. In water management, progress is 
commonly considered relative to the wellbeing of people in some way. However, considerable 
variability exists in defining which people are of interest and how to define and gauge their wellbeing. 
Commonly, authors define progress relative to specific water-related development goals, such as the 
proportion of people with access to improved sources of water and sanitation (World Health 
Organization and UNICEF 2010). Other works place emphasis on values such as environmental 
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sustainability. One of UN-Water's stated purposes (UN-Water 2010, p. 10) is to "monitor the water 
sector performance, from the point of view of a sustainable development objective." The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) provides a book entitled Statistics, Knowledge 
and Policy: Key Indicators to Inform Decision Making, which contains many discussions and 
examples of how progress can be judged in a variety of settings in water management and beyond.  
I chose to define progress in Grenadian water management as relative to resident wellbeing and 
measure it relative to the aspects of water service which residents expressed as most important in 
questionnaires (e.g., service interruptions, dirty water). Residents consume 70% or more of the 
potable water on the island and form a basic component of the Grenadian water system22
One nuance in defining progress relative to resident wellbeing is the implicit role of ecosystem 
health. Simply stated, depleting the ecosystem may affect resident well being negatively. One of 
many possible examples is clearing forests to farm steep hillsides. This action may directly impact the 
timing, quality, and quantity of water received at water treatment plant intakes, which may also 
impact water supply and resident wellbeing. Effects of water resources management extend in the 
downstream direction as well. Actions such as land-use changes, dewatering streams, or polluting 
streams may impact activities such as irrigation, bathing, washing clothes, fishing, and use of coral 
reefs. Therefore, ecosystem health is an underlying consideration in my definition of progress in 
Grenadian water management.  
. Supplying 
residents with reliable and potable water is the primary function of the National Water and Sewerage 
Authority (NAWASA), the target of considerable foreign aid, and a key source of motivation for this 
study. For all of these reasons, I devoted considerable resources to understanding the resident 
perspective with regard to water and chose it as the first of three embedded units of study in this case 
study. 
Much of the following discussion on the resident experience is influenced by my decision to 
use questionnaires to evaluate the range of resident opinion about Grenadian water management, not 
necessarily to capture the views of an ‘average’ Grenadian. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3 and 
depicted in Figure 3.2, I administered questionnaires to residents judged as living in 'end member' 
communities relative to quality of piped water supply and urban and rural community character. I 
                                                     
22 NAWASA projections of water use by sector for 2010 are reported in the Grenada Water Sector Review 
(Government of Grenada 2007b). Residential use was projected to account for 67% of water use, with 
“government use” accounting for an additional 14%, including an unspecified amount of water flowing to 
public standpipes. If standpipe use is considered as residential use, the proportion of water used by residents 
is likely at least 70% and may be closer to 80%. To my knowledge, no follow-up data regarding water use have 
been published to confirm the projections. 
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based the following description of the resident experience with regard to water on data collected 
from:  
• questionnaires given to residents (n=180, 45 per each of the 4 classifications),23
• semi-structured interviews with system actors (n=19),  
  
• written documents, particularly newspaper stories collected during the study (n=27), basic 
demographics of Grenada, and 
• observations of resident attitudes and actions, as a resident of Grenada since 2006.  
Finally, I wish to clarify my use of the terms stakeholder and actor. Stakeholders are all entities 
with an interest in Grenadian water management, which extends well beyond water supply. Actors are 
stakeholders who affect Grenadian water management. Essentially, all 'stakeholders' in this study 
were also 'actors' with the exception of residents, as described below. 
4.1.1 Description of Resident Sample 
The majority of respondents was female (61%) and fell between the ages of 25 and 34 (34%). The 
fewest number of participants were between 18 and 25 (8%). The relative degree of impoverishment 
of residents was determined using three observable indicators suggestive of poverty in Grenada:24
Comparing demographic data collected for this study with census data is complicated by the 
dated (2000) census data and the intention to describe the views of residents experiencing extremes in 
water service rather than capturing an 'average' Grenadian. In addition, census data consider 
residential water source, bathroom facilities, and house construction type, but do not consider these 
data as indicators of poverty and calculate the proportion of residents with multiple indicators as I 
have done in this study. Nevertheless, data for demographics and for individual poverty indicators 
compare well with 2000 census data (Government of Grenada 2009).  
 (1) 
main water source not piped into the home, (2) lack of an indoor toilet (e.g., outdoor latrine), and (3) 
less desirable house construction type (e.g., board or makeshift construction). Fifty-five percent of 
residents fell in the most affluent category, which had zero poverty indicators. Twenty-two percent of 
participants listed one poverty indicator; 14% had two. Only 8% of respondents had three poverty 
indicators, placing them in the poorest category.  
                                                     
23 Section 3.2.3 explains details regarding the sampling rationale and strategy, including response rates (Table 
3.4) and the geographic distribution of sampling locations (Figure 3.3). 
24 Based on past personal experience conducting surveys in Grenada (Neff, Rodrigo, and Akpinar-Elci 2012), I 
deemed this observational method more sensitive to respondents than directly questioning their income. In 
my experience, residents often view direct questions regarding income poorly and many will not answer them. 
Furthermore, many residents do not have stable income, so cannot accurately cite their annual or monthly 
income. Many residents also receive remittances, which may disconnect income from living standard. 
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Table 4.1 presents a comparison of demographic and poverty-related data collected for this 
study with data reported for the year 2000 Grenada census (Government of Grenada 2009).25
Table 4.1. Comparison of demographic data collected with those reported for the 2000 Grenada 
census (Government of Grenada 2009). 
 Relative 
to census data, respondents were more likely to be female, older, and more likely to have water piped 
into their home, an indoor toilet, and live in a home with desirable construction type (e.g. concrete 
block construction). These discrepancies are plausible, considering (a) questionnaires were 
administered mainly during the daytime, when a disproportionate number of younger adults and men 
are likely to be out of the home, (b) only heads of households, who are older than randomly selected 
persons, were recruited for the questionnaire, and (c) questionnaire respondents, interview 
respondents, and my observations indicate water supply in Grenada improved and the economy has 
expanded considerably in the 12 years between the data collection for the census and for this study.  
Category 
All 
Questionnaire 
Responses 
2000 
Census  
Gender - Male 38.9% 49.8% 
Gender - Female 61.1% 50.2% 
Age 25-34 33.5% 12.9% 
Age 35-44 17.6% 13.3% 
Age 45-54 15.3%   8.4% 
Age 55-64 11.4%   5.8% 
Age 65 and Over 14.2%   9.0% 
Water Not Piped Into 
Home 11.7% 37.7% 
Lack of an Indoor Toilet  21.8% 47.1% 
Less Desirable House 
Construction Type 
45.9% 59.0% 
                                                     
25 These are the most recent and reliable demographic data available, particularly relating to the poverty 
indicators. A census was conducted by the Government of Grenada during the study, but results have not 
been published (2013). 
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4.1.2 Supply Disruption 
Disruption of residential water supply ranged from occasional to chronic (Figure 4.1). Statistical 
measures of association for nominal variables indicated a strong relationship between categorization 
and days of service interruption (Cramer’s V=0.471, p=0.00, n=174). This indicates the 
categorization of 'water rich' and 'water poor' communities was accurate.  
 
Figure 4.1. Relation between classification of residents surveyed and frequency of water supply 
interruption reported per year.  
Regarding the relation between poverty and supply interruptions, 36% of the most 
impoverished residents, with three poverty indicators, reported water supply interruptions at least 100 
days per year (Figure 4.2). In contrast, only 16% of residents with zero poverty indicators reported 
over 100 days per year of water supply interruptions. However, poverty indicators are relatively 
unrelated to supply disruptions for residents experiencing a moderate frequency of supply disruptions 
(χ2 = 9.798, df=12, p=0.634, n=174).  
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Figure 4.2. Relation between relative wealth of residents (zero poverty indicators = greater 
wealth, three poverty indicators = less wealth) and frequency of water supply interruption. 
A majority of residents reported the water supply situation is either stable or improving over 
time (Figure 4.3). One notable result was 63% of residents in water poor, urban communities reported 
water supply interruptions are decreasing over time. Also, relatively few residents reported water 
supply interruptions were getting worse. When asked why they felt water supply interruptions were 
(or were not) changing, most residents did not know why (66%) or stated NAWASA was doing a 
good job (25%; Figure 4.4). Only 2.6% of all residents surveyed felt water supply interruptions were 
consistently bad or worsening because NAWASA was doing a poor job or infrastructure was in 
decay. 
 
Figure 4.3. Relation between classification of residents surveyed and resident views on how the 
situation is changing over time 
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Figure 4.4. Relation between classification of residents surveyed and resident views on why the 
frequency of water supply interruptions is (or is not) changing. 
4.1.3 Dirty Water 
According to survey data, residents in both ‘water rich’ and ‘water poor’ communities reported 
receiving sediment–laden water, which they referred to as dirty water, at least some of the time 
(Figure 4.5). However, there was a statistically significant moderate relationship between community 
classification and days of receiving dirty water (Cramer’s V=0.281, p=0.00, n=154). Dirty water was 
reported as more prevalent in the water poor communities, especially the rural, water poor 
communities. In addition, there was a small, but statistically significant, relation between poverty and 
the incidence of dirty water (rs=0.208, p=.010, n=154; Figure 4.6). 
Dirty water is likely to be more frequent in rural, water poor areas due to a combination of 
episodes of turbid streamflow and insufficient water treatment. Runoff from intense precipitation 
events erodes the typically steep river valleys in Grenada and flushes sediment into source-water 
streams. A review of early (pre1990) studies conducted by the Caribbean Conservation Association 
(CCA; 1991, p. 86) states "various sources are in apparent conflict about the extent of soil erosion" in 
Grenada. This same review documents reports of sediment loads during flood events up to 1,000 
mg/L in the Beausejour River, which supplies source water for a large area that includes five 
communities surveyed in the present study. CCA (1991, p. 87) further states, "Persons interviewed... 
in the National Parks, Land Use, and Forestry units of Government, with the National Science and 
Technology Council, and individuals in the water sports industry (e.g., divers) -- tended to view soil 
erosion as a serious issue in areas outside of the forest reserves." In addition to the CCAIR review, 
observations and resident comments received during questionnaires suggest streams can become 
turbid during large rainfalls.  
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Compounding matters, water treatment plants in Grenada typically utilize small streams for 
source water and some NAWASA personnel (# 8 and 12) told me in interviews that many treatment 
plants in rural areas are antiquated and operate beyond capacity. In addition, rural water treatment 
plants are sometimes located in remote areas, often without electricity or road access, and are 
unmanned and not automated, making it impossible to take the plants offline to prevent passing 
sediment-rich water into the distribution system. Fortunately, residents reported episodes of dirty 
water were usually limited to a few hours in duration and typical only following rainstorms or repairs 
to distribution infrastructure.  
 
Figure 4.5. Days per year of dirty water reported by questionnaire respondents. 
  
Figure 4.6. Relation between poverty and the incidence of dirty water. 
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Episodes of dirty water were variable in severity, ranging from some residents who reported 
never seeing any dirty water and other residents who reported receiving water which was “like mud” 
(Figure 4.7). In answering this question, I classified the severity with brief follow-up questions or 
discussion. A participant response of not seeing dirty water was classified 'not dirty.' A response 
describing an 'off color' or 'some dirt,' but not a major inconvenience, was classified as 'slightly, not 
bad.' A report of the muddy water being unusable for consumption or cooking was classified as 
'brown/very dirty,' or 'severe/mud' if the participant described particularly severe muddiness; "like 
coffee" was a descriptor used by multiple respondents. In effect, episodes of 'brown/very dirty' water 
and 'like mud' water represent a water supply interruption. Residents in rural, water poor areas were 
far more likely to receive water “like mud,” possibly because of the same combination of factors 
described in the preceding paragraph. 
 
Figure 4.7. Severity of dirty water reported by questionnaire respondents. 
Similar to the issue of water supply interruptions, most residents felt the incidence of dirty 
water is stable or decreasing over time (Figure 4.8). Likewise, residents reported they either did not 
know the reason for recent changes (or the lack of recent changes) in dirty water or they credited 
NAWASA for doing a good job on the issue (Figure 4.9). 
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Figure 4.8. Relation between classification of residents surveyed and resident views on how the 
situation is changing over time.  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Relation between classification of residents surveyed and resident views on why the 
frequency of dirty water is (or is not) changing. 
4.1.4 Other Issues with Water Supply 
One-third (33%) of survey respondents identified one or more additional issues with their water 
supply. The proportion of residents in each classification who reported each additional issue is 
presented in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.10 and the following discussion reflect only the issues identified by 
more than one resident. 
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Figure 4.10. Additional issues with the water supply identified by residents. 
The most common problems reported by residents, other than water service disruption and dirty 
water, were excessive chlorine smell and/or taste, low and high pressure at the tap, and health 
concerns. Questionnaire participants who elaborated on their concerns over water pressure described 
diurnal fluctuations between low pressure during daytime which interfered with water usage and high 
pressure at nighttime which commonly broke water fixtures. I have personally observed pressure-
related fixture breakage at my home in Grand Anse, which confirms this aspect of questionnaire data, 
albeit outside the surveyed communities. Due to high nighttime water pressure, I have experienced, 
on separate occasions, chronic malfunctioning of a hot water tank, a burst under-sink sediment filter, 
and a broken toilet supply hose.26
Health concerns related to potable water were expressed by 14 of the 180 (7.7%) residents 
surveyed. However, these residents were concentrated in urban areas for reasons that are unclear 
(urban water rich, n=7/45, 18%; urban water poor, n=4/45, 11%; rural water rich, n=1/45, 2%; rural 
water poor, n=2/45, 6%; Figure 4.10).  
 In developed world settings, water pressure in municipal systems is 
typically delivered to residents at a minimum of 35 PSI, which is considered sufficient for firefighting 
operations, and at a maximum of 80 PSI, to reduce leaks and prevent breaking water fixtures in the 
home. One resident whom I surveyed in the Mt. Airy/Bay Gardens community had installed a 
pressure gauge on his incoming water line and reported diurnal daytime pressure dropped to zero but 
nighttime pressure sometimes exceeded 100 PSI (Figure 4.11).  
Questionnaire respondents also commented on abnormalities affecting the aesthetic quality of 
potable water. During the dry season, NAWASA augments the normal surface water supply with 
groundwater from boreholes and distributes it in some areas. Potable water with a high proportion of 
groundwater had a reputation among some questionnaire participants for being undesirable and hard 
                                                     
26 I also experienced failure of two pressure-reducing valves at my home due to clogging with sediment, which 
contributed to the malfunctions listed. 
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with regard to dissolved minerals27
 
. Nine participants (6%) complained of its taste and described it as 
“heavy.” Three residents (2%) expressed concern over a “bad odor” of their tap water. Follow up 
questions indicated the odor was not chemical in nature, but resembled dirt or mud, properties I 
associate with mold. I discussed this matter with the Production and Quality Manager at NAWASA, 
who was unfamiliar with complaints of mud-like odor coming from otherwise clean water. The 
manager said he could not give a definitive answer without seeing the problem first hand, but 
suspected the odor could result from sediment in the lines, or possibly from a poorly maintained water 
storage tank or as a result of backsiphonage from a nearby poorly maintained and improperly 
equipped water storage tank. Finally, four residents (3%) complained of white bubbles in their tap 
water which disappear after a couple minutes. Three of the four residents believed air bubbles were 
excessive chlorine, although the phenomenon results from air dissolving into water in the distribution 
lines under pressure and then releasing when the pressure is relieved as water exits the tap (US 
Geological Survey 2013).  
Figure 4.11. Pressure meter installed on incoming water line by a resident. This person 
reported diurnal pressure fluctuations between 0 psi (atmospheric pressure) and over 100 psi. 
                                                     
27 Data describing potable water quality in Grenada are difficult to attain and data describing groundwater 
quality in Grenada were not available for this study. However, I have observed pipe-borne water in areas 
supplied with groundwater that had a distinct flavor and mouth feel I associate with hard, mineralized water.  
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4.1.5 Adaptation to Water Supply Interruptions 
The ability to cope with water supply interruptions was influenced by the household storage of water. 
Storage can take several forms. Crude storage systems captured and stored rainwater using buckets 
and rain barrels which were not plumbed into the home (Figure 4.12). More elaborate systems stored 
piped water using elevated black polyethylene storage tanks of 500 gallons (1,890 L) or more and 
were plumbed to supply the home with water by gravity when water supply was interrupted (Figure 
4.12). The tanks are filled when piped water is supplied to the house under pressure and held for use 
during water supply interruptions. In some cases, large cisterns, typically holding over 10,000 gallons 
(37,850 L), are located under the home and may hold either rain water or piped water and are 
plumbed to supply the home with pressurized water automatically during water supply interruptions. 
With a sufficiently large tank and pressurization, residents may be unaware of water supply 
interruptions.  
 
Figure 4.12. Left: Example of an elevated 500 gallon (1,890 L) black polyethylene storage tank 
plumbed into the home. Right: Example of a rain barrel not plumbed into the home. 
Questionnaire data showed both the frequency of water supply interruption and wealth of 
residents are key factors in determining which, if any, of these systems are used. The more frequently 
residents experienced supply interruption, the more likely they were to have a water storage tank of 
some kind (Cramer's V=0.298, p=0.004, n=172). Approximately half of survey respondents (n=95) 
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reported having a tank of some type. However, there is no statistically significant association between 
poverty index and tank ownership (χ2=5,253, df=3, p=0.154, n=177). Nevertheless, for those 
respondents without tanks, most (74%) cited cost as a reason for not owning a tank. Additionally, the 
type of tank/system (e.g., plumbed/not plumbed) was moderately associated with poverty index 
(Cramer's V=0.374, p=0.004, n=95; Figure 4.13). This finding suggests residents who need to store 
water for use during water supply interruptions do so, but relatively wealthy residents own large tanks 
plumbed into the home, while relatively poor residents rely on simple rain barrels which must be 
accessed from outside the home. 
  
Figure 4.13. Relation between poverty and the type of water tank used. 
4.1.6 Cost of Water Service and Resident Satisfaction with NAWASA 
The financial cost of water supply in Grenada increased sharply from 2009-2012 in multiple ways. 
The legislature raised water rates in May 2010 for the first time in 18 years, which caused an 
approximately one-third increase in residential water bills.28
                                                     
28 Interviewee #7 provided information on monthly residential water bills (2012) as follows: the average 
residential water bill in Grenada is $44 EC ($16.56 CAD), while middle Income and upper-middle income 
residential bills average approximately $60-70 EC ($22.58-$26.35 CAD). This is in contrast to monthly 
electricity charges which interviewee #7 stated averages $300-400 EC ($112.91-$150.55 CAD) per household. 
The electrical utility was unavailable to confirm this estimate, but I believe it to be reasonable based on my 
direct observations as a Grenada resident since 2006. 
 At the same time, NAWASA has 
dramatically increased efforts to collect outstanding bills by disconnecting water service to delinquent 
residents. Interview participant #19 informed me many residents have access to piped water in a 
physical sense, but cannot afford their bills, are disconnected, and therefore do not have access to 
piped water in an economic sense. Additionally, seven questionnaire participants in Kafé Beau Hill, 
Gouyave, and Woodlands informed me NAWASA removed at least some of the public standpipes in 
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their community within the past three years. One resident in Kafé Beau Hill showed me a standpipe 
he claimed had been retrofitted with a valve to reduce pressure and flow dramatically. I estimated the 
flow to be approximately 1 L/min. 
Residents expressed mixed feelings regarding recent changes in their water bills. When asked if 
the recent changes in water bills had caused any problems, approximately one-half of residents in 
each of the four groups described at least some problem (Figure 4.14). Problems experienced by 
residents included a perception of the water rate being too expensive, financial strain due to paying 
the water bill, and anxiety over the inability to pay the bill, leading in some instances to a supply 
disconnection. Residents expressed mixed opinions when asked if they felt the increase was a good 
deal if NAWASA improved the water supply with the increased revenue (Figure 4.15). While 
resident opinion was split with regard to water bills, a clear majority of residents in all classifications 
was satisfied with NAWASA overall (Figure 4.16). 
 
Figure 4.14. Problems residents reported having due to the recent increase in water bills. 
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Figure 4.15. Resident responses to the question, "If NAWASA improves the water, do you think 
the rate increase is a good deal?" 
 
Figure 4.16. Resident overall satisfaction with NAWASA. 
4.1.7 Issues of Empowerment  
Data from resident questionnaires, document review, interviews, and observations indicated a large 
proportion of residents felt empowered to address water-related concerns with NAWASA and to a 
lesser degree with their elected political representatives; however, empowerment was very low with 
regard to other parts of the water management system. Within the four classifications of residents, 
between 34% and 48% felt NAWASA would not only listen to their concerns or suggestions 
regarding the water supply, but also act on them (Figure 4.17). Additionally, interview data indicated 
a high degree of engagement between NAWASA and residents. Resident needs were a central topic 
in all seven of my interviews with NAWASA personnel.  
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Figure 4.17. Proportion of residents who feel NAWASA would listen and respond if they had a 
suggestion or complaint about their water supply. 
Not only do residents feel empowered with respect to NAWASA, evidence collected also 
indicates customer service is a key part of NAWASA's identity. The vision, mission, and core values 
statements of NAWASA focus on residents, who are considered as customers (Table 4.2). I noticed 
the mission and vision statements prominently displayed in multiple locations at NAWASA offices 
and page one of the current NAWASA annual report (2012) is dedicated solely to display of these 
statements. NAWASA personnel referred to the mission and vision statements repeatedly during the 
interviews done for this study.  
Table 4.2. Vision and mission statements of NAWASA. 
Vision Statement A premier water utility, providing excellent service to all customers, fostering a healthy and productive nation.  
Mission Statement 
To provide customers with a safe, adequate, and reliable water 
supply and safe disposal of waste-water, in a viable and efficient 
manner, that meets and exceeds customer expectations, and 
ensures the development of our organization, communities and 
our nation. 
Core Values 
• Excellence in daily operations, with superior customer service; 
• Social responsibility at the community, parish, and national 
levels; 
• Accountability at all levels, to all stakeholders; 
• Innovation in operations and service provision; 
• Honest interactions with stakeholders; 
• A culture of continuous improvement. 
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During the study, NAWASA made substantive moves to enhance its relationship with residents. 
First, NAWASA created the Communications Unit29 in August 2010, which answers directly to the 
General Manager and is dedicated specifically to resident engagement. Since creating the 
Communications Unit, NAWASA began communicating with customers using Facebook, Twitter, a 
blog, and a YouTube channel.30, 31
  
 Notably, two videos on the NAWASA YouTube channel 
(NAWASA 2012b, 2012c) feature a local sports club and a church group working side by side in a 
‘fireman’s brigade’ to remove rocks and debris by hand from a water supply dam which was 
completely filled during a land slide. The volunteers excavated the dam and NAWASA soon restored 
the water supply. Finally, NAWASA published the Customer Service Charter in 2012 (Table 4.3), 
further strengthening NAWASA's orientation to residents (NAWASA 2012a).  
                                                     
29 Administratively, a "unit" is similar to a department, but has fewer than three full time employees. 
30 Most Grenadians have access to one or more of these media. 44% of questionnaire participants reported 
having access to the Internet and cell phones, which can access Twitter, are very widely used in Grenada.  
31 Facebook URL: https://www.facebook.com/nawasa.grenada  
Twitter user name: @NAWASAGrenada; URL: https://twitter.com/NAWASAGrenada 
Blog URL: http://nawasagrenadablog.wordpress.com/ 
YouTube Channel URL: http://www.youtube.com/user/NAWASA1Grenada 
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Table 4.3. NAWASA Customer Service Charter. Reproduced from NAWASA (2012a).  
Our Promise 
• Respect and courtesy; 
• Fair treatment; 
• We will always listen; 
• We will provide regular updates to customers affected by disruption of  
   service; 
• We will honour promises; 
• We will always inform customers in advance of the need to carry out  
    maintenance or investigation on their service; 
• We will maintain all service connections; 
• We will keep all information given to us confidential; 
• Notify customers through the public media of any programme of  
    disconnection for non-payment of bills; 
• Maintain the sewer systems; 
• Provide bills on a monthly basis to customers. 
Complaint 
Handling 
We will respond to your complaint in an efficient and effective manner to 
ensure that your concern is addressed openly and fairly. 
• We will investigate and resolve, as soon as possible, all complaints concerning  
    our services after you contact us. 
• If a customer feels that he/she has not received fair treatment according to  
   the terms of this Customer Service Charter, then he/she should in the first  
   instance seek a meeting with the immediate supervisor of the member of  
   staff who handled the original problem.  
• If a resolution of the problem is not possible by the immediate supervisor,  
   then the matter should be referred to the Manager of the Department, or  
   if necessary the General Manager, for his/her consideration. 
Customer 
Responsibilities 
• Allow access to your private property; 
• Notify us promptly of any damage to the meter or supply pipe; 
• Notify us of your need to relocate the water meter if and when necessary; 
• Notify us of change of ownership; 
• Adhere to water conservation practices; 
• Pay bills on time;  
• Treat our staff with respect and courtesy; 
• Provide accurate and reliable information;  
• Inform us of any interruption in our service. 
Service      
Standards 
The Customer Service Charter has too many standards to list all of them in this 
table. Notable standards include:   
• Waiting time at the Cashier (3 minutes); 
• Waiting time for NAWASA personnel to arrive for a site visit at an agreed time  
   (within 30 minutes); 
• Response time for repairs of burst water mains and sewer lines  
   (ranges from 1 to 5 working days depending on size of line); 
• Notice times for disconnection (5 working days); 
• Notice times for scheduled water interruption (2 working days); 
• Delivery of water truck services requested by customer (2 calendar days). 
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Feelings of empowerment to address water-related concerns with NAWASA were not shared 
among all residents and many felt NAWASA would not listen or act if they had a complaint or 
suggestion (Figure 4.17). Within the four classifications of residents, between 29% and 39% felt 
NAWASA would not act on their concerns or suggestions regarding the water supply (Figure 4.17). 
Some of these residents felt NAWASA would listen to their complaints or suggestions, but not act. 
Comments commonly received from residents included: “NAWASA will respond but not right 
away,” and "NAWASA will listen, but not act.” Other residents held no hope of having their 
complaints heard. This was usually a general complaint rather than a NAWASA-specific complaint. 
Comments received included: "In Grenada here they don't take advice from small people" and “the 
local man don't have no pass.” I observed a handful of residents (<10) who were clearly 
disenfranchised and did not know or seem to care if NAWASA would listen or respond to a 
complaint or suggestion.  
Aside from NAWASA, relatively few residents knew of anyone to contact regarding water 
supply issues. Some residents also felt comfortable contacting their elected officials if they were 
having water supply issues or had a suggestion. Between 7% and 29% of residents, depending on 
resident classification, felt they could contact their elected representative to help them with a water 
supply problem (Figure 4.18).  
 
Figure 4.18. Proportion of residents who knew of anyone other than NAWASA to contact 
regarding water supply issues. 
While residents enjoyed some degree of empowerment with NAWASA and local political 
representatives, empowerment was largely limited to water supply issues. Some residents showed 
frustration with water management issues which affect them. For example, one insightful resident 
asked:  
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Why are we letting [the private company] Glenelg bottle water and make money when NAWASA 
could bottle it and make that money? [And use the money to fund system improvements.] These 
are the kinds of ideas I expect to come out of board meetings. 
Other residents were willing to believe NAWASA was doing the best it can, but at the same time felt 
frustrated at not understanding the ‘big picture’ of water supply challenges faced by NAWASA. One 
resident stated: 
I think the biggest problem here in Grenada, be in NAWASA, the government, the electricity utility, 
they don't educate the public about why things are the way they are.  
I repeatedly observed poor resident awareness or inaccurate perceptions of many aspects of water 
management and water supply. For example, many residents (>20) spoke of a monthly 'meter fee' on 
their water bills and 14 residents cited the fee as something they would abolish. I asked interview 
participant #12 about the meter fee and received almost 5 minutes of explanation on how the meter 
fee is a 'connection fee,' is consistent with how most utilities structure their fees, and educating the 
public on this point was an ongoing source of frustration within NAWASA.  
Problems with resident awareness were particularly acute in regard to water sector reform, and 
not a single resident to whom I spoke or surveyed indicated any awareness of water sector reform or 
of the issue of fragmentation in the water sector. Media coverage of water sector reform was 
nonexistent during the study. Among four local newspapers published weekly or monthly, I found 27 
articles on water issues published between January 2011 and May 2012. Among these articles, none 
mentioned any aspect of water sector reform or fragmentation of water sector responsibilities. One 
article, published in February 2007 and collected for an unrelated project, described plans for the 
formation of an Environmental Management Authority and did discuss fragmentation in 
environmental management as a problem, but without specific reference to water (Ellard-Deveney 
2007). Also of relevance to the present discussion, this same article discussed the need for public 
education regarding environmental issues and empowering individuals to take action in their 
communities. 
The NGO community32
                                                     
32 My research revealed at least 10 and possibly as many as 20 active grass-roots NGOs in Grenada, although I 
do not consider this estimate conclusive. In addition, churches and schools conduct ad hoc projects to improve 
community well being and poverty reduction. Of these groups, I was unable to identify any that focused 
explicitly on water issues. Nevertheless, some NGOs and groups conduct water-related projects. Peters and 
McDonald (2011) provides a review of Grenadian NGO activities following hurricane Ivan and discussion of the 
factors limiting the Grenadian NGO community. 
 provides a weak voice for residents in water issues and residents are 
almost entirely unaware of water-related NGO activities. Water sector reform reports listed three 
Grenada-based NGOs as stakeholders and one is a partner of GWP-Caribbean. However, interview 
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and document review data indicate water-related advocacy among NGOs was relatively narrow in 
scope. Whatever the level of engagement of the NGO community in representing resident concerns 
over water supply, residents surveyed did not view NGOs as an effective ally in addressing water 
problems. Only one respondent felt a specific NGO was effectively promoting resident concerns with 
regard to water issues. Only 2% of all residents surveyed could name any NGO or formal community 
group working on water issues. An additional 3% of residents surveyed had a vague awareness of an 
NGO or community group they thought might exist. Two NGO leaders (interview participants #17 
and 18) stated in interviews that residents have little power in Grenada, especially with regard to 
water issues, and educating the public on water issues is an area of need. 
4.2 The Grenadian Water Management System 
NAWASA is the dominant actor in Grenadian water management and was therefore pursued as the 
second embedded unit of study in this case study. However, there is a growing consensus among 
actors in the water management system about the statutory limitations of NAWASA and the need for 
more holistic management of water resources. In this section, I first describe the position of 
NAWASA within the existing water governance structure. Next, I examine NAWASA in detail: its 
strengths, weaknesses, internal workings, and relationship to other components of the water 
management system. Finally, I provide commentary on potential for renewal within the water 
management system. 
4.2.1 Governance 
Grenada has no over-arching, coordinating legislation to govern water management. Instead, 14 
statutes, enacted or revised over at least three decades, govern various parts of the water sector. This 
arrangement has led to a piecemeal approach to water management and generally to a top-down 
bureaucratic structure which provides separate agencies with relatively narrow mandates. 
Furthermore, the patchwork of water legislation is poorly integrated and partial, lacking any over-
arching strategic vision for the long-term (multi-decade) water future of Grenada. One other 
shortcoming of legislation is the lack of oversight for NAWASA in key aspects, such as setting 
policies which affect customers and standards of service. The lack of oversight of NAWASA is a 
structural issue in the water governance structure which has drawn the ire of a 2010 review of 
Grenada’s water sector (Government of Grenada 2007b) and is a key feature of a new (2007), but 
unimplemented, water policy for Grenada (Government of Grenada 2007c). The following sections 
describe the 2007 water policy in detail.  
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To emphasize the limitations inherent in the present fragmented system of water management, 
many interview participants used the term ‘water resources management’ (emphasis added) to denote 
a holistic and ‘proper’ way to manage water resources and used the term 'water management' to 
describe what NAWASA does. Interview participant #14 stated, “Presently, because of the number of 
departments and divisions that have some responsibility for water resources management, very little 
coordinated work is done with regard to water resource management.” Eight interview participants 
considered fragmentation in water resources management and lack of overarching management as a 
reality, a known problem which needs to be resolved. Two additional participants, within NAWASA, 
discussed administrative fragmentation of the water sector as a problem, but expressed caution with 
regard to the need to address administrative fragmentation of the water sector.  
Long-range planning, defined here to mean multi-decade planning, is not required under 
Grenadian water management laws and as a practical matter does not occur anywhere in the water 
governance structure. This situation is true even within the individual ‘silos’ of water management I 
evaluated and was verified with the document review, interview data, and observation. The document 
review revealed no multi-decade planning and only weak evidence that multi-decade planning was 
being thought about. I explicitly discussed long-range planning with 12 of the 18 interview 
participants, including people in NAWASA, two other Ministries, academics, consultants, and NGOs. 
None could confirm the existence of any long-range planning with regard to water. Interview 
participant #2 had excellent insight into the water sector and was blunt when asked if there was any 
evidence of long-range, multi-decade, planning in the water sector. He said, “No. It's a short answer.” 
This participant continued to say a lack of planning is not unique to water resources, and that it is the 
same for social and institutional planning in Grenada and most of the Caribbean. Seven additional 
interview participants pointed specifically to a 5-year plan developed by NAWASA (discussed 
further in the next section) as the only water-related planning document and four of those seven stated 
even if planning is occurring, it is not holistic in nature.  
Despite the lack of long-range planning, interview participants in positions of authority kept at 
least a mental list of what needed to be done to improve the current system and prioritized needs well. 
This finding was true of persons in the political field, NAWASA personnel, consultants, and 
academics. I observed the ‘list of what needs done’ either consciously or subconsciously as 
substitutes for a ‘where we want to go’ approach in most interview participants' minds. This finding 
is, perhaps, understandable given the lack of integration in Grenadian water governance, a 5 years or 
less time horizon for political elections, the financial ability of NAWASA (discussed further in the 
next section), and multi-decade planning being a rare occurrence anywhere in Grenada.  
117 
117 
 
As discussed in Section 4.1.6, Resident Empowerment, resident input in water management 
exists with NAWASA, and is stipulated in the unimplemented 2007 water policy (Government of 
Grenada 2007c). Two local NGOs, the Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) and Grenada 
Community Development Agency (GRENCODA), are frequently identified explicitly as stakeholders 
in water sector documents (CEHI 2007; UN-ECLAC 2007; CARIWIN 2009a). However, as 
discussed above, questionnaire data suggest NGOs working on water issues are almost unknown 
among residents. Nevertheless, the balance of the evidence suggests a basic willingness exists in the 
water management community to consider resident concerns in water management and, should the 
2007 water policy be enacted, a structure will be provided to feed resident concerns into water 
management decision making.  
Despite the actions of individual segments of water management to engage and respond to 
resident concerns, decision making was still top-down. One interview participant in the NGO 
community, #18, was particularly critical of the existing top-down approach to water management 
(and in Grenadian society in general). This participant was enthusiastic about bottom-up approaches 
to watershed management used by the Division of Forestry in the Ministry of Agriculture, but felt the 
Forestry Division played only a the slight role in water management and was frustrated at the 
apparent novelty of the bottom-up approach. These views are consistent with evidence collected in 
the document review, which showed relatively weak resident representation in stakeholder groups 
considering residents consume over 70% of the potable water on the island, a point considered further 
in Section 6.1.1.  
4.2.2 National Water and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) 
The dominant actor in water management, by a wide margin, is the National Water and Sewerage 
Authority (NAWASA), which is solely responsible for supplying potable water throughout the 
country. NAWASA is administratively located within the Ministry of Works, which also oversees 
infrastructure such as roads. In addition to being the potable water provider, NAWASA has a legal 
responsibility to manage water resources under the National Water and Sewerage Act of 1990. In 
practice, however, several interview participants told me this responsibility means little. In the words 
of participant #7, "the power that NAWASA has [to manage water resources] is in name only. It is on 
paper only. NAWASA doesn't have the resources, they have a Water Resources Unit, but it is 
basically a shell."  
 The Ministry of Agriculture has some overlapping role with regard to water resources, in that it 
is responsible for managing land use and agricultural activities, which often occur on lands affecting 
source water. Within the Ministry of Agriculture, responsibilities are further split between the Land 
118 
118 
 
Use Division and the Forestry Division. Finally, the Ministry of Health works alongside NAWASA to 
ensure water supplied to customers meets basic health standards. Nevertheless, observations, resident 
surveys, interview data, and the document review indicate NAWASA is the main actor in the water 
sector in Grenada. For example, a 2007 review of the water sector in Grenada (Government of 
Grenada 2007b) contains a chapter devoted to governance. Within the governance chapter, 
NAWASA is named 12 times and no other agency is named more than three times. 
NAWASA recently produced a 5-year strategic plan (NAWASA 2009), the first planning 
document produced by the agency. This document describes the agency’s mission and goals, the 
challenges it faces, and outlines a plan of action for the years 2009-2014. The plan falls short of 
providing a long-range (multi-decade) strategic vision for water management, but acknowledges 
developing such a vision is desirable and the 5-year plan defines the first steps of moving toward such 
a vision. I asked a high-ranking NAWASA official why planning is limited to a 5-year time horizon 
and was told: 
The 5-year strategic plan, 2009-2013, was a watershed event for the authority. Because prior to 
that there had been no serious effort at planning even 5 years ahead. I believe you need to crawl 
before you can walk, and that [a multi-decade plan] is 'pie in the sky' right now. 
The creation of any planning document is significant in that it indicates a potential change in the time 
perspective within NAWASA.  
The internal structure of NAWASA consists of a Board of Directors at the top of the 
organization, which directs the General Manager, who in turn manages the activities of the Chief 
Engineer and the operations of five departments (Figure 4.19). The Chair of the Board of Directors is 
appointed by the Prime Minister. The rest of the Board is nominated by government Ministers and 
approved by the Minister of Agriculture. 
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Figure 4.19. NAWASA organizational chart.  
NAWASA operates as a business and does not receive funding from the Grenadian 
Government. Operationally, NAWASA’s annual budget is nearly EC$30 million (slightly over $10 
million CAD). This sum covers NAWASA’s operation and maintenance costs and is collected from 
charges to water users. However, revenue from user charges is insufficient to fund capital 
improvements. To fund capital improvements, NAWASA depends on foreign assistance. This 
arrangement leaves NAWASA in the uncomfortable position of accepting whichever capital 
improvements foreign assistance grants will fund, whenever they will fund them. One interviewee 
summarized the situation:  
Right now we are making money to recover our costs. But we are not spending money on capital 
improvements. We're not making enough money to pay for those capital improvements. Then we 
have to wait for grants [to pay for the capital improvements] and sometimes they insist on 
spending the money differently than we would spend it. 
Synthesis of document review and interview data led me to identify a common model of 
foreign technical assistance for funding basic studies to identify projects to improve water services, 
but leaving the identified projects unfunded. Unfunded projects are shelved until additional foreign 
assistance becomes available. For example, two important consultant reports referred to by interview 
participants were the Northern Grenada Water Supply Study (Stantec 2001) and the Southern 
Grenada Water Supply Study (OTH International 1995), also referred to as the 'French Report' 
because it was written by French consultants. These reports describe infrastructure improvements 
necessary to improve water supply in Grenada. The Northern Grenada project remains unfunded, 
while the Southern Grenada Water Supply Project was funded in 2009 by a European Union grant for 
EC$20 million ($7.4 million CAD).  
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The Southern Grenada Water Supply Project illustrates the frustration of relying on foreign 
assistance for capital improvements, particularly when based on dated consultant reports. Interview 
participant #8, who had intimate knowledge of engineering and water supply issues in Grenada, told 
me the chronic dry-season water supply problems in the southwest part of the island can easily be 
corrected by building a new and large treatment plant on the Concord River. This river is north of the 
city of St. George’s in the Black Bay watershed and has a relatively large excess of water which, if 
treated, NAWASA could distribute to communities in the southwest part of the island through 
existing infrastructure. However, this project was not considered in 'the French report' on which the 
Southern Grenada Water Supply Project was based. Consequently, a golden opportunity was lost to 
resolve the water supply issues in the southwest part of the island.  
NAWASA operates with limitations on its revenue which private sector businesses generally do 
not have. Interviewees #9 and 10 cited a 'social responsibility' to keep water rates low enough for 
impoverished persons to afford, which restricts revenue. Participant #9 explained the situation: 
There is a social aspect to what we do. We cannot set our rates freely to ensure we recover our 
costs because of our social responsibility. Normally [when running a business] we would look at the 
cost of providing the service and set the cost to recover our expenses. But we cannot do that 
because of the social responsibility. That is another serious limitation we have. 
Interview participant #5 described the situation as: 
There is a social view that people almost have a right to water, not everybody was convinced that 
they should have to pay an amount sufficient to make the water supply company a viable business. 
In addition, the legislature approves all water rate changes, which is politically contentious. The water 
rates were raised during the study, in 2010, for the first time in 18 years (since 1992). Also, the 
Grenadian government must guarantee any loan which NAWASA receives, adding a bureaucratic 
barrier to gaining loans and working around an inability to raise water rates. Therefore, NAWASA is 
effectively a ‘corporation-like’ entity with artificially low revenue, poor control over increasing 
revenue, and few other options for generating revenue such as taking loans. 
I did not find any hint of corruption within NAWASA. Only one resident I spoke to or surveyed 
indicated corruption was a problem in NAWASA. Another resident told me he had unsuccessfully 
tried to bribe his way to the top of the water truck delivery route during the drought of 2009/2010. 
This resident told me he eventually tried calling NAWASA and repeatedly told the customer service 
agent he wanted to talk to “whoever signs your paychecks.” The resident claimed his call was routed 
to “some guy named Christopher Husbands,” (the resident apparently did not realize Christopher 
Husbands was the General Manager of NAWASA). The resident complained the water truck was 
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consistently supplying his neighbors and running out of water before reaching his home. The resident 
then politely asked whom he had to pay off and how much it would cost to have the water truck start 
at his house. The resident then described vividly the reply from Husbands explaining how bribery had 
been a problem with the water trucks but it was no longer tolerated. A water truck supplied this 
resident with water within a few days without requesting a bribe.  
Although corruption within NAWASA did not appear significant, multiple sources indicated 
NAWASA is vulnerable to a lack of political transparency and manipulation from above. For 
example, NAWASA owns three desalination plants it apparently did not request, was not consulted 
on, and are now inoperable and unwanted. In an open letter to the former Minister of Works of the 
now-opposition party, dated 4/22/2010 and published on the Grenadian Connection web site 
(Ferguson 2010), a prominent political activist named Sandra Ferguson wrote:  
The Ministry of Public Utilities bought and installed three desalination plants without any input 
from NAWASA, without the benefit of any feasibility study. When the plants were installed in Petite 
Martinique and in Carriacou, they could not be hooked up to any distribution system since a 
distribution system did not exist. In Woburn, AFTER the plant had been installed, drilling for water 
took place and it was found that the brackish (ground)water (needed for desalination) did not exist 
in the location where the plant was installed. 
I verified basic details of this account with three interviewees, who emphasized NAWASA was never 
consulted regarding the plants and due to the technical and practical implausibility the plants would 
never be useful. Two of the three plants are out of operation (2012) and the third is run minimally to 
keep it operational in the event it may become useful someday. I asked interviewee (#10) about the 
source of the funding for the project and received this response: 
I don't know. Like I said, we didn't know anything about it and then it was built. They were going to 
build it on Grand Anse Beach, but there were objections from the hotels that were close to it, and 
they moved it to Woburn. It cost around seven million dollars [EC] and was never finished. We 
were never consulted on where it should be. The Minister of Works bought the plant. They gave a 
private contractor the job to install it. When the contractor ran into problems then they said, 
NAWASA you take it now, you fix it. So we tried to get a copy of the contract to see what is the 
responsibility of the contractor and what is the responsibility of the government. We never got this 
contract. We were trying to work with our chairman back then, who was the permanent secretary 
in Works. We said, you are the guy in Works, you are second in command, just get a copy (of the 
contract). Not even he could get a copy of the contract. So that's the justice of political 
interventions and how they can cost a company like NAWASA.  
I asked interviewee #9 how this sort of thing could happen. The interviewee responded, almost 
exasperated, "Ah, the Ministries do these things."  
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A similar story, dating to the 1970s, was told to me separately by four interviewees regarding 
the siting of the water treatment plant at Mardi Gras. Water managers had originally planned to locate 
the treatment plant conveniently downhill from the source water intake, near a valley bottom. 
However, the Prime Minister at the time, Sir Eric Gairy, demanded NAWASA build the plant on a 
nearby hilltop so “everyone can see what we have built.” Interview participant #10 recalled:  
Mr. Noel was the manager or chief engineer at the time [Mr. Noel later came back as the General 
Manager]. He left over this project… Mr. Noel protested (locating the plant at the top of a hill). And 
the PM told him, 'look, if you want your job you will do as I tell you.' So Mr. Noel left to go work 
with CARICOM over that project. And our hope when the Americans came [in the 1981 
intervention] is that they would ‘accidentally’ bomb the plant (so it could be relocated to a suitable 
location). Gairy insisted it go there. So Noel left.  
From these data, I conclude that while corruption is apparently not an issue within NAWASA, 
it is vulnerable to manipulation from above in questionable and non-transparent ways. This 
conclusion is consistent with global rankings of governance indicators ranking Grenada moderately 
high globally, although the 2002-2011 trend indicates a modest decline in this regard (Figure 4.20). In 
2011, Grenada ranked in the 69th percentile globally in control of corruption, approximately the same 
as nations such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Cuba, and Korea. 
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Figure 4.20. Governance indicators for Grenada. Higher percentile values indicate better 
governance. Chart created at the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators web page, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp, and was modified to enhance clarity. 
 
4.2.3 Potential for Renewal of the Water Management System 
Capacity exists to mitigate the structural deficiencies in Grenadian water resources management. 
First, individual components within the water management system function well within their 
individual mandates. This is particularly true of NAWASA. On an individual basis, personnel in the 
Grenadian water management system revealed remarkable insight and enthusiasm for what they were 
doing. Second, Global Water Partnership-Caribbean (GWP-C) has especially strong ties to Grenada. 
Former Grenada Prime Minister Keith Mitchell was the keynote speaker at the GWP-C inauguration 
ceremony in 2004 and seven GWP-C partner organizations are Grenadian; including one local NGO; 
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two consulting firms; and four Government agencies. Two of the nine Caribbean-based members of 
the GWP-C Steering Committee are from Grenada; including the Committee Chair, Trevor 
Thompson, Land Use Officer for the Ministry of Agriculture; and Terrence Smith, owner of an 
engineering consulting firm in Grenada and Chair of the NAWASA Board of Directors. Both GWP-C 
and a foreign-based capacity-building project (the Caribbean Water Initiative, CARIWIN) have 
devoted considerable resources to promote sustainable water management in Grenada,33
4.3 Water Sector Reform
 especially 
IWRM. Third, Grenada is sufficiently small for all of the key water sector actors to know one 
another, communicate regarding water issues, and share datasets. Interview data did not reveal any 
antagonism within the water sector and interviewee #10 explicitly stated, "There is no antagonism 
between [NAWASA and the Ministry of Agriculture]. We collaborate where we need to." Finally, the 
wheels of change may already be moving. A new water management policy for Grenada was drafted 
and adopted in 2007 (Government of Grenada 2007c), and is described in the following section. The 
2007 policy mandates a more holistic approach to water management, including the eventual 
implementation of IWRM. However, the new policy remains unlegislated, unimplemented, and, in the 
words of interviewee #10, "an academic exercise, just a piece of paper."  
 
In 2007, the Government of Grenada initiated a process to create a national water policy as a 
condition to receive EC$20 million from the European Union for the Southern Grenada Water Supply 
Project. The Government of Grenada contracted with consultants to produce three key documents: the 
Grenada Water Sector Review, a Draft National Water Policy, and a Framework for Water Policy 
Implementation. These documents sought to identify the deficiencies in water resources management, 
define a water policy for future integrated water resources management, and chart a path to 
implementing the new policy. Later in 2007, the Grenada Legislature formally adopted the newly 
drafted water policy and the EU released funds for the Southern Grenada Water Supply Project. 
However, a crucial distinction exists between adopting the 2007 water management policy and 
water sector reform. Legally, a policy serves to inform the actions of the government, but does not 
automatically dictate how the government operates. To change how the government operates, the 
legislature must take additional action and establish one or more new statutes which mandate and 
direct change. In the case of Grenadian water management, the current system (2013) is a patchwork 
of 14 statutes, which govern specific aspects of water management. None of these statutes has 
                                                     
33 It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of funding spent to improve water governance in Grenada. However, 
conversations with interview participants #2 and 3 and significant internet-based research suggest funding in 
excess of $10 million (CAD) flowed annually since at least 2008, and possibly much earlier, into 15 English-
speaking Caribbean nations explicitly for the purpose of improving water governance.  
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overarching authority, or is holistically oriented. To implement the provisions of the 2007 water 
policy, the legislature must establish a new, overarching statute to supersede the existing legislative 
arrangement and redefine how the water sector operates. The EU required the Grenadian government 
to create and adopt a 'sensible' water policy34 but did not require the government to pass supporting 
legislation.35
4.3.1 Key Provisions 
 In effect, the EU allowed the Grenadian government to give lip service to changing the 
structure of water management, without actually doing so. Although Grenada has not passed 
legislation to implement key aspects of the 2007 water policy, efforts are ongoing to facilitate passage 
of such legislation. The effort to create a new, holistic system of water resources management in 
Grenada by passing legislation to implement key aspects of the 2007 water policy has come to be 
known as water sector reform and forms the third and final embedded unit of this case study.  
The water sector review (Government of Grenada 2007b) provides a detailed analysis of Grenadian 
water governance. A central issue raised in the review is that the current water governance structure 
puts NAWASA in the position of being all of water provider, manager, and regulator. With little 
oversight, NAWASA sold water, but was also in charge of setting standards of service, creating 
policies, and making strategic decisions which affect revenue from water sales. NAWASA also fields 
complaints about water service. Resident survey data show residents had few options if they had a 
problem with NAWASA. Correcting these conflicts of interest is a primary feature of water sector 
reform. Another point made in the water sector review and confirmed in interviews conducted for this 
study is the NAWASA Board of Directors consists of political appointments from the ruling party, 
not an ideal arrangement.  
The water sector review (Government of Grenada 2007b) articulates the many challenges to 
providing water services throughout Grenada, highlighting the need for a more holistic management 
of water resources. Based on the water sector review, a new water policy was drafted in 2007 which 
calls for the restructuring of the water sector to (a) separate water service provision and regulation 
and (b) create an overarching water resources management entity (Figure 4.21). 
                                                     
34 The EU required Grenada to adopt a new water policy. However, the precise language used by the EU to 
describe the requirements for a new water policy was unknown to any interview participant and was not 
described in any document reviewed. The term 'sensible' emerged in interviews to describe what system 
actors set out to develop in a new policy. 
35 It is also unclear if the EU intended to allow Grenada to adopt a new water policy but not implement it. 
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Figure 4.21. Chart of water resource management responsibilities in the new (2007), but yet 
unimplemented, water policy. Modified from Government of Grenada (2007b). 
The function of water sector reform to create an overarching water resources management 
entity appeared to strip authority from NAWASA. Legally, NAWASA has had a mandate to manage 
water resources and has had an administrative unit, named the Water Resources Unit, to manage 
water holistically. However, this unit was perceived as ineffective due to a lack of resources as 
explained by interviewee #7:  
the power that NAWASA has [to manage water resources] is in name only. It is on paper only. 
NAWASA doesn't have the resources, they have a Water Resources Unit, but it is basically a shell. 
NAWASA isn't doing 5% of what it should be doing in the area of water resources management. It 
doesn't have the financial and other resources to do it. So [the statutory authority for NAWASA to 
manage water resources] is on paper only.   
Interviewees #5 and #8 described NAWASA's financial condition as having revenue from user 
charges sufficient to survive operationally and relying on foreign funds to address other priorities 
such as capital improvements. Simply stated, foreign entities funded at least some capital 
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improvements, for example the Southern Grenada Water Supply Project, but no foreign funding 
existed for tasks such as holistic water resources planning.  
Despite the relocating of authority for water resources management from NAWASA to a new 
entity, persons within NAWASA did not feel water sector reform would affect their day-to-day 
operations. In the words of interviewee #12: 
The water sector reform structure does not change anything we do, it provides for something that 
is not being done by anyone. 
It is going to provide an entity that is going to take a forward looking and a management approach 
to the entire nation's water resources. We [NAWASA] only provide very limited information on 
water resources that we use or have intentions of using. Things that are downstream from us, we 
don't play a part in that. So no one is really doing organized catchment protection or anything like 
that. [Water sector reform] provides an opportunity for that to take place. 
One key feature of the 2007 water policy (Government of Grenada 2007c) is a provision for 
IWRM to be carried out within the Water Resources Unit. However, the 2007 water policy provides 
little direction for the form of IWRM, providing vague language for "the coordination with and 
inclusion of national and community-based agencies and (water) stakeholders" (p. 7). One vision for 
how IWRM could be implemented is presented in the Road Map Toward Integrated Water Resources 
Management Planning for Grenada (CEHI 2007). This document presents a relatively elaborate 
vision for implementing IWRM, featuring a 20-page description (p. 48-67) of 100 distinct activities 
presented as "necessary for attaining IWRM at the national level" (p. 46). Notably, the Road map 
document (CEHI 2007) did not discuss or acknowledge alternative management approaches or ways 
of interpreting IWRM, a point I return to in Chapter 6. In summary, much remains to be resolved in 
regard to implementing IWRM in Grenada.  
4.3.2 Legislation as the Key Barrier to Implementation 
Interviewees #2, 6, 7, 12, and 14, who were all in excellent positions to judge water sector reform, felt 
passing legislation to support the 2007 water policy was the critical threshold to transform water 
management in Grenada. To paraphrase these interview participants, once the government passes 
legislation to support the 2007 water policy, a tipping point is reached and the system moves to 
something different. Interestingly, none of the interviewees considered non-legislative means of 
transforming water management. Nevertheless, at the middle of 2013, the 2007 water policy remained 
unsupported by new legislation for reasons explored in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I define 'improvement' in the water sector as improving the resident experience with 
water. I established a baseline description of the range of residents’ views on their water service and 
water management, identified trends, and assessed resident empowerment in water management. The 
resident experience with regard to water was variable, with substantial water shortages in some 
communities36
The water management system in Grenada is fragmented and lacking a coherent, overarching 
approach. Fragmentation results mainly because 14 statutes control specific aspects of water 
management. Additionally, long-range (meaning multi-decade) planning was not present in any part 
of the system, although actors tended to keep at least a mental list of 'what needs done' to prioritize 
actions. NAWASA has the legal task of supplying water throughout the island and was generally 
viewed as the overwhelmingly dominant actor in the water sector. NAWASA is administratively 
within of the Ministry of Works, but operates similarly to a business, in that it recovers 100% of its 
operating costs from water tariffs. Revenue is sufficient to cover its operating expenses, but 
NAWASA depends on foreign assistance to fund capital improvements. Unlike a typical business, 
NAWASA must contend with political resistance to raising water tariffs and is vulnerable to political 
manipulation from above. NAWASA also operates as a monopoly. The identity of NAWASA is 
remarkably customer-oriented and management of the company is relatively healthy and adaptable. 
However, NAWASA is limited in its relatively narrow legal mandate as a water service provider.  
 and problems with episodic poor water quality nearly everywhere. In addition, 
NAWASA is overwhelmingly the single most significant system actor, in the view of residents. 
Residents were nearly completely unaware of NGO engagement in water supply issues and NGO's 
typically did not engage or educate residents directly on water issues except as part of specific 
projects. Resident empowerment in the Grenadian water system is mixed; residents felt some 
empowerment on water issues with NAWASA and to a lesser extent with their elected 
representatives, but not with any other component of the water management system. Finally, the level 
of resident knowledge of water issues was largely limited to water supply and matters typically 
handled by NAWASA. Residents were unaware of issues such as fragmentation of water 
management and water sector reform. 
Water sector reform is the term given to an ongoing effort to transform the water management 
system from a fragmented system into a holistic, integrated, and transparent system. As a first step, a 
                                                     
36 In this study, I surveyed six communities that experience substantial water shortages: Calliste, Kafé Beau 
Hill, Mont Tout, Munich, La Potre, and Mt Airy. However, while exploring the island searching for survey 
communities, I encountered other communities experiencing water shortages. In general, the proportion of 
communities experiencing water shortage is small and in decline.  
129 
129 
 
new water policy was adopted by the Grenadian government in 2007, which retains NAWASA as a 
water provider, but adds independent oversight of NAWASA and consolidates and strengthens water 
resources management in a new administrative body. However, Grenada has yet to adopt legislation 
to supersede the existing patchwork of legislation, leaving the 2007 water policy an essentially 
academic document without legal power.  
In terms of the ball in cup analogy, Grenadian water supply and Grenadian water management 
are depicted in Figure 4.22. Grenadian water supply exhibits low resilience, in that it is vulnerable to 
shortages in times of low precipitation and episodes of dirty water during times of high precipitation 
and after maintenance operations. In other words, it takes only a slight disturbance to move the 
system between stability domains. In contrast, Grenadian water management exhibits high resilience, 
in that it persists under the existing 14-statute legal framework and is unable to transform to the 
arrangement called for under the 2007 water policy. The persistence of the low resilience character of 
the water supply level is linked to the persistence of the current, fragmented water management 
regime; if water management operated in an integrated, holistic fashion, the water supply would 
likely be more resilient, in a positive way, than it is today.   
Traditional water management and interventions typically focus directly on raising the sides of 
the 'normal water supply' cup at the water supply level, often by improving infrastructure. While 
sometimes effective, this approach fails to recognize or address underlying issues. The focus of this 
study is to explain why the water management system has been reluctant to transform and how to 
coax it into doing so. In particular, moving the system away from the existing arrangement and to the 
2007 water policy domain involves passage of legislation to supersede the existing patchwork of 
legislation and is a primary topic of discussion in the next chapter, Traps and Transformations.  
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Figure 4.22. Grenadian water supply and Grenadian water management depicted in a ball in 
cup heuristic. 
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Chapter 5 
Traps and Transformations  
This is the second of three chapters which present and discuss study results. Chapter 4 developed a 
foundational understanding of the case study as it existed in 2012. This chapter explains what is going 
right with transformation of water management. Chapter 6 will explain what is going wrong with this 
transformation and suggest what should be done about it. The following three sections answer the 
first three research questions by developing and applying frameworks to determine (a) the existence 
and extent of maladaptive system traps, (b) transformations in Grenadian water management, and (c) 
the effectiveness of intervention efforts in fostering transformability. 
A key point of the next three chapters is my use of the Kingdon (1995 [2003]) three-streams 
framework to judge important aspects of my results. My rationale for choosing the three-streams 
framework, rather than the many potential alternatives in the academic literature, was threefold. First, 
key transformation literature has already used and endorsed the three-streams to help explain 
transformation (see Table 2.2). Second, the three-streams model was developed to explain legislative 
action and agendas (Kingdon 1995 [2003]), which was particularly applicable to my case study. 
Third, I spent two months trying, unsuccessfully, to explain my dataset relative to various 'networks 
and bridging organizations' concepts. The 'a-ha moment' of my analysis came when I applied the 
three-streams framework, which explained my data well. To be clear, I do not claim the three-streams 
framework is the only valid approach to explain transformation of social-ecological systems. 
Alternative approaches may also be effective and might include the advocacy coalition framework 
(Sabatier 1987) and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). However, I do 
claim the three-streams framework is valid, reputable, and the approach that provided the best 
explanation of my data among those with which I am familiar. 
5.1 Maladaptive System Traps 
This section evaluates Grenadian water management with regard to the presence of SES traps, 
develops an evaluation framework to assess rigidity traps, and applies the framework to answer the 
first research question:  
1.  To what extent is Grenadian water management in a trap? 
Maladaptive system traps were defined in Section 2.2.1 as being “a persistent and undesirable 
state,” while acknowledging both persistent and undesirable are relative terms. Undesirability of the 
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current system, described throughout this chapter,37
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the answers to the five questions regarding persistence. I 
include this table at the outset to allow readers the option to gain an overview of the bulk of the 
chapter. 
 was evident from widespread discontent among 
water professionals over fragmentation of water management responsibilities and poor transparency. 
'Persistence' of Grenadian water management was judged using five questions developed in Section 
3.2.1, answered in the next five subsections. Section 5.1.6 proposes and applies a method for 
describing the extent of a given trap and answers the first research question.  
Table 5.1. Summary of answers to five key questions regarding Research Question #1. 
Key questions regarding Research Question #1   Summaries of answers to  key questions 
See 
Section 
1 
Had the system, or individual adaptive cycles 
within the system, remained in one state for a 
long period, relative to other system 
components? 
 
Yes. The fundamental structure of 
the system was persistent.  5.1.1 
2 
Did formal attempts to improve the system, 
such as implementing IWRM or conducting 
capacity-building exercises, tend to lose 
momentum and fail? Why? 
 
Yes. They failed due to an inability 
to seize windows of opportunity. 5.1.2 
3 
Was 'progress' (e.g., positive system change) 
being stifled via panarchy influences such as 
political factors, funding shortfalls, or key 
personnel or organizations? 
 
Yes. Funding shortfalls and political 
factors were blamed for blocking 
system change. 
5.1.3 
4 Did stakeholders believe change was necessary or possible? 
 
Most, but not all, stakeholders felt 
change was necessary. Stakeholders 
had varying views on the potential 
to accomplish change, although 
most were optimistic. 
5.1.4 
5 What ideas did study participants have regarding rigidity of water management? 
  
Some interviewees felt change was 
easily impeded by government 
leaders. 
5.1.5 
 
                                                     
37 The resident experience with regard to water can also be considered an undesirable aspect of current water 
management. However, interview and document review data focused on fragmentation of water 
management responsibilities as 'the problem.' The impact of water management on residents was largely 
implied rather than stated and tangential to the first three research questions. I return to the issue of resident 
experience in Chapter 6.  
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5.1.1 System Persistence 
Interview and document review data indicate the Grenadian water management system was persistent 
with regard to its structure. In Chapter 4, I discussed interview and document review data, which 
described Grenadian water management as a patchwork of fragmented and overlapping statutory 
responsibilities and lacking any overarching, coordinating management. I found consistent evidence, 
particularly in interviews, that this characterization had not changed since at least 1990.38
Interview participant #16 provided a contrasting view on system persistence that was unique 
among views expressed by other participants and in documents reviewed. Interviewee #16 explained 
the ruling political party was free to arrange Ministries in creative ways to provide some measure of 
integration. For example, the former ruling New National Party (NNP) government (1995-2008) 
administratively arranged for most of the ministries with water management responsibilities to be 
under the direction of one Minister, Gregory Bowen. Bowen directed the Ministries of Agriculture 
(which includes the Divisions of Forestry and Land Use); Public Utilities (which contained 
NAWASA); Fisheries, Lands, and Energy; and Marketing. Although the statutory fragmentation of 
water management responsibilities was persistent, consolidating many Ministries under one Minister 
provided some degree of integration of management of the water sector.  
  
While the views of interviewee #16 seem plausible, they were not shared by other interviewees, 
supported by document review data, or any academic literature to the best of my knowledge. Ten 
interviewees from diverse perspectives acknowledged fragmentation of the water sector as a problem 
and none, other than interviewee #16, expressed a view that ministerial arrangements affected 
fragmentation of Grenadian water management. The effect of arranging Ministries to deal with 
fragmentation of water management was not considered in any document reviewed for this study, and 
to my knowledge has not been proposed in the academic literature as a strategy to attain integration of 
water resources management. Furthermore, an assessment report of IWRM capacity in Grenada, 
published toward the end of the 1995-2008 NNP reign, viewed Grenadian water management 
disapprovingly (UN-ECLAC 2007). 
Regardless of the potential for ministerial arrangement to overcome fragmentation of water 
management, ministry arrangements were not stable. Structural arrangements for government 
Ministries were not legislated; they were simply left to the discretion of the ruling party. Following 
the 2008 elections, a new government took power and immediately rearranged the Ministries 
(Grenada Today 2008). In spite of the occasional rearrangement of government Ministries, the 
statutory fragmentation of Grenadian water management has changed little since at least 1990 and 
                                                     
38 See Section 5.2.1, Historical Transformations. 
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was the object of water sector reform efforts. Section 5.2.1 provides additional discussion of the 
historical stability of Grenadian water management. 
5.1.2 Failure of Interventions to Precipitate Change 
Interview and document review data indicated sustained and well organized attempts to improve the 
Grenadian water management system.39
In the eyes of many interview participants, particularly #2, 5, 6, 12, and 14, achieving water 
sector reform presented a clear path to transform Grenadian water management. Water sector reform 
began in 2007 as a response to an EU requirement for Grenada to create and adopt a new water policy 
to receive $20 million EC ($7.4 million CAN) to fund the Southern Grenada Water Supply Project 
(Section 4.3). A new water policy was developed and formally adopted by the Grenada Legislature in 
2007 to satisfy the EU requirement (Government of Grenada 2007c). However, implementation of 
provisions in the new policy depended on passage of legislation to supersede the existing patchwork 
of statutes and redefine how the water sector functions, which did not occur.  
 Seven interviewees cited specific capacity-building efforts as 
especially influential on the thinking among water professionals in Grenada (Section 5.1.5). 
Nevertheless, capacity-building efforts failed to precipitate structural change in the system.  
Regional capacity-building efforts focused much of their effort in Grenada to sensitize the 
water sector to the merit of aspects of the 2007 water policy and build capacity to implement it. Seven 
interview participants claimed these efforts raised awareness among water professionals of benefits to 
reforming the water sector and stimulated enthusiasm for change among many system actors.40 
Interviewee #1 discussed development of the Grenada Water Information System online resource 
(CARIWIN 2008)41
Support for water sector reform was unanimous among stakeholders I interviewed, except for 
residents, who were unaware of it, and politicians. Notably, all seven of the persons I interviewed in 
NAWASA were supportive of water sector reform, to varying degrees. This is despite aspects of the 
2007 water policy that call for new oversight of NAWASA and the creation of a water resources 
management entity which, at least on paper, would remove NAWASA's authority for water resources 
management. Interviewees within NAWASA, #9 and #10, provided effective insight to their 
 as a significant contribution to the capacity of Grenada to implement IWRM. 
                                                     
39 Discussion throughout Chapters 4-7, especially in Section 4.3, provides details of attempts to improve 
Grenadian water management, most of which promoted water sector reform directly or indirectly. 
40 As stated in Chapter 4, I use the term 'stakeholder' to denote all entities with an interest in Grenadian water 
management. I use the term 'actor' to denote stakeholders who may affect Grenadian water management.  
41 The Grenada Water Information System webpage only supports the Internet Explorer web browser. 
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perspective and rationale for supporting water sector reform. During a discussion of the pros and cons 
of the policy, these interviewees stated: 
Interviewee #10: Generally, I think NAWASA stands to benefit from [water sector reform]. It takes a 
lot of baggage off from us. Baggage that we do not necessarily need to perform. 
Interviewee #9: We collect water, we treat it, we distribute it. That is what we do.  
Interviewee #10: That is what we are concentrating on. 
In the same discussion:  
Interviewee #10: NAWASA does not have the manpower and finances or the mandate to manage 
water resources.  
Interviewee #15, who was in the Grenadian government but not within NAWASA, was especially 
articulate with regard to the NAWASA rationale for supporting water sector reform. This interviewee 
provided a succinct explanation for support within NAWASA that was consistent with views 
expressed by other interviewees within NAWASA (#7, 9, 10, and 12). Interviewee #15 stated: 
Because they want it. They very much want it. I spoke to Chris Husbands (General Manager of 
NAWASA) and Terrance Smith (Chairman of NAWASA's Board of Directors). Both of them 
recognized very much the need for an independent regulatory body with respect to water 
management that is separate and apart from the current role NAWASA plays. And I think that from 
NAWASA's perspective allocating the resources towards both providing households with water and 
self regulating how much water is taken, from where etc. has been a burden to them. They would 
rather pump their funds into addressing demands and the needs for potable water and not 
worrying about... how much is being produced by watersheds, how is that being used, how many 
streams are being tapped, are streams below a certain level being tapped or not, how much water 
can we anticipate is going to be used in the near future, how can we predict and manage that 
better, et cetera, et cetera. Setting those kinds of numbers and priorities is a real strain for them. 
So they are very positive and supportive of (the water policy). 
Additional interviews with NAWASA personnel led me to summarize the NAWASA view, in my 
own words, as:  
We are a water company, that is our identity. We are good at drawing water from the 
environment, cleaning it, and delivering it to customers for a reasonable fee. That is what we do. 
We have nothing to hide. We are not in the business of water resources management. If water 
sector reform lets us focus on what we do, while managing the water resource better, then we are 
all for it. We will be rid of the on-paper responsibility for resource management and we could even 
stand to benefit from good water resource management. Just so long as we do not have to fund it 
and it is not too bureaucratically heavy. 
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Despite the adoption of the 2007 water policy and widespread support for reforms among water 
professionals, interviewees noted that no legislation had been passed to support the new policy and 
maintained the fundamental, fragmented structure of Grenadian water management did not change. In 
discussing this point, interviewee #8 stated:  
There are a lot of documents going around, some I am not even aware of. These documents, when 
not backed up with legislation, might as well not exist. You have to have the legislation.   
Interviewee #2 felt encouraged that a discussion about IWRM exists, but did not see any impact on 
management, adding "Concrete things aren't there. No stakeholder group, nothing formal beyond a 
plan. There are lots of tools, but not much construction."  
Failure to pass water sector reform legislation was not for lack of opportunity. Two brief 
opportunities occurred, termed 'windows of opportunity' in the transformation literature (Section 
2.2.2.3; Kingdon 1995 [2003]; Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004), but were not seized by reform 
proponents. First, interviewees #2, 7, and 14 described the circumstances that appeared to come 
together in 2008. Interviewee #14 summarized the situation, which I paraphrase here as:42
We were very close to passing water sector reform in 2007-2008. There was money for it, a plan for 
it based on the (2007) water policy, draft legislation, and a detailed structure authored by Chandra 
Madramootoo. All that was needed was senior management to set it up. Then the election came 
(in 2008) and with it a change of government. This was followed by the global financial crisis (of 
2008).  
  
Interviewee #2 explained the political change from the New National Party (NNP) to the New 
Democratic Congress (NDC) following the July 2008 elections could have easily derailed changes in 
water management, but it did not. Notably, the new NDC government appointed Terrence Smith as 
Chair to NAWASA's Board of Directors, who was a member of the GWP-C steering committee and 
regarded by seven interviewees as being in favor of water sector reform. However, interviewee #2 
explained that changing leadership resets the process of educating key persons in leadership to the 
need for change, which delayed political action. Interviewee #14 noted the delay came at an 
unfortunate time, as funding within the government became more restricted following the outset of a 
global economic recession in September 2008.  
The second missed window of opportunity to pass water sector reform legislation occurred in 
the wake of a severe drought in 2009-2010. According to Farrell, Trotman, and Cox (2010), 
                                                     
42 I did not audio record my interview with participant #14 and was unable to capture a direct quote. However, 
the participant confirmed the accuracy of my notes on our interview and provided additional detail. Therefore, 
the paraphrase provided is not a direct quote, but the participant has acknowledged it as an accurate 
representation of the content of our conversation. 
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precipitation at Maurice Bishop International Airport during the drought was the lowest on record. 
These authors report precipitation was 50 percent of normal in March – September 2009; between 19 
and 37 percent of normal in October 2009 – January 2010; and in February 2010, essentially no 
precipitation was observed, representing 0.03 percent of normal precipitation. Farrell, Trotman, and 
Cox (2010) further document potable water production decreased due to the drought by up to 60% 
from normal at some water treatment plants. At the same time, NAWASA shipped 340,000 L (90,000 
gal) of water to the neighboring island of Carriacou and brush fires increased 150% from a normal 
year, many of which were extinguished with potable water. Both of these later factors further reduced 
water supply. 
Water shortages caused by the drought resulted in widespread and prolonged water rationing 
and presented a crisis which created a sense of urgency for improving water security.43
Interview participants felt funding issues and political problems in the NDC ruling party 
prevented passage of water sector reform legislation during the second window of opportunity. 
Interview participants #8 and #14 discussed funding as the most important sticking point which 
inhibited legislation. Water sector reform was perceived as expensive to implement in the near term, 
as it would have created government responsibilities for water resources management and service 
regulation without a mechanism to expand revenue. Interviewee #14, as quoted above, maintained the 
increased government expense was not a problem in 2007-08, but funding became a critical issue in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession. Interview participants #2 and #7 believed 
individuals in the ruling party wanted to pass water sector reform, but felt political in-fighting and 
dysfunction in the ruling party diverted precious attention from the issue. In essence, the second 
window of opportunity closed without passage of water sector reform legislation due to unfortunate 
panarchy forces which prevented funding, and perhaps due to a dysfunctional political climate in 
Grenada. 
 However, the 
drought ended in mid-2010 with no legislative progress with regard to water sector reform. Interview 
participant #2 commented: "The time to push change through the legislature was when the taps were 
dry. Residents' memory is short and the opportunity has passed."  
As of 2012, prospects for passing water sector reform legislation had grown more difficult. 
Funding for reform remained a problem, capacity building through the CARIWIN project ended, and 
memory of any promises and good intentions toward passing water sector reform legislation tended to 
                                                     
43 Post-hazard/disaster environments commonly present windows of opportunity such as this. Birkmann et al. 
(2008) provide evidence that this is common in a post-hazard/disaster environment, and that such windows 
eventually close. 
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fade. Perhaps most important, by 2012 political interest in water sector reform had diminished. I 
discussed this latter point at length with Interview Participant #7; here is one excerpt from my 
interview:  
Question: Aside from the funding issue, what else is preventing legislation [as of 2012]? 
Participant #7: I believe the former Minister [of Works], Mr. Gilbert, had developed a thorough 
understanding of the issues and would have been a clear ally [to pass water sector reform 
legislation]. But you know with the politics he was fired and so on [in October 2011]. 
The participant continued, 
I don't think [the new Minister] or this government, with all of their, shall we just call them 
challenges, I doubt very much in the current government scenario. 
The interview conversation continued: 
Follow-up question: Do you see a way forward or are we just stuck?  
Participant response: Right now the ruling party is at war with itself. I cannot see Minister [of 
Works] Modeste having the time or interest in promoting this. Elections are next year [2013], we 
may get some sort of reconstituted version of the existing ruling party with stronger leadership. Or 
we may get the opposition party [NNP]. 
My own personal view is [NNP] will not have much interest in pursuing this. Because it is just too 
challenging and difficult. The water policy was done under [NNP, before they were defeated by the 
current NDC party in 2008], but it was done in a hurry and done to free up $20 million [EC, $7.4 
million CAD] in funding. It is not particularly attractive as projects go. It is not the kind of thing 
where you can tie a ribbon from here to there and have an opening ceremony to cut the ribbon 
and take pictures. That is not water sector reform. 
Comments from two additional interview participants spoke to the general difficulty in passing water 
sector reform legislation. Interview participant #2 said "the costs are high and immediate. Returns are 
low and largely in the future. Our political concerns are immediate and numerous." When asked why 
legislation is difficult in Grenada, Participant #11 replied, "It isn't. It just is for environmental 
legislation. Environmental issues are not seen as a big deal compared to other issues such as criminal 
issues." 
To summarize the discussion in Section 5.1.2, formal attempts to improve the system by 
passing water sector reform lost momentum and were in danger of failure because of an inability to 
seize windows of opportunity. Even when events unfold favorably, windows of opportunity tended to 
be brief and the key actors in the system were either unprepared or acted improperly to seize them. 
With each missed opportunity, time passes and the system tended to become less prepared for the 
next window of opportunity. In the Gunderson (2000) ball and cup heuristic of social-ecological 
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system stability (Figure 1.2), the state of the system (the ball) moves slowly and the lip of the cup 
dividing stability domains only lowers to a passable height for a short period of time.  
5.1.3 Influences of Panarchy 
In explaining the failure of system interventions to precipitate change, Section 5.1.2 documents three 
panarchy influences which contributed to inhibiting water sector reform legislation. First, political 
instability caused by a change in ruling party from NNP to NDC delayed the passage of water sector 
reform legislation at a critical time. Second, funding shortfalls, caused indirectly by the global 
financial downturn of 2008, eroded political will to pass water sector reform legislation. Third, 
ineffectiveness within the NDC political party may also have stifled political interest in passing water 
sector reform legislation.  
The panarchy influence of residents on water sector reform was negligible and was a key 
missing driver for water sector reform. Interview participant #2 noted a lack of a push for water sector 
reform from residents and cited it as one factor preventing change in Grenadian water management. 
As was considered more fully in Section 4.1, discussion with residents and survey data show 
residents were not against water sector reform, but rather, were unaware of it. First, the Grenada-
based NGO community has largely failed to advocate for residents on water issues and residents 
themselves do not view NGOs as an effective ally in addressing water problems.44 Second, not one 
newspaper story collected during the study described any aspect of water sector reform or the issue of 
fragmentation of water management,45 suggesting residents may be unaware of any potential benefits 
of water sector reform. Third, survey data show between 49% and 67% of residents in the four 
classifications were satisfied with NAWASA, suggesting most residents are content with the existing 
system.46
I think the biggest problem here in Grenada, be it NAWASA, the government, the electricity utility, 
they don't educate the public about why things are the way they are. 
 However, with regard to an open-ended question to describe what they would change about 
water management in Grenada, one survey respondent expressed frustration at not knowing enough to 
answer the question, stating:  
Interview participants #2 and #18 indicated cultural factors also contributed to a lack resident 
influence on water sector reform. Interview participant #2 responded bluntly when asked if residents 
were pushing for any kind of water resources planning, [the resident perspective is essentially] 
"You've got to be joking, pass the next rum punch, please." Beyond simple disinterest in water 
                                                     
44 See Section 4.1.7 Issues of Empowerment and especially Figure 4.18. 
45 See Section 4.1.7 Issues of Empowerment 
46 See Section 4.1.6 Cost of Water Service and Resident Satisfaction with NAWASA and Figure 4.17. 
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management, interviewee #18 offered robust commentary on a lack of resident involvement being 
related to a pervasive top-down social environment in Grenada which has origins in plantation rule 
during slavery and colonial times. Interviewee #18's explanation suggests residents may not be 
"looking up" to people in power for ways to contribute to water management, and are reflected in the 
words of one resident survey participant, "In Grenada here they don't take advice from small people." 
After describing why residents may not be "looking up" for opportunities to participate, interview 
participant #18 continued the discussion on the top-down character of Grenadian society and offered 
additional insight as to why professionals higher in the system may not necessarily be "looking down" 
for input from residents: 
the sad thing is when people (from Grenada) grow up and pass through university, they feel they 
have nothing (remaining) to learn. They are brought up that if you are in a position to give to 
others, they have to listen. [Grenadians] have been accustomed to that sort of autocratic behavior. 
And it is entrenched very deeply into the whole situation we have going on. 
Questionnaire data reveal most residents regard NAWASA as the beginning and the end of all 
things water in Grenada (Section 4.1). I told one interview participant within NAWASA, #18, the 
questionnaire data revealed overwhelmingly that residents identify NAWASA as the single entity 
which handles water issues in Grenada and I was unable to locate any NGOs which champion the 
resident voice with regard to water management. Participant #18 replied: 
I would say they are right about this. We are the ‘go to.’ And we have accepted that we are the go 
to. In November [2011] we had a media briefing and we asked them to use us as the ultimate 
resource for anything water related in Grenada. We are not just a bunch of pipe fitters, we have 
engineers and many other professionals and we want them to use us to get the correct water 
information. 
As long as residents consider NAWASA to be 'all things water,' it is reasonable they would be 
unaware of fragmentation of the water sector and the need for water sector reform.  
While conducting interviews I sensed many residents had potential to create political pressure 
to legislate water sector reform if they understood the need for it. Although I did not ask a specific 
question in this regard, some of the questionnaire data support my perception. First, I found many 
residents (between 21% and 27% of respondents in each of the four classifications) were unsatisfied 
with NAWASA. Many of these residents engaged me in conversation far beyond the scope of the 
questionnaire and expressed substantial interest in water issues. Second, I found many residents 
(between 7% and 29% of respondents in each of the four classifications) already felt comfortable 
contacting their elected representatives if they had problems with their water. This finding led me to 
suspect that a grass-roots campaign to educate residents and promote legislation to reform the water 
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sector could motivate a substantial number of residents to engage their elected representatives to 
support reform legislation. However, no such effort to mobilize residents existed and residents were 
completely unaware of water sector reform (Section 4.1).  
5.1.4 Believing in Change 
Evidence from interviews and the document review indicates Grenada-based water and NGO 
professionals generally accepted the idea that changing the structure of water management was 
desirable. Interviewee #16, who was in the political field, expressed a nuanced view in this regard. 
This interviewee felt the existing framework of water sector legislation was desirable, but stressed the 
need to govern the existing system in a better manner than was being done (in 2012). Interviewee #16 
was the only one who felt the existing system should not be restructured. However, some stakeholders 
were relatively neutral on the issue, as I discuss below. 
Patterns emerged regarding which stakeholders supported change most passionately and what 
they felt change should look like. Water professionals outside of NAWASA were the most 
enthusiastic supporters of 'water sector reform,'47 with very few exceptions. Within NAWASA, 
interviewees perceived problems with current water management arrangements such as conflicts of 
interest and the absence of holistic management of water resources. These professionals were all 
agreeable to water sector reform, albeit with less enthusiasm than water professionals outside 
NAWASA were. In interviews, NGO professionals expressed displeasure with "A disjointed and 
misguided management system." as stated by interviewee #18. However, NGO professionals 
expressed little enthusiasm for water sector reform and, in interviews, discussed issues quite different 
from those addressed by water sector reform. Interviewee #17 went as far as to say enforcing water 
sector reform would be a huge problem and passing it would not mean anything. Residents who 
participated in the questionnaire were almost completely unaware of the existence of water 
management beyond NAWASA and no respondent expressed any opinion or knowledge of attempts 
to change how water was managed in Grenada48
Stakeholders expressed a range of views on the potential for change in Grenadian water 
management. Interviewee #3 felt the Grenadian Legislature would act if funding for water sector 
 (see Section 5.1.3).  
                                                     
47 Water sector reform was the term used by interviewees to describe potential or proposed legislation with 
the specific intent of implementing the 2007 water policy. See Section 4.3. 
48 The questionnaire did not directly address water sector reform, but did ask open-ended questions which 
allowed residents to comment on issues such as water sector reform. Residents were asked, "If you were in 
charge of all water supply in Grenada, would you try to change anything? If yes, how?" 72% of residents (130 
out of 180) stated they would change something and provided 29 specific changes. All of the 29 proposed 
changes concerned water service rather than the institutional arrangements of water resources management.  
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reform could be secured. Interviewee #2 believed the legislature needed an urgent financial incentive 
to motivate action, stating "We need a crisis. And this crisis has to have immediate financial and /or 
economic consequence to inaction." Interviewee #17 felt high-level political will was needed to move 
Grenadian water management forward. Interviewees #18 and #19, both associated with Grenada-
based NGOs, spoke of eroding a societal 'top-down mentality' to bring about change in water 
management. Conversations I had with interviewees within NAWASA, particularly #7 and #12, 
illuminated many traits of water sector reform that are undesirable from a political point of view (see 
Section 5.2.6). These participants felt political action was possible if these politically undesirable 
aspects of water sector reform can be resolved. Interviewee #10 also discussed aspects of water sector 
reform which were politically unappealing but did not express optimism for resolving these issues. 
The interviewee dismissed water sector reform efforts as being, "an academic exercise, just a piece of 
paper." 
At least four documents reflect stakeholder attitudes toward the need and potential for change 
in the water management. The 2007 water policy (Government of Grenada 2007c) and three 
documents drafted to support development and implementation of the 2007 water policy (CEHI 2007; 
Government of Grenada 2007a, 2007b) support the view that change in the water sector is needed, 
possible, and that water sector reform is the appropriate instrument to bring needed changes. While 
these reports do provide insight about perceived shortcomings of the existing system and rationale for 
reforms, it should not come as a surprise that documents drafted to support water sector reform 
express optimism for it. One academic paper addresses change in water management throughout the 
Caribbean (Cashman 2012) and supports the view that water sector reform is significant, needed, and 
very close to happening. No documents reviewed for this study held a pessimistic position with 
regard to the potential for change in the water sector. 
5.1.5 In Their Own Words: Participant Perspectives on Capacity Building  
Considerable discussion is provided in Chapter 4 and in preceding sections of this chapter on 
participant views regarding rigidity in water management. The intent of this subsection is not to 
repeat or summarize those discussions, but rather to serve as a backstop to those discussions and 
present additional views relevant to the study not already captured above.  
When discussing capacity building to support IWRM in Grenada, participants acknowledged 
the following efforts as particularly influential on the thinking among water professionals in Grenada:  
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• GWP-C (interviewees #2, 12, 13, 7, 14),  
• various efforts promoted by CEHI, such as the GEF-IWCAM project (interviewees #1, 2, 
14),49
• the CARIWIN project
 
50
• financial backing by the UN-FAO
 for promoting IWRM (interviewees #1, 2, 4), and  
51
However, interviewee #2 expressed skepticism about the product of capacity building efforts. This 
interviewee said the product of this influence sensitized many people about the need for water sector 
reform, but has not precipitated the change, because change is easily impeded by poor leadership. 
Interviewee #2 also discussed capacity building as having sensitized persons who show up to 
workshops, but not necessarily the right persons to bring about change.  
 (interviewees #2. 7).  
5.1.6 The Extent of Maladaptive System Traps in Grenadian Water Management 
From the above information, summarized in Table 5.1, I conclude Grenadian water management was 
and is in a maladaptive system trap, defined in Section 2.2.1 as a "persistent and undesirable state," 
acknowledging that both ‘persistent’ and ‘undesirable’ are relative terms. Grenadian water 
management is 'persistent' in that the basic structure of legislated fragmentation of water management 
responsibilities has persisted for as long as water has been managed on the island by a government 
and has resisted attempts to move to a more integrated structure.52
Holling (2001) defines the 3-axes of potential, connectedness, and resilience in the adaptive 
cycle framework, which provide the basis for classifying types of maladaptive system traps (see 
Sections 1.1 and 2.2). Based on the 3-axis adaptive cycle framework I describe the water management 
system as being in a rigidity trap, characterized by high potential, high connectedness, and high 
resilience. I judge the system has high potential, defined in Section 1.1 as determining the limits of 
what is possible, or the options for the future. Capacity such as accumulated water professionals, an 
 The 'undesirability' of the system is 
marked by widespread discontent over fragmentation of water management responsibilities and poor 
transparency which hinders effective management of water resources. Assignment of 'undesirable' 
also assumes the current system has negative consequences for resident well being with regard to 
water, relative to more integrated arrangements.  
                                                     
49 CEHI is an acronym for the Caribbean Environmental Health Institute. GEF-IWCAM is an acronym for the 
Global Environment Facility-funded Project on Integrating Watershed and Coastal Areas Management in Small 
Island Developing States of the Caribbean. 
50 CARIWIN is an acronym for Caribbean Water Initiative.  
51 UN-FAO is an acronym for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. 
52 Interview participant #16 argued that the former ruling political party (NNP) administratively arranged 
Ministries with complementary water management responsibilities to foster integration of water 
management. However, such arrangements were not stable and the 'ruling party to ruling party' variability in 
water management has persisted over time.   
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established water authority and governance structure, and infrastructure provides many options for 
how Grenada may manage water resources in the future. I judge the system has high connectedness, 
defined by Holling (2001, p. 394) as “the degree to which a system can control its own destiny,” 
because much of its potential is internal. That is, the system does not need to rely on outside sources 
to make decisions on water management. Finally, I judge the system has high resilience defined in 
Holling (2001, p. 394) as “how vulnerable the system is to unexpected disturbances and surprises” 
because the basic structure of the water management system is resistant to attempts to change it. In 
terms of the Gunderson (2000) 'ball in cup' heuristic, the system resists moving to a new 'cup.'  
Despite assigning the academic label 'rigidity trap' to Grenadian water management, system 
persistence is far from extreme. System persistence is better described as moderate, lasting decades 
overall and having survived organized attempts to change it in the last 10 years. In addition, the 
system has showed signs of moving toward transformation. For example, many potential obstacles to 
transformation are absent or fading. Water managers in different agencies appeared to empathize with 
one another and were not antagonistic or noticeably territorial, even when they had reason to be. Most 
stakeholders in the Grenadian water management system, other than some politicians and the public, 
are knowledgeable of water resources management and the consequences of structural fragmentation 
in the current system. Most of these stakeholders suggest a solution to transform the system to a more 
desirable state exists in water sector reform, and this solution has widespread support to varying 
degrees among water professionals. Many of these characteristics, which suggest a system open to 
transformation, are a product of capacity building and a testament to the quality of human capital 
within the system (see further discussion on this topic in Section 5.4.2, Capacity Building). The 
remaining obstacles which frustrate transformation are political and financial, yet these do not appear 
to be insurmountable. 
Grenadian water management is acknowledged above to be in an undesirable state, but there 
are many positive aspects and the situation is far from a worst-case scenario. While Chapter 4 
documented clear potential to improve water service, most residents enjoy piped connections 
supplying safe, clean water nearly full time and report water service to be improving. In addition, 
individual parts of Grenadian water management such as NAWASA and the Ministry of Agriculture 
are remarkably functional, within their narrow mandates. Much potential exists within the existing 
system, both in built infrastructure and in water professionals working within the system. 
Unfortunately, because of the legislated fragmentation in the current system, the effectiveness of the 
whole is less than the sum of the parts. 
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From the prior two paragraphs it is apparent not all rigidity traps are equal; trapped systems 
vary in their persistence and in their degree of undesirability. To complicate matters further, neither 
persistence nor undesirability are static properties. Unfortunately, the academic literature lacks 
nomenclature to describe trapped systems in detail. There have been no proposed methods or terms to 
describe the relative severity of a trap, in general terms or in terms of 'persistence' or 'undesirability.' 
Furthermore, the literature provides no guidance on differentiating a system moving toward greater or 
lesser undesirability or persistence. As discussed in Section 2.2.6, this gap prevents differentiating 
severely trapped systems from more manageable systems. It also hinders assessing the effectiveness 
of interventions to promote transformation and important trends regarding movement of a system into 
or out of a trap. I propose the following model to describe trapped systems and to help frame 
discussion of how to free such systems.  
1. Explicitly identify the type of trap a system is in 
and then describe:  
2. The degree of persistence of the system 
3. If, and how, persistence is changing 
4. The degree of undesirability of the system 
5. If, and how, undesirability is changing 
Applying this model to Grenadian water management, the system is (1) in a rigidity trap, (2) 
characterized by moderate (3) but weakening persistence (the current system has lasted decades, but 
showing signs of potential change). In addition, the system is (4) moderately undesirable and (5) 
stable in this regard. This description helps identify Grenadian water management as a prime 
candidate for breaking the rigidity trap and helps frame the discussion of how we might do so 
(Chapter 6). 
5.2 Transformability  
This section evaluates Grenadian water management with regard to transformability, by developing 
an evaluation framework to assess transformability and applying the framework to answer the second 
research question:  
2. To what extent is Grenadian water management transformable? 
A series of six questions were developed and presented in section 3.2.1 to judge the transformability 
of Grenadian water management. Each of these six questions is answered in the following six 
subsections. In the final subsection, a framework, based on the Olsson 3-phase framework of 
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transformation (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 2004), is presented for assessing and describing the extent 
of transformability of a system and applied to Grenadian water management.  
5.2.1 Historical transformations 
Five key questions53 were developed in Section 3.2.1 to assess historical transformations in water 
management systems. After applying these questions to Grenadian water management, I was unable 
to identify any historical transformations. The structure of the present system had not changed since 
at least 1990 when NAWASA was founded and the fragmented and incomplete character of water 
management may have originated during British colonial rule.54
Although past transformations in water management were not detected, relatively recent 
developments contributed to transformability of the system. Data relevant to this recent change in 
transformability are presented in discussions of SES traps (Section 5.1), the water management 
system (Section 4.2.3), interventions to improve transformability (Section 5.3.2), and points of 
breakdown in transformation (Chapter 6). Rather than repeating other discussions, Table 5.2 below 
provides a brief summary of relevant discussions to each of the five key questions for judging 
historical transformations.  
 Rather than being a process of 
transformation, interview participant #14 described development in water management as an 
evolution rather than a product of sudden change. Review of the 14 statutes relevant to water 
management also suggests the current arrangement is the product of ad hoc legislation being enacted 
to meet perceived needs which rose to political prominence over time (Section 4.2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
53 These 5 'key questions' are intended to verify and describe historical transformations, which together will 
help answer the first of six questions intended to judge the transformability of Grenadian water management. 
54 NAWASA was legislated into existence in 1990 and became the central fixture in Grenadian water 
management (see Section 4.2.2). However, interview participant #14 described the founding of NAWASA as 
"window dressing" what already existed as a water authority, especially from a water resources management 
perspective. The founding of NAWASA did change how water business was done, but not how the water 
resource was managed.   
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Table 5.2. Summary of discussions relevant to judging historical transformations of Grenadian 
water management. 
Key questions for Judging Historical 
Transformations   
Answer   Relevant Sections 
Have new named and identifiable 
entities emerged which were intended 
to facilitate a positive and meaningful 
change in how water was managed?  
 
Yes.                                                                                    
NGOs such as GWP-C, CEHI, and 
CARIWIN emerged to conduct 
capacity building efforts and 
advocate for changes to water 
management  
 
4.2.3                              
5.1.5 
Had attempts at facilitating a positive 
meaningful change in how water was 
managed failed or succeeded?  
 
Failed.  
5.1.5                             
5.3.2 
To what degree had these new 
entities displayed flexibility, 
adaptiveness, and an ability to foster 
incremental and transformative 
change in how water is managed?  
 
Capacity-building efforts did foster 
incremental improvements of 
transformability, but failed to be 
flexible and adapt in critical ways.  
 
4.2.3                                         
5.3.2 
Chapter 6 
To what degree had these new 
entities improved water supply 
conditions?  
 
Minimal.   
5.1.5                                         
4.1 
Had the new entities become a stable 
part of water management in 
Grenada?  
  
GWP-C and CEHI established a long-
term influence on water 
professionals, but without a water 
management role. GEF-IWCAM and 
CARIWIN were finite projects.  
  4.2.3                                                             5.1.2 
 
5.2.2 Fresh Ideas 
Fresh ideas and perspectives relevant to water management were plentiful in some portions of the 
Grenadian water management system. Notably, IWRM ideals underpin significant parts of the 2007 
water policy (Government of Grenada 2007c). In addition, some documents were written specifically 
to develop and implement IWRM in Grenada (CEHI 2001, 2007; Government of Grenada 2007b, 
2007a; CARIWIN 2009a; Thompson, Senecal, and Madramootoo 2012). Interview data revealed a 
concomitant emergence of enthusiasm for IWRM among water professionals. Interviewees #1, 2, 6, 
7, and 14 credited relatively highly funded regional and international capacity-building efforts for 
sensitizing water sector professionals to IWRM (see Section 5.1.5). These projects and efforts offered 
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"free" water projects, management tools, and training of Grenada- and Caribbean- based water sector 
professionals. Regional capacity-building efforts directly enlisted the assistance of water 
professionals in Grenada and throughout the Caribbean, forming a core of enthusiastic IWRM 
supporters.  
Knowledge and support for IWRM flowed from the core supporters and capacity-building 
efforts, described above, to other parts of the water management system with variable success. The 
strongest IWRM supporters were generally outside of NAWASA, but these persons persuaded 
professionals within NAWASA to recognize potential value of IWRM in Grenada. All seven 
interviewees within NAWASA supported IWRM to varying degrees. However, support for IWRM 
among these interviewees appeared to be conditional on IWRM serving to help NAWASA achieve its 
mission, and not be a financial or administrative burden. Comments made by interview participants 
#9 and 10, discussed in Section 5.1.2, expressed guarded optimism regarding IWRM which helped 
me articulate the rationale for NAWASA's support for IWRM. Furthermore to this point, NAWASA 
does not appear to be planning any type of IWRM implementation in the near future. Mention of both 
IWRM and the 2007 Grenada water policy (Government of Grenada 2007c) are notably absent from 
the NAWASA 5-year strategic plan (NAWASA 2009). Relative to the penetration of IWRM concepts 
and support within NAWASA, the political level was much less affected, as discussed in Section 
5.1.1. Finally, residents had no detectable knowledge or influence of IWRM or water sector reform.  
A second source of fresh ideas and perspectives within the system was the relatively recent 
empowerment of young, energetic, female voices with prominent water and environmental 
management roles. Historically, positions of power in Grenadian businesses and Ministries were 
delegated via gender and seniority to eschew foreign influence and ensure subordination. One 
anonymous resident I spoke with at length claimed to have formerly worked for NAWASA and 
described great frustration with seniority-based hiring practices when he worked at NAWASA, many 
years before: 
The system doesn't attract youth. It rewards seniority. If you leave to get educated and return you 
lose ground to those that stayed. And then you are over qualified compared to those above you. 
You can try to change it and you just keep hitting walls. After a while you either leave or learn to 
stay quiet.  
The anonymous survey participant stressed the problem was not isolated to NAWASA and exists 
throughout the island, "Other places your supervisor can see your performance and pass you on to a 
higher level. Here you die with your talents." Interview participant #5 confirmed the anonymous 
resident account of NAWASA hiring practices: 
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That's right, and that's exactly the case of how it is in NAWASA [as of 2010]. I encountered that 
time and time again, people who were highly educated and motivated just unable to make a 
difference because they come up against a wall of seniority.  
When asked about the resident comments above, participant #15 provided additional insight: 
Yes. I would agree with that 110%. I think that mediocrity is the order of the day. And when you 
return [from pursuing foreign education] you just have to pay your dues. [People in positions of 
power] figure that you must have been coasting out there, carousing. And now you want to come 
back and, having lived foreign, you want to come and show everybody [how things work]. And as a 
result there is a lot of hostility. Particularly from people who did not get the opportunity [to study 
abroad]. Never mind they don't have the capacity to do it. You are quite right. And I think that 
contributes a lot to why the government is so slow.  
It is important, because as a mechanism, you would anticipate that the people who are returning 
[from studying abroad] would be important catalysts for moving things forward. And this is not the 
case. This is absolutely not the case. 
Participant # 15 provided two examples of talented young professionals in solid waste management 
who pursued education abroad and had difficulty after returning to Grenada. This participant later 
continued, "Change, anywhere in the world, change is resisted. But people here in particular. And 
having gone through a revolution55
Later in data collection, I observed a notable exception to the above-perceived pattern of 
seniority- and gender-based hiring, suspicion of outsiders, and resistance to change. In 2010, 
consultants hired to support institutional development as part of the EU-funded Southern Grenada 
Water Supply Project (see Section 4.2.2) recognized the existing customer relations structure of 
NAWASA was unsustainable and recommended the addition of a communications unit in the 
organizational structure of NAWASA to facilitate improved customer relations (NIRAS 2010). 
Rather than being received with skepticism and hostility as an 'outsider' opinion, the consultant 
findings precipitated reorganization within NAWASA. NAWASA took decisive action and added a 
communications unit. In addition, NAWASA went much further toward genuine change by hiring a 
young, energetic, female professional from outside the organization to manage the new department. 
This person had a vibrant personality, did not hesitate to speak when she disagreed, was foreign 
educated, and was previously dismissed from another Ministry, allegedly for challenging the status 
quo.  
 [contributes to] a suspicion of people who come from outside." 
                                                     
55 Grenadian leadership was toppled by a violent coup in 1981 that claimed the lives of Prime Minister 
Maurice Bishop and much of his Cabinet. The coup was widely perceived to be the product of a Soviet and 
Cuban attempt to spread communism to Grenada. The coup prompted swift military response from the 
United States and a coalition of Caribbean forces that purged Cuban military forces from Grenada and 
restored democratic rule.    
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Within one year of hiring the new communications unit manager, NAWASA designed and 
released a Customer Service Charter. The Charter is a new policy guiding customer relations and 
promotes NAWASA’s “mission of continuous improvement within the organization" (NAWASA 
2012a). The Charter outlines a series of policies and standards of service which NAWASA pledges to 
maintain with customers. The policies and promises described in the Charter are customer-focused, 
relatively ambitious, highly professional, and go considerably beyond what is offered from other 
utilities on the island. In addition, since hiring the new communications unit manager, NAWASA 
began using Facebook, Twitter, a blog, and a YouTube channel to communicate with customers.  
5.2.3 Planning  
Planning in the Grenadian water management system is addressed in three prior discussions, 
specifically of water governance (Section 4.2.1), NAWASA (Section 4.2.2), and influences of 
panarchy (Section 5.1.3). To summarize these discussions, no long-term (decades) or holistic 
planning of water resources has occurred in Grenadian water management. Resource managers were 
observed to place little importance on multi-decade planning, but did appear to maintain at least a 
mental list of 'things that need to be done' to prioritize projects.  
One notable advance toward resource planning on a shorter (sub-decade) time scale occurred 
during the study. In 2009, NAWSA published its first ever planning document, a 5-year strategic plan 
(NAWASA 2009). The strategic plan is a modest, but significant, first step toward greater use of 
planning. The topics considered in the strategic plan are appropriate for the scope of NAWASA's 
water management functions. However, NAWASA is limited by a relatively narrow legal mandate 
and does not engage in holistic water resources planning, which is reflected in the scope of the 
strategic plan.  
Interview participant #2 added insight to the scope of poor or limited planning, stating a lack of 
planning is present throughout the Caribbean, is not unique to water resources, and is particularly 
noticeable in social and institutional planning. Interview participant #2 continued to state 
governments in the Caribbean have little or no idea if the instruments currently in place, such as laws 
and government agencies, are adequate for future needs. In the water sector, this participant stressed 
the capacity for long range planning is also absent: 
For example, take climate change. The discussion right now is all about meteorology. Nobody has 
transferred that to dialog about what it means for water resources. Grenada, as many other 
Caribbean islands, is dependent on surface water. As a hydrologist, you could probably do some 
nice work on what the likely impacts of climate change could be for the surface water resource. But 
until somebody actually does that, how can we plan for it? We can't. 
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5.2.4 Is There a Need for Change? 
The views of stakeholders regarding the need to change the current system of Grenadian water 
management are discussed in four prior sections:  
- Section 5.1.2 Resistance to Change,  
- Section 5.1.3 Influences of Panarchy, 
- Section 5.1.4 Believing in Change, and 
- Section 5.1.6 The Extent of Maladaptive System Traps in Grenadian water Management. 
To summarize these prior discussions, many types of stakeholders56
5.2.5 Influences of Panarchy
 acknowledged the need to change 
the current system of water management in Grenada. There were, however, two notable exceptions. 
First, residents were disenfranchised with regard to water management beyond their interactions with 
NAWASA. Second, politicians did not necessarily agree the existing system needed to be changed. 
Interview participant #16 described flexibility in the current system to allow the ruling political party 
to bundle multiple Ministries administratively under the direction of one Minister. This interviewee 
claimed that by arranging Ministries carefully, some degree of integration of decision making is 
already possible under the existing system. The participant believed good leadership was the key to 
making the existing system work and therefore change to the structure of the system was not 
necessary. 
 
Change in intermediate scale adaptive cycles can serve to enhance transformability of a system or to 
enhance adaptability and simultaneously decrease transformability.57
NAWASA introduced intermediate adaptive cycles within itself, in the form of limited 
bureaucratic changes, in a manner similar to what has been observed in the corporate world to foster 
adaptability (Scheffer and Westley 2007) and in doing so may have unwittingly reduced 
 One example of each of these 
two possibilities was discovered. First, efforts to enhance adaptability within NAWASA were 
effective and may have unwittingly reduced transformability of the existing system. Second, the 
existence of an informal network of system actors, particularly at regional conferences, served to 
facilitate the flow of fresh ideas throughout the system.  
                                                     
56 The 'many types' of stakeholders referred to are: Researchers, foreign and domestic consultants, persons 
within the Grenadian government both inside and outside NAWASA, and persons associated with resident-
focused NGOs. 
57 By enhancing adaptability, the undesirability of the system is relieved, which often decreases pressure to 
change the system. See Section 1.1. 
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transformability of the system.58
Section 4.1.7 documents evidence describing the culture of NAWASA as being focused on 
continually striving for excellence and improvement with regard to the resident experience with 
water. Resident opinion from all four groups surveyed shows a widespread perception that water 
service is improving over time (Section 4.1.2, 4.1.3). It is possible the adaptability of NAWASA, 
even within its relatively narrow legal mandate, reduces the perceived severity of challenges to the 
system and dampens the urgency to overhaul the existing structure of water management. Stated 
another way, the more adaptable NAWASA is, the less apparent the need to restructure or otherwise 
transform the water sector. 
 An institutional review of NAWASA was conducted by foreign 
consultants as part of the Southern Grenada Water Supply Project (NIRAS 2010). The final report of 
the institutional review recommended a moderate restructuring of the company, including the addition 
of a Chief Engineer and a Communications Unit. NAWASA acted on both of these recommendations, 
which have resulted in substantial positive changes in how NAWASA interacts with the public, 
including adding the Customer Service Charter as described in Section 5.2.2.  
Second, the presence of an informal network of system actors and idea-exchange venues such 
as workshops and conferences was seen as important to transformability of the Grenadian water 
management system. Interview participant #10 stated, "It is a small country. There is no official 
arrangement (of the network of system actors), but everybody knows everybody." Many interview 
participants cited conferences as the primary arena for informal networks to emerge and operate.  
Interview participants #8, 11, and 15 cited conferences, in a general sense, as being a place in 
which informal groups of system actors mingle, exchange ideas, and learn from one another. 
Participant #1 cited workshops conducted by the CARIWIN project as being especially notable for 
the exchange of ideas among system actors. However, these venues were not without problems. 
Interviewee #1 provided robust description of interactions among water managers within informal 
networks at workshops and conferences and offered pointed criticism of their interactions; persons 
holding PhD degrees and coming from larger islands, tended to unjustly assume higher status and 
'importance' to the exclusion of persons without advanced degrees and coming from small islands 
such as Grenada. Interview Participant #2 described the Caribbean water professional community as 
relatively small, and regularly observed that persons from GWP, CEHI, IWCAM, NAWASA, 
CWWA, and other regional water managers meet and mingle at the CWWA conferences. Participant 
                                                     
58 Section 1.1 provides discussion of academic literature on adaptability and transformability and explains 
how, in the ball-and-cup heuristic, adaptability focuses on keeping the ball in a specific stability domain while 
transformability does the opposite; it focuses on moving the ball to a new domain. 
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#2 also noted part of GWP's purpose is to provide an arena to allow this type of group interaction. 
When asked if this informal group had power, Participant #2 replied the groups had influence, but not 
power due to their informal nature.  
5.2.6 In Their Own Words: Participant Perspectives on Precipitating Change 
Considerable discussion is provided in preceding sections and in Chapter 4 on participant views 
regarding transformability in water management. The intent of this subsection is not to repeat or even 
to summarize those discussions, but rather to serve as a backstop to those discussions and present 
additional views relevant to the study not already captured above.  
Study participants identified two sources of growing capacity within the water management 
system to promote positive change. First, Participant #1 described great potential for a Caribbean-
wide web platform, similar to the Grenada Water Information System web tool, to allow regional 
information flow and coordinated development and use of management tools such as mapping 
suitable zones for specific types of agriculture. Second, I spoke at length with Participant #13 about 
the ability of NAWASA to engage residents when needed, including soliciting the assistance of a 
local church to assist NAWASA personnel to clear a water supply dam of debris following a land 
slide which had rendered the dam and a key water intake inoperable.  
In addition to the sources of improving capacity described above, interview participants spoke 
strongly to the need for good leadership to guide the system through transformation. Participant #5 
stated, "First and foremost it is going to take some very high level government will. I've seen that as 
always being the #1 factor or constraint (to change)." Participant # 1 stated, "You need to have good 
people in place, starting with leaders. If you have the right system in place, that will attract the right 
people to promote change." Speaking about change in the agriculture sector, interview participant #4 
stated, "It comes at a higher level. Political understanding and will. Acknowledging that up-front 
costs have a long term payoff." 
Discussion with participant #5 illuminated a remarkable and recent change in the adaptability 
of NAWASA. This participant was concerned about the financial stability of NAWASA: 
Eventually, the company will collapse if it continues to be managed like it was when I was there 
(2009). It will just run out of money or the government will stop stepping in to subsidize it and say 
it needs to go through the big shakeup. It can't go on (like this) indefinitely. I'm surprised it hasn't 
happened yet. When I was there I didn't give them more than a couple of years before something 
was going to happen. 
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When I told this participant about relatively recent (since 2009) revenue-increasing measures 
NAWASA had taken, including raising water tariffs by approximately one third, clamping down on 
delinquent accounts, and removing public standpipes, the participant observed: 
These are huge steps in the right direction and a clear indication that [NAWASA General Manager] 
Christopher Husbands has been empowered to overcome some of internal obstacles to moving the 
company forward. 
The 2010 increase in water tariffs, known as water 'tariff reform' among study participants, had 
significance beyond improving the operation of the water authority; it served as an example of 
enacting politically contentious legislation in the water sector. All water tariff adjustments must be 
proposed by NAWASA and approved by the legislature. Prior to 2010, water tariffs had not been 
increased since 1992 (17 years), due largely to a political climate which viewed increasing water 
tariffs as a tax increase. However, in 2010 the legislature approved a tariff increase of 33-34%.  
Successful passage of water tariff reform legislation demonstrated strongly supported, but 
politically unsightly, water legislation is possible to pass in Grenada. I engaged in lengthy discussions 
with some interview participants to draw lessons learned from navigating the legislative process for 
water tariff reform to apply to the broader water sector reform context. Participants #7, 10, and 12 had 
particularly useful insight and provided information which allowed me to triangulate regarding the 
similarities and differences between water sector reform and water tariff reform (Table 5.3). 
Differences between the two reforms offer insight to the difficulty facing water sector reform and are 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Some interview participants close to the water sector reform situation were prepared to accept 
the need for a 'game changer' or a crisis to motivate the legislature to act. Participant #6 was hopeful 
for continued efforts by GWP-C but agreed a severe drought might also stimulate the legislature to 
act on water sector reform. When asked what it would take to move water management forward in 
Grenada, Participant #2 replied, "We need a crisis. And this crisis has to have immediate financial 
and /or economic consequence to inaction." During an exchange about what has gone wrong with 
water sector reform, interview participant #7 described a bleak outlook for the future of water sector 
reform legislation. I commented to the participant, "Unless there is another $20 million project to 
push (legislation)?" Participant #7 replied, "That is the point of view I have been tending toward for 
some time now."  
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Table 5.3. Key differences and similarities between water tariff and water sector reforms. 
Water Tariff Reform 
  
Water Sector Reform 
Similarities 
Legislation was politically unattractive 
 
Legislation was politically unattractive 
Had strong support from upper level 
(NAWASA) management  
 
Had strong support from upper level water 
sector professionals 
 
Differences 
Increased government revenue  Increased government expenses 
Key policy entrepreneur was successful in 
motivating the Minister of Works to promote 
legislation in Cabinet. Policy entrepreneur 
was possibly more politically powerful 
 
Key policy entrepreneur(s) have been 
frustrated in attempts to gain Ministry-level 
support for legislation. Policy entrepreneur(s) 
are possibly less politically powerful 
Benefits of action were clear, made NAWASA 
financially solvent 
 
Benefits of action were ambiguous, linking 
holistic water management to water service is 
difficult for political leaders to perceive 
Consequence of inaction clear, short term 
 
Consequence of inaction ambiguous, long term 
Motivation was high, threatened government 
interests (Financial management of NAWASA 
is somebody's job, if the company becomes 
insolvent, jobs are lost)  
 
Motivation was modest, did not threaten 
government interests (WSR is not somebody's 
job, if it doesn't happen none of the system 
actors suffer) 
Addressed an urgent problem 
 
Addresses a relatively distant problem 
Simple to implement 
 
Complex to implement 
Promoted by people internal to Grenada   
Promoted (largely) by people external to 
Grenada 
5.2.7 The Extent of Transformability in Grenadian Water Management 
From the information presented in this section, summarized in Table 5.4, Grenadian water 
management has many traits of a transformable system. However, research question #2 requires an 
assessment of extent of transformability of Grenadian water management. As discussed in Section 
2.2.3, no methods have been proposed to determine the transformability of systems and no guidance 
is provided on differentiating a system moving toward greater or lesser transformability. These gaps 
prevent easy identification of systems close to or far from transforming or judging the effectiveness of 
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interventions. In addition, filling these gaps would make it easier to draw attention to the specific 
point(s) of breakdown in transformation of trapped systems. To fill these gaps and advance the 
literature on transformability, I have developed a framework which involves grading the relative 
capacity of a given system to navigate each step in the Olsson 3-phase framework of transformability 
(Table 5.5). Furthermore, I applied this framework to Grenadian water management (Table 5.6), 
described in following paragraphs. 
Table 5.4. Summary of answers to six questions regarding Research Question #2. 
Key questions regarding                            
transformability   Answers 
See 
Section 
1 Had transformations taken place in the past? 
 
No. 5.2.1 
2 
Did fresh ideas and perspectives exist 
within the system? Where? And did 
these ideas and perspectives flow from 
stakeholders with little power to those 
with the most power? Or vertically 
within the water authority? 
 
Yes. Fresh water management ideas and 
perspectives flowed from capacity-
building efforts to water sector 
professionals, but were stifled at the 
political level and did not spread to 
residents. 
5.2.2 
3 
What planning of the Grenadian water 
system was being done and has it been 
effective? 
 
No long-term (multi-decade) planning.                             
Some planning existed on a shorter time 
horizon (5 years), notably in NAWASA. 
5.2.3 
4 Did stakeholders identify a need to change the system? 
 
Yes, among water and NGO professionals.   
No, among residents and politicians.  5.2.4 
5 
Had there been a reduction, or 
increase, in the number of 
intermediate-scale adaptive cycles? Did 
intermediate adaptive cycles in the 
Grenadian water management system 
play a role in adaptability and 
transformability? 
 
Yes.                                                                                             
One case increased adaptability of 
NAWASA and may have reduced 
transformability. A second case diffused 
new ideas through the system and 
increased transformability. 
5.2.5 
6 What ideas did study participants have regarding transformability? 
  
Passage of water tariff reform 
demonstrated passage of water sector 
reform is possible. 
5.2.6 
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Table 5.5. Framework for assessing and describing the transformability of a social-ecological system.  
  Low Capacity   Moderate Capacity   High Capacity 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Phase 1:                  
Preparedness for 
Transformation   
Based on the three key factors described in Olsson et al. (2006): Building (1) knowledge and (2) trust within the system,         
and (3) the presence of policy entrepreneur(s) to lead the system through transformation 
System possesses little knowledge or trust 
among system actors and no suitable policy 
entrepreneur(s) have emerged 
System actors possess some 
knowledge and trust; non-
ideal policy entrepreneur(s) 
may have emerged  
Relatively high levels of knowledge and trust 
exist among all system actors and a suitable 
champion has emerged 
Ability to Seize 
Windows of 
Opportunity                            
Based on the ability to 'join the three streams' of problems, solutions, and politics (Kingdon 1995; Olsson et al. 2006) 
System can join none of 
the streams 
  System is able to join 1 or 2 
streams 
  System is able to join all 
3 streams 
Phase 2:             
Ability to Navigate 
Transition(s)                                 
Based on the likelihood the system will assume the form intended by transformation efforts 
Characterized by an ineffective or absent 
champion to lead the transition, also    
resistance through panarchy linkages  
Between 'high' and 'low' 
capacity 
Characterized by an effective champion and 
long-term support through panarchy linkages 
Phase 3:                          
Stability of the 
New System                          
Based on the potential for a transformed system to revert to its former self or to a less desirable state 
A low threshold exists to revert to the old 
system or to a different undesirable system 
is low 
Between 'high' and 'low' 
capacity 
A high threshold exists to revert to the old 
system or to a different undesirable system 
is high 
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Table 5.6. Transformability framework applied to Grenadian water management. The state of Grenadian water management is is shaded.  
  Low Capacity   Moderate Capacity   High Capacity 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Phase 1:                  
Preparedness for 
Transformation 
Based on the three key factors described in Olsson et al. (2006): Building (1) knowledge and (2) trust within the system and 
(3) the presence of a "champion" to lead the system through transformation 
  System actors possess some 
knowledge and trust; non-
ideal policy entrepreneurs 
have emerged  
  
Ability to Seize 
Windows of 
Opportunity 
Based on the ability to 'join the three streams' of problems, solutions, and politics (Kingdon 1995; Olsson et al. 2006) 
  System is semi-successful 
joining 2 of the 3 streams 
      
Phase 2:             
Ability to Navigate 
Transition(s) 
Based on the vulnerability of transformation to unforeseen obstacles  
  Champions to lead the 
transition have been absent 
or ineffective in key ways; 
resistance to transformation 
through panarchy linkages 
exists  
    
Phase 3:                          
Stability of the 
New System 
Based on the potential for a transformed system to revert to its former self or to a less desirable state 
    A moderately high 
threshold exists to revert 
to the old system or to a 
different undesirable 
system 
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In applying the framework to the case study (Table 5.6), I conclude Grenadian water 
management has moderate capacity for transformation based on four key judgments. First, I judged 
the system to have moderate capacity in regard to preparedness for transformation, a 3 on the 1-5 
scale. Actors in the system had a high degree of knowledge of needed water sector reforms and trust 
of one another. However, high levels of knowledge and trust did not extend to political and resident 
levels of the system. Potential policy entrepreneurs for transformation had emerged, but were not 
sufficiently effective (as of 2012), to guide the system through transformation.  
Second, I judged the system to have a relatively poor capacity to seize windows of opportunity, 
a 2 on the 1-5 scale. As discussed further in Section 5.3 and especially in Chapter 6, policy 
entrepreneurs were unable to join the three streams and seize windows of opportunity. This 
breakdown was the 'point of failure' in attempts to transform the system. Policy entrepreneurs 
generated agreement among water professionals on a 'problem' and a 'solution,' but generated very 
little political support to pass key legislation. Moreover, fundamental flaws in defining the 'problem' 
may need to be rectified to help generate political support needed to join the three streams and seize a 
window of opportunity. In addition, despite being frustrated by the legislative system, there was no 
consideration of shifting strategy and pursuing non-legislative means to achieve the goals of water 
sector reform. Policy entrepreneurs had little awareness of these faults and no plans to rectify them 
existed. In my subjective rating, I would have awarded a '3' if significant awareness of these problems 
existed or a '4' if there were an organized attempt to correct the problems.  
Third, I judged the system to have a relatively poor capacity to navigate a transition to water 
sector reform, a 2 on the 1-5 scale. My largest concern in this regard is that system actors perceive 
legislation will precipitate transformation. Only one interviewee (#17), who was associated with a 
resident-focused NGO and relatively peripheral to water sector reform, discussed concern with 
implementation of IWRM or water sector reform provided they are legislated and funded. Legislation 
is important, but other elements of implementation exist and can render even the best legislation 
useless. This point is well made by Brooymans (2011, p. 96) in discussing the Canadian experience 
with implementing legislation:  
"The Fisheries Act has sometimes been characterized as the most powerful piece of environmental 
legislation in Canada," de Loe says. "Can you imagine an activity that doesn't affect fish or fish 
habitat? Good luck." The catch is, you can have all the legislation in the world, but if you fail to put 
in place all the things that turn legislation from paper into reality, it doesn't really matter, he says. 
So, for example, if you lack the political will to enforce legislation and you underfund key sections 
... the laws become useless. 
160 
160 
 
Add to this, my finding that water sector reform was drafted primarily by water sector technocrats and 
with little resident or resident-focused NGO involvement (see Section 6.2.1). This raises concern that 
if water sector reform legislation is passed, it could morph into a new system to empower technocrats 
rather than improve resident wellbeing.  
Fourth, I judged the potential 'transformed' system likely to be relatively stable, a 4 on the 1-5 
scale. To a large degree, the relatively high threshold to change the current system would likely apply 
to changing a transformed system. The largest uncertainties in judging the stability of a transformed 
system are if a sustainable funding mechanism will be established, and if the system will have the 
capacity to operate a restructured water sector and IWRM. 
Overall, Grenadian water management scores an 11 out of a potential 20 points on the 
framework described above, indicating the system has substantial capacity to transform but has much 
to improve upon. This framework also helps direct attention to the weak points of transformability, 
which may provide insight for designing interventions to enhance transformability.   
5.3 Transformation and System Intervention 
This section evaluates the effectiveness of capacity building and other intervention efforts in 
Grenadian water management with regard to advancing the system through the three phases of 
transformation (see Sections 2.2.2, 5.2) and answers the third research question:  
3. Do current and recent interventions effectively foster or utilize transformability? 
Interventions such as foreign-funded capacity building and capital improvement projects 
advanced the system with regard to phase 1 of transformation (preparing for transformation). These 
interventions also advanced each of the three streams needed to seize windows of opportunity to 
varying degrees (Kingdon 1995 [2003]; Olsson et al. 2006). Although transformation was not 
achieved, intervention efforts helped to establish footholds which may lead to seizing a future 
window of opportunity to pass water sector reform legislation. 
5.3.1 Preparedness for Transformation 
Interventions contributed to preparedness of Grenadian water management for transformation in 
multiple ways. Arenas have been created for networks of water professionals to interact safely, build 
friendships and mutual respect, and learn about new ideas in water management (see Section 5.2.5). 
Specific examples of such arenas were discussed by interview participants #1, 2, 8, 11, and 15 and 
included CWWA conferences and training classes or workshops on water management conducted by 
entities such as CARIWIN and GEF-IWCAM. Although it was not explicitly stated in any interview 
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or document reviewed, I observed membership and participation in GWP-C provided camaraderie 
among water professionals.  
Trust among water professionals is generally high. For example, persons interviewed within 
NAWASA were remarkably at ease with water sector reform despite provisions for additional 
oversight of NAWASA and relocation of water resource management authority from NAWASA to a 
new, independent entity (see Section 5.1.2). Knowledge of IWRM flowed into the system from 
regional and international NGOs such as CEHI, GWP-C, and CARIWIN (see Section 5.2.2) and 
diffused throughout the system. Basic knowledge of IWRM was ubiquitous among the persons I 
interviewed. In addition, water managers in Grenada broadly recognized structural and conflict of 
interest flaws in the water sector and most acknowledged water sector reform was a suitable 
resolution (see Section 4.3.1). Capacity building has also developed or enlisted potential policy 
entrepreneurs. For example, two Grenadians on the GWP-C steering committee59
5.3.2 Advancing the Three Streams
 are both well 
positioned and have expertise which may be useful to champion water sector reform. 
 
The three-streams framework for seizing a window of opportunity was presented in Section 2.2.2.2. 
To summarize earlier discussion, social-ecological systems are most likely to transform when a policy 
entrepreneur utilizes a window of opportunity to join three 'streams:' (1) recognition of a problem 
among system actors, (2) formation and revising of policy to address the problem, and (3) political 
practicalities such as "public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological 
distributions in congress, and changes of administration" (Kingdon 1995 [2003], p. 145). Olsson et al. 
(2006) termed the three streams problem, solution, and politics, nomenclature I retain here. Failure 
to join the three streams within a window of opportunity typically prevents transformation. In the 
Grenadian case, the three streams were never joined and two windows of opportunity were missed. 
Stated another way, the key point of breakdown in transformation of Grenadian water management 
was the failure to join the three streams.  
Despite the failure to join the three streams of problem, solution, and politics, system 
interventions cumulatively advanced each of the three streams to varying degrees. With regard to the 
problem stream, interventions were responsible for building consensus among water professionals 
that administrative fragmentation of water management responsibilities was a large problem. None of 
the 18 interview participants or any documents reviewed expressed any doubt that fragmentation of 
                                                     
59 The two Grenadians on the GWP-C Steering Committee are Trevor Thompson (GWP-C Chair) of the Grenada 
Ministry of Agriculture and Terrence Smith of T.P. Smith Engineering Inc. and current (2012) Chair of the 
NAWASA Board of Directors 
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water management responsibilities was a problem in Grenada. However, enthusiasm for this point 
was greatest among persons associated with GWP, CARIWIN, and CEHI.  
With regard to the solution stream, belief in a need for legislation to integrate management of 
water resources was widespread. No documents reviewed and only two participants, #16 and #17, 
expressed skepticism that legislation was useful to remedy fragmentation of water resources 
management (see Section 5.1.4). Intervention efforts appeared to contribute greatly to a near 
consensus on the solution. First, regional and international NGOs were relatively united in their 
definition of problem and solution and provided a constant influence on system actors. Second, 
intervention efforts funded creation of water management tools, (Senecal and Madramootoo 2012; 
Thompson, Senecal, and Madramootoo 2012), demonstration projects (CARIWIN 2009a; GEF-
IWCAM 2011), and implementation manuals (CEHI 2007; Government of Grenada 2007a; 
Environmental Advisors 2008; CARIWIN 2009b), which I refer to collectively as 'tools, projects, and 
manuals.'  
Interventions to construct the tools, projects, and manuals directly benefitted many key actors 
in the system and provided arenas for Caribbean water professionals to interact and learn about 
IWRM, which further reinforced IWRM as 'the solution' and helped build consensus. In addition, all 
of the products of tools, projects, and manuals projects were portrayed by their sponsoring agencies 
and authors as supporting IWRM implementation in Grenada or nearby Caribbean islands. It appears 
these products may have contributed to phase 3 of transformability by making IWRM more desirable 
and stable, in the event it is ever implemented.  
As discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.3 and 5.1.2, the EU provided EC$20 million ($7.4 
million CAD) to install capital improvements in southern Grenada, on the condition Grenada develop 
and pass a new water policy. This intervention prompted the Grenadian Government to develop, and 
adopt via legislative action, a new water policy in 2007 (CEHI 2007). While coercive, the 
arrangement was an effective driver of the political stream. Although the legislature did not establish 
an additional statute to supersede the existing patchwork of statutes and implement provisions in the 
2007 water policy, these events advanced the political stream.  
Other intervention efforts aimed at the political stream existed, but were much less effective. 
First, GWP-C and CWWA collaborate to hold 'Regional Ministerial Meetings', also referred to as 
'High Level Sessions' at annual CWWA conferences. These meetings are described in a recent GWP-
C press release as "an unmatched regional event, being the only meeting of Water Ministers in the 
Caribbean to date" (GWP-C 2012, p. 1). However, products from these meetings are generally non-
binding agreements recognizing some problem or prescribed solution. I could not verify that any 
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aspect of water management had changed because of the High Level Sessions. I asked one 
knowledgeable interview participant60
Not very much. Really, I think they are a waste of time in my honest opinion. Don't get me going on 
that one. It needs a good shake up, I don't think they know what they want to do with (the 
meeting). It has been recognized, as a result of the 'difficulties' at the last High Level Session, that 
perhaps a little more structure and forward planning needs to take place. And follow up afterward. 
At the moment it just seems to be a one-off event that the Ministers get invited to for a couple of 
days. It doesn't cost them anything to attend and they just need to put in a few words.  
 about what happens in the High Level Sessions and received a 
particularly candid and insightful opinion: 
I suggested the High Level Session might be a good political event, and the participant continued: 
Yes, it is an event to be seen at. So the way it is constituted at the moment, I really don't see the 
High Level Event as a good value for the money. And I am not telling you anything I haven't said 
elsewhere.  
Thompson, Senecal, and Madramootoo (2012) provide a more nuanced assessment of the meetings, 
"this has started Ministers 'talking' at the highest level on issues relating to water but there is need for 
much greater coordination and communication on water resources issues across the region."  
Second, a GEF-IWCAM working group evolved into the Consortium of CARICOM 
Institutions on Water and was tasked by the CARICOM61
Third, Environmental Advisors produced a review of policy, legislation and institutional 
structures in Caribbean nations relevant to implementing IWCAM (Environmental Advisors 2007), 
followed by a 'toolkit' for institutional, policy and legislative improvements relevant to IWCAM 
(Environmental Advisors 2008). Both reports were produced through the GEF-IWCAM project and 
have some relevance to legislative aspects of IWRM in Grenada. While the reports provided insight 
into the legislative realm of policy change, I was unable to find evidence these products were used to 
promote water sector reform. 
 Council of Trade and Economic 
Development (COTED) to assist member states with developing and implementing IWRM Plans 
(Cap-Net, GWP, and UNDP 2005; GEF-IWCAM 2011). Despite much administrative line drawing 
and acronym drafting, little has come from this group in terms of IWRM implementation (Thompson, 
Senecal, and Madramootoo 2012).  
                                                     
60 This participant is possibly known to many for expressing this particular view. Disclosing the participant's 
code number here may compromise the true source of other coded commentary. Therefore, for 
confidentiality purposes I am withholding the participant's identity number in this one case.  
61 CARICOM is the acronym for the Caribbean Community. 
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5.3.3 Footholds and Moral Victories 
General capacity building and the use of conditional funding for capital improvement projects worked 
in tandem to sensitize water professionals to the value of adopting IWRM and to motivate the 
legislature to adopt a concomitant water policy. Although these advances did not bring about any 
change in the structure of Grenadian water management, they did move the system toward 
transformation in important ways. In the ball in cup analogy (Figure 1.2), sensitizing water 
professionals and the adoption of the 2007 water policy represent changes in the shape of the cup, 
creating a more favorable setting for future transformation. These advances can also be 
conceptualized in the ball in cup as footholds on the upward slope toward the critical threshold of 
legislating water sector reform. In the footholds conceptualization, the side of the cup is not smooth, 
but features points at which the system can rest temporarily and launch further attempts to reach the 
top of the cup (Figure 5.1). Drawing attention to specific footholds as 'resting points' toward 
transformation provides an alternative to the more ambiguous task of changing the shape of the cup.  
 
Figure 5.1. Ball-in-cup heuristic, featuring 'footholds' on the uphill slope. 
To answer Research Question #3, interventions did foster transformability in Grenadian water 
management, but not enough to trigger transformation. The system failed to join the three streams of 
problem, solution, and politics, but is in a better position to do so now (2013) than it was prior to 
2007. Thanks to intervention efforts, transformation is not blocked by lack of transformability. The 
point of breakdown has been advanced to a poor fit among the three streams of problem, solution, and 
politics. I further pursue the reasons why the three streams were not joined in Chapter 6. 
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5.4 Summary  
This chapter answers the first three research questions, summarized at the end of this section in Table 
5.7. With regard to the first research question, I determined Grenadian water management to be in a 
'persistent and undesirable state'. The system has been 'persistent' in that the basic structure of 
legislated fragmentation of water management responsibilities has been highly resistant to change and 
'undesirable' in the administrative fragmentation of water management responsibilities. In addition, 
the system exhibited high resilience, high connectedness, and high potential. Together, these 
conditions define Grenadian water management as being in a rigidity trap.  
Despite the coarse label of rigidity trap, the system exhibited many traits of a transformable 
system. Unfortunately, the current literature on maladaptive system traps lacks methods or terms to 
describe the relative severity of maladaptive system traps. Therefore, I propose a model to describe 
trapped systems more precisely to help frame discussion of how to free such systems. Applied to 
Grenadian water management, the system is (1) in a rigidity trap, (2) characterized by moderate, (3) 
but weakening persistence. In addition, the system is (4) moderately undesirable and (5) stable in this 
regard. 
In regard to the second research question, the literature on SES transformability provides no 
methods or terms to describe the magnitude of transformability in a given system. However, in this 
chapter I developed and used a framework to assess transformability which involves grading the 
relative capacity of a given system to navigate each step in the Olsson 3-phase model of 
transformability. Applied to Grenadian water management, the system has moderate capacity for 
transformation, but has much room to improve, particularly with its ability to seize windows of 
opportunity and navigate transitions.  
With regard to the third research question, some aspects of transformability were responsive to 
interventions, particularly with regard to phase 1 of transformation. Conditions placed on receiving 
foreign funding for capital improvement projects directly resulted in the development and legislative 
establishment of a new water policy in 2007. In addition, capacity-building efforts effectively spread 
knowledge and support for water sector reform. However, interventions did not empower water sector 
reform supporters to join the three streams of problem, solution, and politics and seize two major 
windows of opportunity for change. Although transformation did not occur, intervention efforts 
helped establish footholds on the upward slope toward the critical threshold of legislating water sector 
reform. Figure 5.1 includes a modified version of ball-in-cup heuristic (Figure 1.2; Gunderson 2000) 
featuring footholds along the side of the 'cup.' 
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Table 5.7. Summary of answers to the first three research questions. 
Research Question   Summary of Answer 
1 
To what extent is 
Grenadian water 
management in a trap? 
 
Grenadian water management is in a rigidity trap 
characterized by moderate, but weakening persistence. In 
addition, the system is moderately undesirable and stable in 
this regard. 
2 
To what extent is 
Grenadian water 
management 
transformable? 
 
Grenadian water management is moderately transformable. 
Specifically, the system has a moderate capacity with regard 
to (a) Phase 1 of transformation, (b) the ability to seize 
windows of opportunity, and (c) Phase 2 of transformation 
as well as a high capacity with regard to (d) Phase 3 of 
transformation. 
3 
Do current and recent 
interventions effectively 
foster or utilize 
transformability? 
  
Yes. Interventions advanced the system with regard to phase 
1 of transformation and advanced each of the three streams 
of seizing windows of opportunity to varying degrees. 
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Chapter 6 
Implications and Recommendations 
This is the third of three chapters which present and discuss study results, implications, and 
recommendations. Chapter 4 developed a foundational understanding of the case study. Chapter 5 
explained what went right with transformation, answered the first three research questions, and 
identified the failure to seize windows of opportunity as the point of breakdown in transformation. 
This chapter explains why breakdown in transformation occurred and answers the fourth research 
question by providing five recommendations to facilitate transformation of water management in 
Grenada. A suggested path forward is presented at the end of this chapter.  
A key theme in this chapter is the complementary roles of advocacy and brokering in the 
context of seizing windows of opportunity and the three-streams framework (Kingdon 1995 [2003]). 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2.2, I use the term advocacy to denote general actions intended to 
persuade others to accept the merit or need for a policy or idea, in this case water sector reform and 
IWRM. The term brokerage denotes a distinct set of actions which joins the three streams of problem, 
solution, and politics to seize a window of opportunity. Brokerage involves unique tactics and 
strategies, and was a key missing link in efforts to transform Grenadian water management.   
6.1 Limitations of Advocacy to Seize Windows of Opportunity 
Advocates of water sector reform, and IWRM in particular, initiated dialogue about water 
management and promoted their proposals and suggestions of how to improve water management in 
Grenada (CEHI 2007; Government of Grenada 2007c). Interview participants #2, 7, and 14 discussed 
the cumulative effects of capacity building and referred repeatedly to the "sensitization" of the water 
management community to the need for changes in water management. Sensitization, in this context 
was equivalent to 'softening up' as described in Kingdon (1995 [2003]) and discussed in Chapter 2. 
Although transformation did not occur, sensitization of water professionals has created a dialogue on 
improving water policy among many key actors in the Grenadian water management system.  
Advocacy for water sector reform and IWRM was limited in two important respects. First, 
advocacy efforts did not reach a broad enough audience, particularly residents (Section 4.1.7) and 
politicians. Second, as discussed in Section 2.2.2.3, advocacy is fundamentally insufficient to seize a 
window of opportunity and advance a system to phase 2 of transformation. Seizing windows of 
opportunity depended on one or more policy entrepreneurs rising up and brokering a proposal through 
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the legislative process through political maneuvering, deal making, and bargaining, but no such 
person emerged. 
6.1.1 The Opportunity to Expand Advocacy to Residents  
Interviewees #2 and 14, who both played central roles with regard to water sector reform, felt 
residents could serve as a driver for legislative action, particularly during severe droughts when water 
supply interruptions can be widespread. Despite this perceived need, questionnaire data indicate 
residents were disenfranchised with regard to water sector reform and IWRM (Section 4.1.7).  
Information collected through interviews, document review, and resident questionnaires 
illuminated a pervasive top-down character of the Grenadian water sector (Section 5.1.3). Interview 
participants affiliated with local NGOs (#17, 18, and 19) each provided lively commentary on the 
need to change the top-down culture to address resident needs better. Encouraging evidence of recent 
softening of the top-down culture within NAWASA was identified (Sections 4.1.7 and 5.2.2), but 
resident involvement or representation in water sector reform and to a lesser extent in proposed 
IWRM was slight. 
Deconstruction of the Grenada water sector review (Government of Grenada 2007b) provides 
insight to the extent residents were excluded from shaping water sector reform. The water sector 
review effectively defined the 'problem' as solved by the 'solution' presented in the 2007 water policy 
(Government of Grenada 2007c) and implementation framework (Government of Grenada 2007a).62 
Part of the stated purpose of the water sector review (p. 2) was "[t]o report on the problems and 
critical issues pertaining to the water sector." Page 35 of the water sector review lists 28 stakeholders 
who were consulted in development of the water sector review, none of whom were residents,63 
NGOs with a mission of advocating for residents, or community groups.64
Within the water sector review, a "Matrix of Problems and Critical Issues" lists and ranks 18 
"critical issues" based on stakeholder consultations (Government of Grenada 2007b, p. 44-45). Two 
 Resident representatives 
are listed in a table describing stakeholder awareness of IWRM (p. 35-36). However, the source of 
this table was an IWRM 'roadmap' document produced by a regional NGO (CEHI 2007) and resident 
concerns or perspectives are not explicitly discussed in the water sector review.  
                                                     
62 See Section 4.3 for additional discussion of water sector reform. 
63 My use of the term resident denotes people living in Grenada and not holding any other stakeholder 
perspective.  
64 Government of Grenada (2007b) listed the Petite Martinique Church Council as a stakeholder consulted for 
the water sector review. However, I can find no additional details of what this organization is, what it was 
advocating, or even verify its existence. In addition, this group is apparently based on an outlying island of 
Grenada and falls outside the geographical scope of this study. 
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issues in particular are relevant to the resident experience with regard to water: water shortages and 
intermittent supplies, and poor water quality. Poor water quality is rated as one of the three least 
important issues on the list. This contrasts sharply with resident views presented in Chapter 4, and 
especially in Section 4.1.3. Remarkably, the list of 18 critical issues rated "poor hydrogeological 
data" and "potential conflict among users" among the most important issues. Interestingly, the list of 
critical issues did not include water-borne disease, poorly controlled water pressure, chlorine taste of 
water, or issues related to poverty such as the economic availability of water, the ability to cope with 
water supply problems, or gender issues. The marginalization and absence of issues which affect 
residents in profound ways indicates resident well being was not the focus of water sector reform. 
Had resident well being been the focus, poor water quality would not have rated as less important 
than availability of hydrogeological data. Poor resident participation and focus on water sector reform 
contributed to a peculiar or narrow problem definition, an idea considered further in Section 6.2.1, 
and weakened the potential for residents to act as a driver for political action (Section 5.1.3). 
Authors of a plan to implement IWRM in Grenada (CEHI 2007)65
Comment: Judy Williams, Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA): Since 1983 
when the beautiful process of developing a national Forestry Policy began I have been involved. In 
2007 we are still waiting for a National Land Use Policy. Now we are doing this [planning IWRM for 
Grenada] because we need a National Water Policy to access EU funds. I don’t see how it can be 
meaningfully done in 6 months. I disagree that we have a wide cross-section of stakeholders here. 
 made an attempt to 
incorporate resident views but were not necessarily successful in this regard. CEHI (2007, p. 40) 
acknowledged "the historical norm that management of water is the responsibility of the national 
water provider utility is still embedded in and foremost in the minds of people." The passage also 
stated a need exists to engage the public to create "public support for, and appreciation of, the 
concept, principles and values of IWRM." Also, development of the IWRM roadmap included leaders 
of at least two resident-focused local NGOs. However, comments of the secretary general of one of 
these two NGOs indicate an early perception of, and objection to, poor resident involvement in water 
sector reform and IWRM planning for Grenada. From p. 75 of CEHI (2007): 
Interview data provide further insight to the gap between residents and attempts to promote 
water sector reform and IWRM. Interview participant #18 offered lively commentary on a lack of 
resident focus in water sector reform being related to a pervasive top-down social environment in 
Grenada. To paraphrase interview participant #18, professionals higher in the system tend not to 'look 
                                                     
65 CEHI (2007) details a roadmap to implement IWRM in Grenada which is distinct from water sector reform. 
The IWRM roadmap focused on incorporating IWRM in water management, whereas water sector reform 
focused on restructuring the water sector to enhance oversight of the water sector and separate water 
resource management from water service responsibilities. 
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down' for input from residents, and residents do not necessarily 'look up' to provide input (also see 
Section 5.1.3).  
Advocates for water sector reform and IWRM did not promote these proposed solutions among 
residents, nor were local NGOs approached to carry out advocacy at the resident level. I did not 
identify any newspaper articles describing water sector reform, no questionnaire respondents had 
heard of water sector reform, and no interview participant expressed any knowledge of promoting 
water sector reform among residents. Interview participants #2, 7, 15, 17, 18, and 19 acknowledged 
local NGOs could play a role in advocating for residents in the future. However, document review 
and interview data show no attempt to fund or otherwise engage local NGOs to take an active role in 
promoting water sector reform or IWRM. This finding may support the notion that water 
professionals higher in the system were not looking down for input from the resident level, as 
comments by interview participant #18 suggest. The combination of not including residents in 
defining the problem or identifying solutions, and not engaging residents in advocacy efforts, 
effectively squandered an opportunity to create political pressure for legislative action. Without 
political incentive for action, the three streams were not joined and transformation of the water sector 
did not occur. 
This analysis leads to my first recommendation to facilitate transformation of Grenadian water 
management:  
Recommendation #1:  
Future interventions should engage residents as part of a vision to create 
political pressure for proposed water management solutions. 
In pursuing my first recommendation, two key assets to facilitate engaging residents are (a) an 
abundance of funding at the regional and international level for advocacy and (b) untapped capacity 
of local, resident-focused NGOs to deliver the water management message to residents. It is difficult 
to quantify the magnitude of funding which flowed into the Caribbean for improving water 
governance. However, conversations with interview participants #2 and 3 and extensive internet-
based research suggest funding totaled more than $10 million (CAD) annually in the English-
speaking Caribbean, since at least 2008, explicitly for the purpose of improving water governance. To 
date, little of this funding has trickled down to local NGOs to engage residents. I asked interview 
participant #19 what access their organization has had to foreign funds and received this response: 
It is interesting to hear there is that money out there. We don't know about it, and we certainly 
don't have access to it. The work we do comes with very, very meager resources. That funding is 
not something we have access to or even knowledge of.  
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This needs to change. Local NGOs have unique ability to engage residents in Grenada on water 
issues. Providing funding to local NGOs to engage residents directly on water management issues 
could lead to crucial political pressure to motivate legislative action to improve water management. 
Engaging residents in water sector reform and creating political pressure for legislative action 
could be facilitated by reframing the problem stream to permit consideration of solutions more 
attractive to residents. As first steps, future interventions should explicitly abandoned the top-down 
mindset in defining water sector issues and future water sector reform proposals should be redesigned 
with substantial resident and local NGO input. Doing so may increase the flexibility of policy 
entrepreneurs to join the three streams, an opportunity explored further in Section 6.2.1. 
6.1.2 Why Advocacy Was Not Enough  
Section 2.2.2.2 provides an explanation of the three-streams framework for seizing windows of 
opportunity (Kingdon 1995 [2003]). The complementary, but distinct, roles of advocacy and 
brokerage in seizing windows of opportunity are particularly important to the case of Grenadian water 
management. In the three-streams framework, a system is prepared for transformation by advancing 
the streams through advocacy. When a window of opportunity occurs, policy entrepreneurs are then 
able to join the streams through brokering.  
In Section 5.2.7, I identified the point of breakdown in transformation of Grenadian water 
management as the inability to join the three streams of problem, solution, and politics. In this 
chapter, I explain how a lack of brokerage was the most likely cause of the breakdown. In addition, I 
explain how pursuing brokerage may be the key to freeing the system from its rigidity trap.   
Interview, document review, and observation data indicated brokerage was particularly 
deficient in efforts to transform Grenadian water management. I was unable to detect any coherent 
strategy for how to achieve passage of legislation to implement water sector reform or IWRM beyond 
advocacy. Notably, the Framework for Water Policy Implementation (Government of Grenada 2007a) 
defined a solution to Grenada's water management problem, but did not address how to harness 
political support for implementation. The Roadmap Toward IWRM Planning for Grenada (CEHI 
2007) comes the closest to presenting an implementation plan sensitive to the need for brokering. The 
Roadmap document contains basic elements of brokering such as assessing the political support for 
reform. However, strategies and tactics for how to harness political support necessary to pass 
legislation were not addressed. I engaged interview participant #2 in discussion of academic concepts 
of policy implementation, such as punctuated equilibrium theory, advocacy coalitions, and the 
participant's observations of how multiple factors such as a crisis and key persons with the ability to 
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move an idea forward, must align for policies to be implemented. Toward the end of this discussion, I 
asked interview participant #2: 
Question: So, are any of these other ideas seeping into the road-mapping, the IWRM plans, are any 
of these governance ideas seeping into the discussion anywhere? 
Response: No.   
In the Grenadian case, advocacy effectively coaxed water professionals into general agreement 
of the solution and the problem. However, political support for implementation was fleeting. Reasons 
for the failure to generate political support are discussed in other sections and include: not extending 
advocacy to residents (Section 6.1.1); engaging politicians was brief, occasional, and poorly executed 
(Section 5.3.2); a lack of honing the solution (6.2.1); and poor anticipation of crises (6.2.2). In 
summary, space exists to advance advocacy marginally, but brokerage is needed to seize a window of 
opportunity and advance Grenadian water management to the transition phase of transformation. 
6.2 The Brokerage Niche 
My single most important finding with regard to explaining why Grenadian water management failed 
to transform is the large and unfilled need for brokerage to seize windows of opportunity to transform 
Grenadian water management. In the following sub-sections, I discuss dimensions of the brokerage 
niche in terms of 'why, what, how, when, and who' and recommend specific actions to help join the 
three streams. Section 6.3 serves to synthesize recommendations and provide one example of a path 
forward.  
6.2.1 The Opportunity to Reframe the Problem 
In his description of the problem stream, Kingdon (1995 [2003]) differentiates between 'conditions' 
and 'problems.' Conditions are features of daily life and become problems when we acknowledge 
something should be done about them. Many aspects of Grenadian water management can be 
considered a problem, depending on one's perspective. For example, intermittent water service is a 
condition for many Grenada residents. This condition presents a problem for many impoverished 
residents who go without water until service is restored. However, the condition may not warrant 
elevation to a problem for residents who own large water storage tanks and pumps to augment home 
water supply during service interruptions (Section 4.1.5).  
From a brokerage perspective, decisions must be made on which conditions to elevate to 
problem status. It would likely be impossible to create a proposal which does something about every 
condition, and harnessing political support for such a proposal would be impractical. Thus, it is 
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necessary to be selective in elevating conditions to problem status. The political consequence of 
problem definition is profound. One example seen in Grenada’s attempt at water sector reform 
(Section 6.1.1) was defining poor hydrogeological data availability as a 'critical issue' in the Grenada 
Water Sector Review (Government of Grenada 2007b, p.45), while overlooking water-borne disease, 
poorly controlled water pressure, chlorine taste of water, and issues related to poverty such as the 
economic availability of water, the ability to cope with water supply problems, and gender issues. 
This problem definition encouraged consideration of solutions which benefited one subset of people 
disproportionately (e.g., water professionals) relative to others (e.g., residents).66
Interview participant #10 perceived problems of mismatch between the proposed solution of 
water sector reform and reality. As the participant saw it: 
  
We talk a lot, in our case, IWRM, we were focusing on potable water and water for agriculture and 
irrigation. When this paper came out on reform in the water sector [the water sector review], I 
asked what is the objective of the reform. Is it because a [water management] style now exists [is 
now in vogue] that separates water management from service provision or have you really seen a 
difficulty in Grenada under the present system? And they couldn't tell me. All I was told was 
basically NAWASA controls all the water, including agriculture. But agriculture has no problem. 
Agriculture has never had a problem getting water for irrigation. I said, 'do you have a plan, a 
project for an expansion in agriculture that would be using a lot of water?’ And they couldn't 
answer. 
The balance of winners and losers which emerges from the problem definition has important 
implications for which proposed solutions are considered and, in turn, for political support for action. 
To continue the example from above, the problem definition led to a proposed solution that offered 
little incentive for support beyond the water professionals who defined the problem. The take-home 
point with regard to joining the three streams is that problem definition can be manipulated to favor 
different solutions and to facilitate political support for action. This analysis leads to my second 
recommendation to facilitate transformation of Grenadian water management: 
 
Recommendation #2: 
Future interventions should frame the problem with substantial resident input and focus.  
Doing so will dovetail with my first recommendation to engage residents with advocacy efforts and 
creates a greater incentive for residents and resident-focused NGOs to pressure the legislature for 
                                                     
66 Two issues were defined as "critical" in the Water Sector Review (Government of Grenada 2007b, p.45) that 
residents identified as problems in my questionnaires: intermittent water supply and poor water quality. 
However, poor water quality was rated as one of the three least important "critical issues" of the 18 listed.   
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action. Framing the problem differently also provides greater flexibility to craft solutions to fit the 
political stream, discussed in Section 6.2.2.  
6.2.2 The Opportunity to Improve the Fit Between the Solution and Political Streams  
In terms of fit between the solution and political streams, the solutions proposed through water sector 
reform (Government of Grenada 2007c) and IWRM (CEHI 2007) did not conform to political reality. 
Comparison of water sector reform, which failed to be legislated, with water tariff reform, which was 
successfully legislated (Table 5.3), provides insight into the degree to which water sector reform was 
incongruent with political reality. Water sector reform proposed to increase government expenses, 
had ambiguous benefits of action, had ambiguous and long-term consequence of inaction, and was 
complex to implement. In contrast, water tariff reform proposed to increase government revenue, had 
clear benefits of action, identified clear and short-term consequences of inaction, and was simple to 
implement. To facilitate joining the political and solution streams, either the proposed solution needed 
to change to fit political reality, or the political reality needed to change to fit the proposed solution.  
Funding restrictions were one key unresolved mismatch between prescribed solutions and 
political reality. The 2007 water policy was expensive to implement relative to political will to fund 
the actions proposed under the policy. Notably, implementing the water policy would have required 
funding to allow: administrative restructuring of the water sector; creation of a new water resources 
unit; addition of 6 new positions, and; upgrading 2 existing positions (Government of Grenada 
2007a).The Framework for Water Policy Implementation (Government of Grenada 2007a) recognized 
the problem of funding, recommending (p. 22) "additional external funding be sought to facilitate the 
establishment and implementation of the [new Water Resources] Unit." Interview participants #8 and 
14 perceived a lack of funding to be the most important impediment to passage of water sector reform 
legislation. Regardless of merit, the proposed solution needed be 'free' to the government or offer a 
cost savings to be seriously considered. No source of external funding emerged and no attempt was 
made to refashion the water sector reform proposal to be more politically palatable, according to data 
examined during document review. However, I discussed the somewhat elaborate nature of IWRM 
being promoted since 2007 with interview participant #2 and asked if the participant was aware of 
any discussion about toning down the current vision of IWRM or changing the approach, and 
received this response: 
 [The IWRM that has been promoted] is a bit of a Nirvana type of concept, a Shangri-La, something 
that we would all like to move to but without having something that it is latched on to as an issue. 
That has been part of the problem [preventing implementation] and it has been recognized that 
there is more traction in trying to not be so ambitious and looking at some of the more concrete 
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things that could be addressed rather than trying to do the whole thing. But that is more of an 
internal discussion; you won't find that in any documentation.  
Although the proposed solutions were not tailored to political reality, the possibility remained 
to bend political reality to the proposed solutions. There are many ways to manipulate the political 
stream, and I consider two options here. First, large foreign investments with legislative conditions 
were observed to stimulate a cooperative spirit in the Grenada legislature (e.g., requirements related 
to the Southern Grenada Water Improvement Project, see Section 4.3). I discussed the prospects of 
passing water sector reform legislation in its existing form at length with interview participant #7, 
who expressed frustration with political inaction on water sector reform and agreed another large 
funding opportunity may be needed to motivate the legislature to act. However, no such project 
emerged and the legislature did not act on water sector reform legislation. Second, residents could 
have been mobilized by reform proponents and resident-focused NGOs to create political pressure for 
action to improve water governance. However, this option was squandered by excluding residents 
from participating in defining the problem and subsequently by not pursuing residents with advocacy 
efforts (Section 6.1.1).  
This analysis led me to my third recommendation to facilitate transformation of Grenadian 
water management: 
Recommendation #3: 
Future interventions should craft solutions which take advantage of 
political realities.  
Many options exist to take advantage of political conditions at any given point in time, and I resist the 
temptation to outline a 'best' path forward in this section in favor of discussing four considerations in 
fitting the solution and political streams. Following sections provide recommendations for specific 
solutions to facilitate joining the three streams and triggering transformation.  
First, a proposed solution must be viewed as politically feasible. Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 132) 
describes the word "actually" as commonly used to discuss feasibility by policy makers. Examples 
include, "Will it actually accomplish what we want to accomplish?" and "Can it actually be 
administered?" Fortunately, advocacy efforts popularized a perception of IWRM as a feasible 
solution in many parts of the system. To facilitate a political perception of feasibility, future proposals 
should retain a normative focus on IWRM. However, to further aid political perception of feasibility, 
an explicit attempt should be made to simplify future proposals. One critique of the Framework for 
Water Policy Implementation (Government of Grenada 2007a) and the IWRM Roadmap (CEHI 
2007) is that they were relatively elaborate related to their implementation. The Framework for Water 
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Policy Implementation involved creating a new administrative unit and redrawing administrative 
lines, while the IWRM Roadmap featured a 20-page description of 100 distinct activities necessary to 
implement IWRM in Grenada (p. 48-67). Stated another way, opportunity exists to improve political 
perception of feasibility by scaling the complexity of future proposals to the degree of political 
ambition for change in the water sector.  
Second, funding constraints served to block proposals to transform water management, but 
could be harnessed to promote new proposals if they are viewed as money-saving endeavors by 
legislators. Strategies to reduce the perceived cost of proposed solutions to the government are wide 
ranging and combinations of strategies can create many possible solutions. For example, outside 
funding could be secured to offset any additional cost to the government. Also, politically less-
objectionable ways to raise revenue, such as charging water bottlers' extraction fees, could be pursued 
to offset costs of a proposed solution. A third option is to scale down proposals to be less costly to the 
government. The key is to create the perception among legislators that implementing a given proposal 
will not cause a financial burden for the government.  
Third, political incentives to implement a given solution could be created. Simply stated, 
political acceptance, and thus implementation, is more likely when individual legislators perceive 
either a personal political gain from implementing a given solution or a personal political risk from 
not supporting a given solution. As is the case with other aspects of brokering, many ways exist to 
create political incentives. Reframing the problem can be one tool to create political incentives for 
action (Section 6.2.1). Enlisting and funding local NGOs to advocate for proposed solutions could 
also create political pressure to implement a proposed solution (Section 6.1.1), as can providing 
proposals for politicians to use to their political advantage in times of crisis (Section 6.2.3). 
Fourth, and finally, if political reality precludes any legislative action, consideration should be 
given to pursuing avenues which do not require it. A basic contention of Mitchell (1990, p. 8-16) is 
that aligning all the ideal ingredients for implementing IWRM is unlikely and, by necessity, water 
resources managers must proceed as best as possible in each case. Ideally, IWRM in Grenada would 
have a statutory foundation. However, non-legislative instruments for environmental management 
exist (Gouldson et al. 2008) and could provide a way to 'plow around the stump' when political 
difficulties are insurmountable.  
6.2.3 The Opportunity to Prepare for and Anticipate Crisis 
Rham Emanuel, former White House Chief of Staff for President Barack Obama, is noted as saying, 
“Never waste a crisis. It can be turned to joyful transformation” (Buiter 2009, p. 1). However, seizing 
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upon a crisis and turning it into "joyful transformation" generally requires great preparation, 
anticipation, and skillful brokering to join the three streams of problem, solution, and politics 
(Kingdon 1995 [2003]). Thus, my fourth recommendation to facilitate transformation of Grenadian 
water management is: 
Recommendation #4: 
Anticipate and prepare for crises. 
Not all windows of opportunity result in joining the three streams. Windows of opportunity are 
notoriously brief and if policy entrepreneurs fail to act quickly and make critical couplings the 
window may shut and the opportunity for transformation lost. For example, as discussed in Section 
5.1.2, a severe drought reduced potable water production and triggered widespread water service 
interruptions in Grenada in 2009-2010. This drought crisis elevated the lack of resilience of water 
service to problem status, and created political interest in doing something about the problem, thus 
opening a window of opportunity to pass legislation to implement water sector reform and/or IWRM. 
However, no formal proposal was presented to join the problem with political interest to act and the 
crisis passed without action occurring (Section 5.1.2). Interview participant #2 commented, "The time 
to push change through the legislature was when the taps were dry. Residents' memory is short and 
the opportunity has passed." 
Fortunately, some aspects of windows of opportunity can be predicted. For example, it is 
possible to anticipate the form of many windows of opportunity and prepare accordingly. In the 
Grenadian case, severe droughts can reduce water supply and cause water service interruptions. This 
type of crisis elevates the normally uninteresting 'condition' of water supply resilience to 'problem 
status' in the eyes of many. Politicians may sense an opportunity for personal political gain by 
supporting proposals viewed by their constituency as addressing the problem. Conversely, politicians 
may sense personal political risk in not supporting proposals viewed as addressing the problem 
(Kingdon 1995 [2003]). By anticipating a severe drought, proposals can be crafted years in advance 
which can be promoted opportunistically as addressing the specific problem of water supply 
resilience to drought. The hook to draw in support from legislators is the consequence of political 
gain or risk relative to supporting the proposal. Other aspects of preparing to advance proposals 
during a drought crisis are considered further in Section 6.3.  
The timing of many windows of opportunity can also be anticipated. Many opportunities occur 
regularly, such as the generally ambitious environment for political action following elections. In the 
Grenadian case, drought was a crisis which triggered windows of opportunity (Section 5.1.2). It is 
impossible to know exactly when the next drought will occur, but one will likely occur every 10 years 
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or fewer and probably in connection with an El Niño/La Niña–Southern Oscillation event (Giannini, 
Kushnir, and Cane 2000; Stephenson, Chen, and Taylor 2008; Gergis and Fowler 2009). Anticipating 
the timing of a window of opportunity will help structure and prioritize preparations and provide a 
better opportunity to seize the moment of crisis when it comes. 
The greater the variety of crises which policy entrepreneurs are prepared for, the greater the 
chance they will be able to seize the next window of opportunity, whatever it looks like. 
Accumulating plans to push proposals during drought and following hurricanes, elections, or 
infrastructure failures adds greatly to the potential for policy entrepreneurs to join the three streams 
when the next crisis occurs. Interview participant #2 stated, "The time to push change through the 
legislature was when the taps were dry." To this, I add, "The time to develop suitable proposals and 
solicit political alliances is when the taps are running." 
This section provides a limited discussion of key aspects of seizing windows of opportunity. 
The full range of actions policy entrepreneurs employ to prepare for and anticipate crisis is enormous 
relative to what is presented here. The point of this section is not to provide an exhaustive discussion 
on anticipation and preparation for crisis, but rather to convey their importance and highlight these 
activities as a critical gap in current efforts to bring about "joyful transformation" in Grenadian water 
management.  
6.2.4 The Opportunity for a Broker  
Section 6.2 discusses the single most significant finding with regard to transforming Grenadian water 
management, the wide and unfilled brokerage gap in efforts to transform water management in 
Grenada. Previous sections describe 'the why, what, how, and when' of brokerage. In this section I 
discuss difficulties in finding a 'who' to perform brokerage tasks and suggest ways to recruit persons 
to perform critical brokerage functions.  
Addressing the gap in brokerage is complicated because persons currently engaged in advocacy 
are unlikely to assume a brokerage role for three reasons: (1) the opportunity costs of engaging in 
brokerage; (2) a contrast in ideal skill sets for brokerage and advocacy; and (3) path dependency. 
First, shifting the role of persons currently engaged in advocacy to brokerage risks impairing 
advocacy efforts. Advocating for improved water governance in Grenada is a complex task which 
requires a special skill set. Advocates who I interviewed were highly trained in water management 
issues, were recognized by others as experts, and were able to persuade others to see the value in their 
preferred water management styles. Advocates designed or managed projects which built knowledge 
and trust among local actors, such as demonstration projects, conducted seminars on water 
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management, and participated in organizations such as GWP-C. In addition, without effective 
advocacy, brokerage is not likely to succeed. Diverting limited expertise from advocacy to improve 
brokerage may not offer a net benefit with regard to transformation.  
Second, skills needed for effective brokerage contrast with skills needed for effective advocacy. 
Few advocates make effective brokers, and vice versa. Kingdon (1995 [2003], p. 183) states, 
"Sometimes [advocacy and brokerage] are combined in a single person; at other times, [policy] 
entrepreneurs specialize, as in the instance of one pushing from an extreme position and another 
negotiating the compromises." I engaged interview participant #3 on aspects of the governance 
literature which suggest value in skill sets which do not necessarily align well with skills of 
hydrologists and engineers. Interview participant #3 commented:  
Actually [the need to involve people with different skill sets] has been at the center of a lot of 
conversations too. There are a lot of different skill sets that you need because the common 
perception of water is water services supply. Who actually is most involved in that? Engineers at 
water utilities. Those are not the guys who think about how to structure national programs to raise 
awareness of interconnectedness of water resources. They don't have that orientation. So the 
question becomes then, which other partners do you engage with, recognizing your resource 
constraints. 
Toward the end of our discussion on the need for diverse skill sets, interview participant #3 talked 
about difficulties in selling the concept of improving water governance to the public across the 
Caribbean. The participant noted the people who are professionally engaged in water management, 
such as engineers, do not necessarily have good communications skills for selling water governance 
approaches to the public. "You need champions, and those champions are not really forthcoming as 
such." 
Third, path dependence may also play a role in preventing present advocates of water sector 
reform and IWRM from assuming the role of broker. Changing emphasis from advocacy to brokering 
will require a change in thinking and little evidence suggests such change is forthcoming. In 
interviews, participants #2 and #3 demonstrated an emerging awareness for the need to broaden the 
general approach of advocacy. In particular, participant #3 stated:  
To get the needed [legislative] response, until somebody is literally every day going to their job and 
from the time they get to work until the time they go home their job is IWRM, drafting policy 
statements that need ratified, drafting cabinet memos that mandate x, y, and z, or making 
amendments to the legislation as needed. Until that is somebody's job, it rests nowhere. That is 
what we have seen, what we are realizing.  
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However, no reviewed documents recognized a need to broaden the strategy to promote change in 
water governance and interview participant #2 stated no such change in approach had appeared in any 
document.  
Given current advocates will not likely assume brokering roles, my fifth recommendation to 
facilitate transformation of water management in Grenada is: 
Recommendation #5:  
Enlist one or more people or organizations to serve as brokers.  
Two likely candidates exist to lead an effort to enlist a broker. First, international funding 
agencies such as GEF or CIDA could call for proposals for brokerage-oriented projects. Second, 
agencies that are already actively engaged in efforts to transform Grenadian water management, such 
as GWP-C or CEHI, could make a conscious effort to recruit potential brokers to collaborate on 
future projects. However, this latter case will require a fundamental shift in the mindset of how these 
organizations view transforming water management.  
 Once recruited, brokers need to be empowered and retained. To this end, structures used to 
retain advocates could easily be adapted to retain brokers. For example, brokers can be recruited for 
participation in prestigious steering committees and boards of directors. Brokers could also be 
recommended for consultancy projects which generally fell to advocates. Funding could be extended 
to brokers to design and participate in projects to promote improved water governance. With regard to 
how the actions of brokers might be coordinated with advocacy efforts, interview participant #1 spoke 
to the need for institutional capacity at the regional level to be flexible and ambitious: 
You can ... find institutions that have a culture, a certain culture that fosters positive energy. Like, 
for instance CEHI. I don't know how much contact you have had with them, but they make things 
happen. You never, never hear negative things from anyone about CEHI. It's always, 'What can we 
do, how can we make it work, what is the next step, where are we headed?'. Patricia Aquing 
[Executive Director of CEHI] is a phenomenal force of positive energy. Christopher Cox is a 
wonderful professional, very positive, gets things done. He is fortunate to work in an organization 
with a phenomenal leader who is very positive, and wants to make things happen, is open to 
working with people, is aware of what is going on and positions the institution within the other 
major stakeholders in the region and tries to create a culture of making things happen. 
An opportunity exists to tap capacity among NGOs to provide an environment for brokers to work 
alongside advocates. 
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6.3 A Path Forward 
Five recommendations to facilitate transformation of Grenadian water management were discussed in 
previous sections of this chapter and are summarized in Table 6.1. Considerable flexibility exists in 
how these recommendations are applied and the appropriateness of alternatives will shift from 
situation to situation and over time. Nevertheless, this final section of Chapter 6 provides one 
example of how the recommendations could be applied. 
Table 6.1. Summary of opportunities and recommendations to facilitate transformation of 
water management in Grenada. 
Recommendation Section 
(1) 
Future interventions should engage residents as part of a vision 
to create political pressure for proposed water management 
solutions 
6.1.1 
(2) Future interventions should frame the problem with substantial resident input and focus 6.2.1 
(3) Future interventions should craft solutions which take advantage of political realities 6.2.2 
(4) Future interventions should anticipate and prepare for crises 6.2.3 
(5) Future interventions should enlist one or more people or organizations to serve as brokers 6.2.4 
 
My recommended path forward begins with realistic expectations for transformation in terms of 
outcome, timeframe, and funding needed. With regard to outcome, transformation is an imperfect 
game. Transformation depends largely on fit among problem, solution and political streams, not 
necessarily on how 'good' a solution may be. Often, excellent solutions for how to improve a system 
are untenable politically and therefore unattainable. Proposing a solution based on merit and without 
regard to fit with the problem and political streams will likely result in achieving little or nothing.  
Expectations for a time frame to achieve transformation of Grenadian water management 
should also be realistic. The primary factors to consider are: (a) the time required to prepare for 
seizing different types of windows of opportunity, and (b) the time it takes for a suitable window to 
occur. While projects to prepare for windows of opportunity can be molded to the popular five-year 
project cycle for foreign funding, transformation ultimately depends on the occurrence of a suitable 
window of opportunity, which likely will not coincide with year four of a five year transformation 
project. However, given the historical frequency of crises of droughts, changes in ruling political 
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party, and funding crises, a reasonable expectation for success is within a decade of when suitable 
transformation plans are in place.67
A reasonable expectation of funding needed for a brokerage-oriented project to facilitate 
transformation of Grenadian water management is $200,000 - $400,000 CAD annually. This figure 
assumes 2 to 5 full-time employees devoted to the project and is much less than the $10 million CAD 
cited in Section 6.1.1 as spent annually in the English-speaking Caribbean explicitly for improving 
water governance. Also, funding requirements are sensitive to the scale of project and the desired 
timeframe for success. For example, a fully funded team of 10 or 15 political strategists and water 
resources experts backed by local NGOs funded to advocate for change in the water sector can be 
expected to work more quickly than a team of two or three individuals.  
 Interestingly, the time frame for achieving transformation may not 
be strongly related to the magnitude of the transformation. Given the right set of circumstances, 
radical organizational change can occur quickly.  
I envision a multifaceted, ongoing project utilizing a mix of persons with Grenada-based 
expertise in community organizing, political strategizing, and water resources management. The first 
component of the project is to engage residents with an eye toward facilitating political pressure for 
action to improve water management. Information needs to be gathered from residents to aid defining 
problem(s) in a way which favors adoption of solutions residents are likely to support politically. 
Residents also need to be persuaded to take interest in water management issues and be empowered to 
create political pressure for action. Methods to engage residents could include the academic staples of 
mining the literature for relevant datasets or conducting town-hall style meetings, focus groups, 
surveys, and interviews. However, engaging residents may also be done more creatively. For 
example, a weekly newspaper column could be maintained to address resident water concerns. 
Interview participant #3 advocated the use of social media to engage residents and NAWASA already 
uses Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and a blog to interact with residents. 
The second project component is to reframe the problem in a way to maximize political 
pressure for action. It is important to include a balance of political interests in defining the problem, 
including, but not limited to, residents or resident advocates, technocrats, and business interests. In 
the short term, the problem can be defined based on professional advice of NGOs, political strategists, 
and existing relevant datasets. In the longer term, the problem definition should be revised as 
understanding of the positions of politically-relevant stakeholders improves.  
                                                     
67 The estimate of 10 years is admittedly somewhat speculative. However, between 2006 and 2013, potentially 
suitable crises included: one drought which caused widespread water rationing; two changes in ruling political 
party; and a funding crisis which caused Grenada to default on foreign debt payments.  
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The third project component is to craft solutions (e.g., proposals) which fit well with the 
problem and political streams. The task here is to devise solutions which are politically palatable, but 
still perceived to address specific problems sufficiently to facilitate support from groups such as 
residents, business interests, and technocrats. Also, multiple solutions need to be devised to facilitate 
strategies to seize different types of windows of opportunity. In the Grenadian setting, solutions 
should be devised to address problems related to drought, poverty, business needs such as installing a 
new bottling plant or juice manufacturer, and disease outbreak. Solutions should also be altered for 
different levels of funding availability. The point of the third project component is to provide options 
for brokers to devise strategies to join the three streams. Text Box 6.1 describes one vision for a plan 
to improve Grenadian water management, and publications such as Environmental Advisors (2007, 
2008) contain discussion relevant to development of solutions. 
The fourth and final project component is to anticipate and prepare for crises as described in 
Section 6.2.3. The types of crises anticipated can inform development of draft proposals in the third 
project component, as well as strategies for brokering. For example, preparations can be made to 
build support for a proposed solution by building connections with media outlets and outlining 
potential press releases and talking points for anticipated crises. In addition, legislators can be 
engaged in advance to inform brokering strategies. The point of the fourth project component is to 
facilitate fast action to join the three streams when windows of opportunity occur. The time to 
develop strategies is not when the taps run dry. 
Finally, the project outcome is limited in two important ways. First, it does not necessarily 
produce transformation within a set time frame; rather it prepares policy entrepreneurs to spring into 
action and broker transformation when the next opportunity occurs. Second, the project focus is on 
seizing windows of opportunity. This outcome will free the system from its current rigidity trap and 
move the system to the next phase of transformation. However, seizing a window of opportunity does 
not guarantee successful transformation.  
This chapter has defined the limitations of advocacy and the need for brokerage in efforts to 
transform Grenadian water management. In addition, I provide recommendations to facilitate 
transformation and outline a potential path toward seizing windows of opportunity. The following 
chapter concludes the thesis and synthesizes the study findings.  
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Text Box 6.1: One Vision for Improving Grenada Water Management 
Over $10 million (CAN) flows annually to the English-speaking Caribbean to fund projects with an 
explicit purpose of improving water governance (Section 6.1.1). To date, no significant IWRM 
proposals have been adopted beyond a few small catchment demonstration projects and only one 
nation, Jamaica, has implemented significant water sector reforms of any kind (Cashman 2012, 2013). 
Funding restrictions were identified as one reason measures to improve water management in 
Grenada were not legislated. One solution is to divert a portion of foreign funding to establish and 
maintain a semi-autonomous water management council to consider stakeholder concerns and 
normative aspects of IWRM, develop and implement a water management plan, and provide 
oversight of government actions with regard to water management.  
 
 
 
In the beginning, the Council would function to coordinate the efforts of government agencies 
with regard to water. Over time, integration of water management could be pursued. Two 
mechanisms would give the Water Management Council meaningful authority. First, the Council 
would distribute funding to individual agencies to assist implementation of recommendations. 
Second, the government of Grenada would grant the Council limited statutory authority over 
individual government agencies in exchange for infusion of funding and provision of a service for no 
charge. 
The Council's authority could be limited to water resources management issues and to 
'reasonable' measures. Details of how to carry out Council directives could be left to each agency. 
Enforcement mechanisms could mimic those of environmental legislation elsewhere. For example, if 
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a citizen or group believes an agency is not complying with Council directives they could file a 
lawsuit to force the agency to comply. In turn, if the agency believes Council directives are not 
'reasonable' it could sue to force the Council to revise the directive(s) in question.  
The point of developing a draft proposal for ideas such as the one described here is not to 
devise a 'best' or even a detailed solution, but rather to give brokers something to promote and 
negotiate should an appropriate scenario emerge. This draft solution considers the scenario of a 
funding crisis coinciding with foreign funds being made available to facilitate transformation of water 
management. Other draft proposals should be created to address other scenarios. Many details of the 
arrangement described here are intentionally left to negotiation and refinement to aid brokering and 
facilitate political acceptance. Negotiation points include Council membership and oversight, what 
constitutes 'reasonable,' the magnitude of funding to the Council and to individual agencies, the scope 
of Council directives, and enforcement mechanisms.  
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
The goals of this study are to: (1) advance understanding of SES transformations and MS traps, (2) 
provide insight about if and why Grenadian water management is resistant to change, and (3) generate 
recommendations to precipitate change. To fulfill these goals, four research questions were presented 
in Chapter 1 and subsequently answered in Chapters 5 and 6 (Table 7.1). This chapter brings 
resolution to my dissertation by:  
• synthesizing study findings and discussing them in light of literature discussed in Chapter 2, 
• discussing strengths and limitations of the research, 
• identifying and discussing contributions to academic knowledge, and 
• providing recommendations for future investigation. 
 
Table 7.1. Summary of answers to the four research questions. 
Research Question   Summary of Answer 
1 To what extent is Grenadian water management in a trap?  
Grenadian water management is in a rigidity trap 
characterized by moderate, but weakening persistence. In 
addition, the system is moderately undesirable and stable in 
this regard. 
2 
To what extent is Grenadian 
water management 
transformable? 
 
Grenadian water management has many traits of a 
transformable system. However, the system has relatively 
poor capacity to seize windows of opportunity and to 
navigate a transition to water sector reform. The system 
scored an 11 out of 20 potential points on the framework 
described in Section 5.2.7. 
3 
Do current and recent 
interventions effectively 
foster or utilize 
transformability? 
 
Yes, but with key deficiencies. Interventions helped the 
system prepare for transformation, but did not effectively 
help the system seize windows of opportunity for change. 
4 
Which interventions should 
be pursued to facilitate 
transformation of water 
management in Grenada? 
  
Future interventions should focus on seizing windows of 
opportunity to advance transformation by brokering political 
action to facilitate holistic water management. 
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7.1 Synthesis of Findings 
Water management in Grenada is incomplete, fragmented, and poorly coordinated in some cases. The 
water management system is in a rigidity trap characterized by moderate, but weakening, persistence. 
In addition, the system is moderately undesirable and stable. Despite the label of rigidity trap, 
prospects for transformation are far from bleak. Intervention led by the EU resulted in creation of a 
new water policy in 2007. The legislature formally 'adopted' the water policy to satisfy the EU, but 
did not pass legislation to implement any aspect of the policy. System actors widely regarded the new 
water policy as a positive development, but maintained the key threshold to changing water 
management was passage of legislation to reform the water sector, which had not occurred as of July 
2013.  
Intervention efforts focused on water sector capacity building and advocating for specific water 
policy changes. Advocacy-based interventions persuaded actors throughout the water sector of the 
merit of proposed reforms. However, intervention efforts also lacked an effective strategy to broker 
action at the political level and missed two windows of opportunity to pass legislation to support 
water sector reform. The inability to seize windows of opportunity was the point of failure of 
transformation, which I also consider to be the cause of the rigidity trap described in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 6, I provide five recommendations to facilitate seizing future windows of 
opportunity and move Grenadian water management closer to transformation. The five 
recommendations focus on employing brokerage strategies to join the three streams of problem, 
solution, and politics to precipitate passage of water sector reform legislation (Kingdon 1995 [2003]; 
Olsson et al. 2006). One caveat regarding these recommendations is that they are intended to advance 
the system beyond its current point of failure, and to the second phase of transformation, navigating 
the transition. The navigation phase has many potential problems and success is uncertain. System 
actors focused on legislation being 'the' barrier to IWRM and may be underestimating the challenges 
of implementation. 
Study results confirm that the Olsson, Folke, and Hahn (2004) 3-phase framework of 
transformation had value in explaining transformation of Grenadian water management. In addition, 
my findings confirm the Kingdon (1995 [2003]) three-streams framework to seize windows of 
opportunity as useful to identify obstacles to transformation and causes of traps in the Grenadian 
water management context. The Kingdon framework provided two insights not possible using 
alternative frameworks. First, this framework illuminated the importance of brokering as a distinct 
action from advocacy to bring about transformation. Second, the framework provided a lens to view 
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and describe poor fit between problem and solution, which resulted in poor political support for 
reform and perpetuated the rigidity trap.  
I found synergy exists in considering MS traps and SES transformation together and in 
applying the two concepts to explain the inability to implement IWRM68
7.1.1 Contrast and Resolution with Literature
 in Grenada. First, by 
considering MS traps alone, I was able to verify and describe a rigidity trap in Grenadian water 
management, but with little insight into the underlying causes of the trap. By considering SES 
transformation in tandem with MS traps, I discovered the cause(s) of the rigidity trap were the 
point(s) of breakdown in transformation. This led me to view freeing a system from a MS trap as a 
matter of 'fixing' the point(s) of breakdown in SES transformation, which in turn helped me generate 
novel recommendations to break the rigidity trap. Second, evaluating a system for MS traps, defined 
earlier as a persistent and undesirable state, involves explicit consideration of what persistent and 
undesirable mean and to whom. In the context of Grenadian water management, focusing on the to 
whom part led me indirectly to identify a mismatch between the problem and solution streams and 
helped me determine a point of failure of transformation. These findings provide the basis of several 
generalizable contributions to conceptual knowledge of social-ecological system behavior, described 
in Section 7.3.  
 
My results contrast with previous work in various ways. With the notable exception of a 2010 special 
feature in Ecology & Society, transformation literature since Olsson et al. (2006) has shifted its focus 
away from the three-streams framework (Table 2.3). More recent literature has centered on networks 
and bridging organizations, and in some cases agency, as important means by which to navigate the 
first phase of transformation and seize windows of opportunity. However, I found the networks and 
bridging organizations perspective (Figure 2.7) to have limited use in interpreting my data. I observed 
active networks of system actors, both formal and informal, operating within safe arenas created by 
bridging organizations. Among system actors, I found a high degree of knowledge of water 
management, awareness of the shortcomings of the current water management configuration, and 
trust among actors in different Ministries, the private sector, and NGOs. In other words, all the 
ingredients to seize a window of opportunity in the networks and bridging organizations perspective 
appeared to exist. Nevertheless, windows of opportunity passed and transformation remained elusive. 
                                                     
68 There were two related efforts to transform Grenadian water management. One was termed 'water sector 
reform' and focused on implementing the 2007 water policy, which among other things called for 
implementation of IWRM. The other was an explicit effort to implement IWRM as described in the Road Map 
Toward Integrated Water Resources Management Planning for Grenada (CEHI 2007). To clarify the discussion, 
I refer to both cumulatively as 'attempts to implement IWRM.'  
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I devoted considerable effort to interpreting my data using the networks and bridging organizations 
perspective but could not convincingly explain why Grenadian water management was resistant to 
change. 
I found Kingdon's three-streams framework to be much more useful to explain my data than the 
networks and bridging organizations perspective (Figure 2.2). After growing frustrated in my 
attempts to explain my data using the networks and bridging organizations perspective, I revisited the 
transformation literature. I recognized potential value to interpreting my dataset by using the concept 
of joining the three streams of problem, solution, and politics to seize windows of opportunity. 
However, the 'a-ha moment' of my analysis did not occur until I read the full text of Kingdon's 1995 
book, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, which provides much insight not captured in the 
transformation literature.  
After applying Kingdon's three-streams framework to my data, I began to understand networks 
and bridging organizations as playing an advocacy role in my case study. Kingdon emphasizes the 
importance and difficulties of advocacy to advance each of the three streams. However, in the 
Kingdon framework, the three streams must be joined to seize a window of opportunity. Joining the 
three streams requires a different set of actions described as brokering. When I applied these concepts 
to my data, I discovered extensive advocacy had advanced the three streams, creating a system that 
appeared poised for transformation. However, I also discovered little evidence of brokering, which 
helped explain multiple failures to seize windows of opportunity.  
My endorsement of Kingdon’s three-streams framework is not to say, however, that networks 
and bridging organizations were unimportant. Networks and bridging organizations were effective 
advocates and spread general agreement of the problem and the needed solution among water 
managers and technocrats. One interpretation of my findings is Kingdon's three-streams framework 
provides the 'what' needs to be done to seize windows of opportunity in terms of joining the three 
streams through advocacy and brokerage, while the networks and bridging organizations perspective 
may provide the 'how' to advocate and broker. I return to this notion in Section 7.4 in my 
recommendations for future study.  
7.2 Strengths and Limitations 
Use of a single-case study design with embedded units of study provided an opportunity to conduct 
an especially rich analysis of the case and move beyond 'what' questions to focus on questions of 
'how' and 'why.' However, this also came with the tradeoff of limiting the scope of the study. 
Consequently, study findings are likely more reliable in describing Grenadian water management, but 
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may need to be confirmed by future studies before broadly applying the lessons learned. Yin (2009) 
acknowledges the inevitable tradeoff between depth and breadth of study, and states researchers are 
justified to use the relatively narrow, but deep, case study method when seeking to understand 'how' 
or 'why' social phenomenon work. A temptation exists to apply the lessons from this case to explain 
the failure to implement IWRM throughout the English speaking Caribbean. However, such 
statements would be speculative. I discuss the potential for future research to explore the general 
applicability of study findings in Section 7.4. 
Use of the three-streams framework for seizing windows of opportunity is also a strength of 
this study, as it provided crucial insight, but may have limited application to non-legislative types of 
transformation. In particular, the validity of the three-streams concept depends on the applicability of 
the garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Passage of 
legislative reforms, the key threshold to transformation considered in this case, is perhaps a best-case 
scenario for applying the garbage can model. The garbage can model, and thus the three-streams 
aspect of the MS transformation framework, may break down or not be as effective in other settings.  
My use of the SES transformation concept was a strength of the study, in that it enabled the 
description and explanation of phenomena preventing change in Grenadian water management. 
However, the transformation concept is also limited in that it does not provide a judgment of the 
‘goodness’ of a proposed transformation. Bad transformations are possible and indeed do occur 
frequently; legislatures pass bad laws, voters elect poor leaders, and bureaucracies implement harmful 
policies. Transformation of Grenadian water management is largely a game of legislatively passing 
whatever reform possible, given political constraints. Whether or not politically palatable reform is 
beneficial, and to whom, is another matter.  
Questionnaire data are limited by low response rates to individual questions, due either to 
questionnaire participants not answering individual questions or failure to ask the question. The result 
was to limit the validity of comparisons among classifications of residents. However, the key lesson 
with regard to resident opinion was the solution prescribed by IWRM and water sector reform did not 
match the problem in the eyes of residents. Nevertheless, I was still able to ascertain resident 
concerns regarding water supply from questionnaire data, and to confirm these findings by 
triangulating questionnaire results with observations and interview data from persons associated with 
community-based NGOs. I do not believe low response rates to individual questions adversely 
affected my findings.  
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7.3 Contributions to the Literature 
Before discussing contributions to the literature, I wish to review how I chose specific segments of 
the literature on which to focus and disclose to which parts of the literature I am contributing. Given 
my stated purpose of "determining what interventions are most likely to stimulate transformation of 
Grenadian water management," I found it was especially important to gain three insights specific to 
my setting. First, I needed greater understanding of the water management system, including its 
strengths and its weaknesses. Second, I needed to determine factors contributing to rigidity and 
change of water management. Third, I needed to learn about past interventions to bring about change 
and their effectiveness to discover clues to what might stimulate change in water management. I 
considered many segments of the literature and chose a complex-systems based approach, SES 
resilience, to guide my study to and pursue my stated purpose. Within the SES resilience literature, I 
found the concept of 'resilience thinking,' particularly with regard to MS traps and SES 
transformation, to provide a useful framework to recognize systems which resist change and isolate 
factors preventing change.  
In designing and conducting this study, I encountered boundaries in existing conceptual and 
empirical knowledge. To overcome these boundaries, it was necessary to expand the limits of 
academic knowledge to provide the intellectual space to pursue my stated purpose. I overcame some 
boundaries early; I overcame others later by linking them with empirical evidence collected during 
the study. Cumulatively, this study makes fundamental conceptual contributions to existing SES 
resilience literature, particularly with regard to MS traps and SES transformation, and to a lesser 
degree, to the IWRM literature. This study also makes important empirical contributions regarding 
the Grenadian water management setting. Based on my understanding of the relevant literature, most 
of the contributions by this study are 'firsts.' The following sections discuss study contributions and 
their significance. Table 7.2 provides a summary. 
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Table 7.2. Summary of contributions of this study to the academic literature. 
Conceptual Contributions 
• Provides an explicit term, maladaptive system trap, and simple definition to describe systems 
that do not advance through the adaptive cycle  
• Provides a nomenclature and framework to describe the extent of an observed MS trap 
• Provides a framework for assessing the extent of SES transformability in a system, by 
considering 'progress' through the 3-phase transformation process (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 
2004)  
• Defines the cause of an observed MS trap as the 'point(s) of failure' of SES transformation 
• Identifies a lack of brokering as preventing SES transformation and causing an observed MS 
trap 
• Suggests a strategy of 'fixing' the point(s) of failure in transformation to free a system from an 
MS trap 
• Offers a modification to the ’ball in cup’ heuristic (Gunderson 2000) to include footholds en 
route to transformation 
• Illustrates the merit of considering traps and transformations together 
• Explicitly reframes the IWRM 'implementation gap' (Mitchell 2009) as a challenge to overcome 
an MS trap and foster SES transformation 
• Articulates one cause of the IWRM implementation gap as the failure to join the three streams 
of problem, solution, and politics 
 
Empirical Contributions 
• Results support the three-streams framework (Kingdon 1995 [2003]) rather than the network 
and/or bridging organization perspective of seizing windows of opportunity 
• First study of MS traps on SIDS and one of three to apply resilience thinking concepts on SIDS 
(see Bunce et al. 2009 and Found and Berbés-Blázquez 2012) 
• Explains the failure to implement IWRM in Grenada as the result of interventions which lacked 
an effective strategy to join the three streams to seize opportunities for change 
• Provides a strategy to guide future intervention efforts to trigger transformation of Grenadian 
water management 
• Provides a description of the resident experience with regard to water in contrasting water 
supply settings in Grenada 
• Provides the only description of Grenadian water management with regard to resilience-
thinking concepts 
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7.3.1 Conceptual Contributions 
This study contributes to conceptual knowledge by establishing a way to discuss systems in 'trapped' 
states. Prior to this study, the literature provided little in the way of a definition, or even a consistently 
used term, to describe systems that fail to conform to the adaptive cycle.69
Development of a framework to assess SES transformability was crucial to this study and is a 
key conceptual contribution to the literature. The literature on SES transformation has advanced 
considerably more than that of MS traps. Notably, the literature provides an accepted term and 
definition for SES transformation. Nevertheless, prior to this study, the literature lacked methods for 
assessing the magnitude of transformability within a SES. This study presents a framework to assess 
transformability, developed through trial and error by interpreting data collected in this case study. 
The framework essentially considers progress through the Olsson, Folke, and Hahn (2004) 3-phase 
transformation framework and utilizes the three-streams framework for seizing windows of 
opportunity (Kingdon 1995 [2003]).  
 First, based on the 
literature, I provide a term, maladaptive system traps (MS traps), and definition, a social-ecological 
system in a persistent and undesirable state, for these systems. Second, this study provides a 
nomenclature and framework to describe the extent of an observed MS trap. It is intuitively apparent 
that not all MS traps are equal in their severity or persistence; some systems are in worse states than 
others and escape is more likely in some instances than others. Describing these aspects enables 
comparisons between and among observed traps and identification of traps that may respond better to 
intervention efforts. Nevertheless, prior to this study, literature on MS traps lacked nomenclature and 
advice on how to describe the extent of an MS trap.  
Development of the framework to judge transformation enabled five key conceptual 
contributions to the literature. First, this study defines the cause of an observed MS trap as the 
'point(s) of failure' of SES transformation. Second, this study provides the first description of a lack of 
brokering, political maneuvering, or anything similar as preventing SES transformation and causing 
an observed MS trap. Third, this study suggests a strategy of 'fixing' the point(s) of failure in 
transformation as a way to break free of a MS trap. Fourth, based on empirical observations, this 
study presents a graphical depiction of 'footholds' in the Gunderson (2000) ball-in-cup heuristic to 
reflect points on the side of the cup at which the system can rest temporarily and launch further 
                                                     
69 Prior literature defined four types of 'traps' within the adaptive cycle, but authors avoided referring to traps 
cumulatively and no consistently used term had emerged to describe traps in a general sense. Additionally, no 
consistent definition had emerged for these systems. I base my definition on the two traits common to 
descriptions of trapped systems provided in the SES resilience literature: perceived persistence and 
undesirability, acknowledging that both terms are relative.  
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attempts to reach the top of the cup (Figure 5.1). Fifth, these contributions collectively illustrate the 
merit of considering traps and transformations together.  
The conceptual contributions made by this study fundamentally shape the SES resilience 
literature on traps and transformation. Prior to this study, relatively little work had been done to 
explain trapped system behavior. Now, nomenclature, methods, and conceptual frameworks exist to 
explain trapped system behavior and develop prescriptions to free systems from MS traps.  
With regard to IWRM, this study provides two conceptual contributions. First, I explicitly 
reframe the IWRM 'implementation gap' (Mitchell 2009) as a challenge to overcome an MS trap and 
foster SES transformation. This contribution provides one more 'arrow in the quiver' of researchers 
and practitioners to reframe the IWRM implementation gap when other approaches break down. 
Second, this study articulates the IWRM implementation gap in the Grenadian setting as the failure to 
join the three streams of problem, solution, and politics, which provided insight to bridging the gap. 
At this time, the value of these contributions to the understanding of IWRM is incremental. However, 
these contributions may grow in significance if future research validates these lessons in other 
settings or future practitioners utilize these lessons to bridge real-world implementation gaps.  
7.3.2 Empirical Contributions 
Empirically, this study makes notable contributions to SES resilience literature. With regard to SES 
transformation, study results support the three-streams framework of seizing windows of opportunity 
(Kingdon 1995 [2003]; Olsson et al. 2006) rather than the network and/or bridging organization 
perspective of transformation which has been discussed more prominently (Section 2.2.2.3). In 
addition, to my knowledge this study is the first to study MS traps on SIDS and only the third attempt 
to apply resilience thinking concepts on SIDS (also see Bunce et al. 2009 and Found and Berbés-
Blázquez 2012). The significance of these contributions is perhaps incremental, useful to future 
researchers but not likely to change how researchers think about SES transformation. 
Significant Grenada-specific contributions include a post-mortem on why efforts to implement 
IWRM have failed and recommendations for overcoming obstacles to change. Specifically, this study 
explains the failure to implement IWRM in Grenada as the result of interventions that were overly 
committed to advocacy and lacked an effective strategy to join the three streams of problem, solution, 
and politics to seize opportunities for change. I also present a strategy to guide future intervention 
efforts to trigger transformation of Grenadian water management. These two contributions are 
potentially very valuable to a small subset of readers: people frustrated by failures to implement 
IWRM in Grenada and those interested in how to advance these causes in Grenada in the future. 
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 Additional empirical contributions to the literature involve Grenada-specific observations. This 
study provides insight to the water-related experiences of Grenadian residents residing in 
communities with and without water supply shortages and in urban/rural contexts. In addition, this 
study captures a snapshot of Grenadian water management and describes it with regard to SES 
resilience concepts. The significance of these contributions is perhaps incremental in nature, of 
interest to future researchers, but unlikely to change how people think about Grenada.  
7.4 Future Research 
This study answers one set of questions, but opens new opportunities for future inquiry. One avenue 
of further inquiry is to pursue transformation in the Grenadian water management setting. In the short 
term, research could focus on refining and executing strategies to prompt the Grenada legislature to 
act on water issues. Another option is to pursue 'plowing around the stump' when legislative action is 
untenable and pursue transformation through non-legislative means. In the longer term, research 
could evaluate if applying recommendations made here precipitates transformation of Grenadian 
water management. 
A second avenue for future study is to explore the general applicability of this study. Future 
research could evaluate if my findings are common to other SIDS and beyond water management 
settings. For example, research could evaluate efforts exist to implement 'better' approaches to many 
types of management, such as coastal zone management, solid waste management, and healthcare 
management. In addition, future inquiry could explore if the approach developed in this study to 
judge trapped systems, identify the point of failure in transformation, and addressing it to help a 
system break free of a trap has value to research in other settings.  
A third avenue for future study also applies broadly to research in settings outside Grenada and 
outside water management. Future research could refine our understanding of how windows of 
opportunity are seized and why some windows are missed. Specifically, will research in other settings 
confirm the Kingdon three-streams framework defines a 'what' needs to be done to seize windows of 
opportunity, while bridging organizations and networks provide a 'how' to do it? In addition, future 
research can help define the range of settings in which Kingdon's three-streams framework is valid to 
explain seizing windows of opportunity for transformation.  
7.5 Closing Thoughts 
The cumulative effort described in this dissertation may be thought of as building a path of 
knowledge. Past literature has constructed many well-paved paths for academics and practitioners to 
follow, each setting out to some faraway destination and each with side paths and intersections. 
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However, at some point the paths often deteriorate and become impassable. Next to each path lays a 
pile of bricks, and each brick is differently shaped. The role of the academic community is to utilize 
the pile of bricks to continue the paths; the role of this individual study was to select a suitable path, 
follow it as far as possible, and install a few more bricks on that path.  
In Chapter 1, I identified a faraway destination, advancing water management in Grenada. Then 
I chose a path to follow which I hoped would lead to the destination, resilience thinking. In Chapter 2, 
I carefully followed my chosen path until it deteriorated and became impassible. I examined the gaps 
in the path, the pile of bricks available, and selected specific bricks likely to fit into the gaps. In 
Chapter 3, I explained how I would attempt to place my chosen bricks in the path. Chapters 4, 5, and 
6 describe my attempts to lay the bricks into place, difficulties encountered in doing so, and how I 
eventually fit the bricks into gaps in the path. In this final chapter, I explain the cumulative 
contribution of the bricks placed in the path, how my additions aided me in pursuing my destination, 
and how others might build upon my contribution. 
Advancing the concepts of traps and transformations is potentially of great consequence beyond 
the setting of this study. Globally, social-ecological systems likely caught in MS traps have frustrated 
many efforts intended to improve governance. Often, substantial capacity exists within these systems, 
but change remains elusive. My research shows promise for using the traps and transformations 
concepts to identify points of breakdown in attempts to transform trapped systems and illuminate 
ways to tip them toward change.  
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Appendix A. Semi-Structured Interviews 
Appendix A.1. Participant Codes, Classifications, and Date(s) Interviewed. 
Code Classification Date(s) Interviewed 
1 Academic or Researcher 7/12/2012 
2 Academic or Researcher 6/18/2012; 4/2/2013 
3 Academic or Researcher 4/3/2013 
4 Academic or Researcher 7/11/2012 
5 Consultant - Foreign 7/7/2012 
6 Consultant - Grenada 7/10/2012 
7 NAWASA 7/17/2012; 7/26/2012 
8 NAWASA 7/18/2012 
9 NAWASA 7/18/2012 
10 NAWASA 7/18/2012 
11 NAWASA 7/19/2012 
12 NAWASA 7/24/2012 
13 NAWASA 7/26/2012 
14 Government (non-NAWASA) 7/2/2012 
15 Government (non-NAWASA) 7/10/2012 
16 Political Field 8/1/2012 
17 Resident-Focused NGO 7/23/2012 
18 Resident-Focused NGO 7/27/2012 
19 Resident-Focused NGO 4/5/2013 
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Appendix A.2. Interview Themes and Question Pool. 
THEME: System Variables and Drivers 
First Question: What do you perceive to be the biggest problems facing water SUPPLY in Grenada (or the 
Caribbean if appropriate) 
FOLLOW UP: How about the management end? Do you see any particular issues with water management? 
FOLLOW UP: To what extent do you feel long-range planning (decades) is incorporated into water 
management? 
BE SURE TO ANSWER: What sorts of things do you feel have affected the management of 
water in Grenada (e.g., political changes, hurricanes, foreign funding, internal/external 
projects, policy changes, etc.) 
THEME: Power 
First Question: To what extent have you thought about issues of power in water management here? (does 
anyone have power other than NAWASA? Does NAWASA really have power?) 
FOLLOW UP: Foreign governments and organizations play a considerable role in water management here, 
particularly with specific projects and general "capacity building." Do you have any opinions on their role or 
their effectiveness?  
FOLLOW UP: Have you seen any "informal networks" of people here that have power to influence water 
management? I'm not speaking of corruption necessarily, I'm thinking of something like an informal network 
of friends or friendly colleagues. Have you seen any of this? 
FOLLOW UP: How would you change the system if you were in charge?  
FOLLOW UP: What do you think it would take to accomplish that change?  
FOLLOW UP: What do you think is preventing your vision from being realized? 
BE SURE TO ANSWER: Where the power for change is. 
THEME: Governance 
First Question: How do you view how water is governed in Grenada? 
FOLLOW UP: What types of needs do you see NAWASA as being responsive to? 
FOLLOW UP: To what extent do you see IWRM as having an impact on how water is managed? 
BE SURE TO ANSWER: Governance… As appropriate 
THEME: Historical Profile (and Future) 
First Question: To what extent do you feel this has changed or is changing? 
FOLLOW UP: Do you see any particular developments as having an impact? Such as Hurricanes Ivan/Emily? 
Or changes in policy or political leadership? 
FOLLOW UP: Do you see any changes coming in future years for how water is managed in Grenada? 
FOLLOW UP: What do you know about IWRM in Grenada? To what extent do you feel that has changed the 
way water is managed in Grenada? 
BE SURE TO ANSWER: This is a good place to get into how IWRM came about and if it is "real" 
THEME: Thresholds 
First Question: What do you think it would take to move water management forward in Grenada? 
FOLLOW UP: Discuss possible future scenarios and backtrack what it would take to accomplish them. 
BE SURE TO ANSWER: What thresholds might exist 
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Appendix B. Questionnaire 
 
[Continued next page] 
1a
1b
1c
1d
1e
2a
2b
2c
2d
2e
3a
3b
3c
3d
3e
4a
4b
4c
5a
5b
5c
5d
5e
5f
Do you have any other concerns about your water? (a) yes   (b) no
         If yes, do you feel these concerns have changed, as far as you can remember? (a) yes (b) no (c) not sure
         If so, how?
Does your home have a water storage tank or cistern?  (a) yes (b) no
         If yes, what type of water do you store in it? (a) piped (b) rain (c) both (d) other
         If yes, is your tank/cistern piped into your home? (a) yes (b) no
         If yes, is your tank/cistern water pressurized? (a) yes (b) no, or less than normal    
         If NO, do you think you would be better off with one? (a) yes (b) no (c) not sure
                  If yes, what is the biggest reason you don't get a tank?                                                                                                                                             
.                 (a) cost (b) installation (c) don't know how (d) not sure (e) other (specify) 
Do you experience dirty water? (a) Yes, (b) No, (c) not sure
         If yes, how often? and how dirty?
Do you feel this has changed, as far as you remember?    (a) Yes, (b) No, (c) not sure
         If yes, how?
Do you have any idea why it has (or hasn't) changed?      (a) yes (b) no
Do you have any idea why it has (or hasn't) changed?      (a) yes (b) no
You and your home
What is your age?  (a) 18-24   (b) 25-34   (c) 35-44  (d) 45-54   (e) 55-64   (f) 65+ 
What is your gender?  (a) Male  (b)  Female
What is your main source of drinking water?                                                                                                                                                                         
(a) Public, piped into home   (b) Public, piped into your yard (c) Public Standpipe (d) Rainwater  (e) Other
What type of toilet facilities does your household have?                                                                                                                                      
(a) W.C. Linked to Sewer  (b) W.C. Linked to Septic    (c)  Pit-Latrine/V.I.P   (d) Other
Does your home have internet access? (a) yes (b) no
Your experiences with water
Do you experience water cut-offs in your pipe/tap?  (a) Yes, (b) No, (c) not sure     
         If yes, how often? and how many days/year?
Do you feel this has changed, going back as far as you remember? (a) Yes, (b) No, (c) not sure
         If yes, how?
      Date __________ Grenada Water Management: 
Gauging Resident Opinions
 Interviewer:
      Start time ________  Questionaire ID#  
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6a
6b
6c
6d
6e
6f
7a
7b
7c
7d
7e
8a
8b
*
Resident Views on How to Improve Water
If you were in charge of all water supply in Grenada, would you try to change the current system?
         If yes, how?
OBSERVATION ONLY, do not ask.    Type of material of outter wall of dwelling:                                                                        
(a) Wood, (b) Concrete/Concrete Block,   (c) Wood & Concrete, (d) Stone, (e) Brick, (f) Makeshift
                                        Survey Finished  Finish Time ___________
         If yes, do you feel they are effective?  (a) yes (b) no (c) not sure
         If yes, what problems?   
If NAWASA improves the water, do you think the rate increase is a good deal? (a) Yes (b) No (c) not sure
If you had to choose between having NAWASA cut the water to your home or the phone company cut your 
phone for one day, which would you rather have cut?                                                           (a) phone (b) water 
Do you feel NAWASA would listen & try to respond to a suggestion or a complaint about your water?                                      
(a) Yes   (b) No  (c) I don't know 
Overall, are you satisfied with your water supply from NAWASA?  (a) yes (b) no (c) not sure
Other Organizations & Projects
Besides NAWASA, do you know of anyone else you could contact if you have problems with your water?                                              
(a) yes (b) no (c) not sure
         If yes, how?
Do you know of any community groups or foreign organizations trying to improve water supply in Grenada?                                                
(a) yes (b) no 
         If yes, who?
Recently the water rates went up. Has this caused you any problems?  (a) Yes (b) No (c) not sure
NAWASA
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